The enlargement and reform debate has started, and some progress should be possible before the European elections in June 2024, says Anna Lührmann, minister for Europe in the German Foreign Office.
After a lost decade-and-a-half that saw the establishment of German predominance, there is now the acute danger of Berlin and Paris applying rejected ideas to enlarging and reforming the EU: Four principles for a future-oriented EU expansion and adaptation.
After 10 years, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has done little to achieve its original aim of better integrating the People’s Republic’s western periphery. That might change in its second decade, with Beijing paying more attention to routes that circumvent Russia.
Seven years after the Brexit vote shocked Germany, it’s time for the two countries to rediscover common ground. Unfortunately, Berlin is sitting on its hands.
The German government faces a weighty decision: Should it block France from providing cheap energy to its industrial companies? Or should it introduce its own electricity subsidy for its struggling industrial sector? The decision will show us if Berlin is ready to embrace an economic Zeitenwende.
Overall, Europeans are in favor of a bigger European Union. However, there are huge differences when it comes to individual countries and whether or not it requires reforms.
The European Union has grown used to thinking of China as a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. Europe’s priority now should be ensuring that Beijing does not become an enemy.
British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has failed to build on the Windsor Agreement; relations with the rest of Europe are stagnating. His presumptive successor, Labour Party Leader Keir Starmer, is unlikely to fundamentally change direction, either.
The Sino-Russian relationship has become a more intractable problem for the transatlantic alliance. The West should continue to concentrate its efforts on Beijing.
Beijing and Moscow are aligned when it comes to fighting the US-led world order. But beyond this common aim, there are many points of bilateral friction.
As South Korea positions itself as a “global pivotal state,” the country’s dual pursuit of a strong US alliance and greater strategic autonomy may well serve as a lesson for Europe.
Germany runs the danger of belatedly arming itself for yesterday’s wars. It needs to fundamentally change the way it thinks about military-technological innovation.
From Tokyo’s point of view, the European and Asian strategic theaters are becoming interlinked. Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated Japan’s defense spending and prompted a fundamental change in its strategic culture.
The German economy is already paying the price for having put the green energy transition on the backburner. To win the future, it needs four “Ds”: Decarbonization, digitalization, decentralization, and democratization.
