The administration of US President Joe Biden came into office determined to focus Europe’s attention on the threat posed by the rise of China. Washington soon discovered it was pushing at an open door. The European Union shared similar economic concerns and was eager to engage. Dialogues quickly sprung up between the United States and the EU over economic security vis-à-vis China, with Washington even adopting the EU’s “de-risking” moniker.
When it comes to Europe’s security role in the Indo-Pacific, however, Washington has been scratching its head about what it wants Europe to be doing militarily in the region. And “Europe” does not only encompass the EU and its member states, but also the United Kingdom and Norway.
Washington’s default foreign policy instinct has been to get Europe to prioritize what it prioritizes. Europe’s role is to play Robin to America’s Batman. On his first trip to NATO in March 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken pressed the transatlantic alliance to focus on China, mentioning the country in his remarks more than 10 times and Russia on just four occasions. NATO duly sought to oblige. Yet following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine less than a year later, it has also become clear that Europe cannot afford to play Robin to America’s Batman in the Indo-Pacific. Europe must focus on defending itself, not on fighting a potential war in the Indo-Pacific.
That does not make Europe an irrelevant actor in Indo-Pacific security. On the contrary, Europe can play an important security role in the region. But to play that role, Europe needs to build up its geopolitical credibility and act in a more concerted and cohesive manner. Europe needs to act more as Europe and should leverage its immense security cooperation potential to deepen its relationships in the region. In doing so, Europe would be laying the groundwork for a much larger European military presence in the future.
Europe’s Potential
The European Union has the economic, political, and strategic interests of a great power, but it lacks the military means to match or reflect its interests. The EU is a market the size of the US and China, and 40 percent of its trade passes through the South China Sea. The EU is also the largest foreign investor in the region. Europeans have a tremendous interest in preserving a free and open Pacific, ensuring Taiwan’s status, countering Chinese coercion, and developing its diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with countries in the region.
However, Europe has two twin problems.
First, it lacks the hard power to be relevant or taken seriously. The crux of the problem is that Europe should be able to play an important military role in Asia, but it has so under-invested in defense over the past two decades that the priority for Europe needs to be on rebuilding its ground forces. Moreover, global military powers like the United Kingdom and France are incredibly overstretched. France has territorial obligations in the Indo-Pacific and the UK has long had an extensive presence. While both bring assets to bear that could aid US forces, particularly in subsurface warfare, both militaries are spread too thin. The UK, in particular, has suffered under a decade of austerity that followed a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and these combined have decimated the British army.
Second, Europe may have the interests of a great power, but it rarely acts like one. The EU’s collective economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific is deep, yet the lack of diplomatic coordination and integration with broader foreign and security policy means this influence is not converted into diplomatic leverage. When the EU acts on behalf of Europe, such as on trade or economic security issues, it is quite impactful. But the EU’s collective economic power is disconnected from Europe’s foreign policy and military tools, which are largely wielded by Europe’s states, which individually lack geopolitical clout. Europe is thus profoundly confusing to deal with. The European sum is greater than its parts.
Six Steps for Europe to Take
Thus, for Europe to play a more impactful role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe should focus on the following areas.
First, focus on reducing the demand for US forces in Europe. Europe’s major contribution to security in the Indo-Pacific would be in securing Europe, the Mediterranean, and potentially the Red Sea and the straits of the Babel Mandev. In short, Europe could play a critical role deterring Russia, protecting the naval flanks, and ensuring maritime access for Europe and the US into the Indian Ocean.
The danger for Europe is that should war erupt in the Indo-Pacific it would become all-consuming for the United States. The US would inevitably move certain critical military assets out of Europe and would devote all its defense industrial production to supporting US forces. That would leave NATO severely weakened. Russia’s current defense industrial mobilization means that as soon as fighting subsides in Ukraine, Russia can focus on recapitalizing its forces. A war in the Indo-Pacific could create an opening for Russia to take advantage of an overstretched and potentially absent America. The European defense objective should therefore not just be to meet NATO capability targets, which assume robust American involvement. But to invest and integrate its military efforts so that it can defend itself irrespective of US engagement.
Second, Europe’s defense industrial base could be a tremendous asset to the United States in an Indo-Pacific contingency. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need for defense industrial capacity. Europe and the United States should ensure they can leverage each other’s production potential. War games done at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) show that the US would run out of precision-guided munitions very quickly in any conflict, yet the US defense industrial base lacks the ability to quickly ramp up production. This represents not only a strategic vulnerability for the United States but also for Europe, as the US will not resupply Europe’s F-35s with munitions, if American forces are in need.
Thus, Europe needs to not only build up its own stockpiles, but in ramping up defense industrial production it should ensure a degree of standardization so that the US military could also potentially turn to European factories in a conflict scenario. Additionally, America’s defense industrial challenges are particularly acute in shipbuilding, an area where Europe is comparatively much stronger. Europe should propose to the United States a grand AUKUS-like proposal for transatlantic cooperation on shipbuilding. (AUKUS, concluded in 2021, brings together Australia, the UK, and the US to facilitate Australia’s development of nuclear-propelled submarines.)
Third, Europe should seek to build diplomatic and security ties where the US has struggled. For instance, the US has made significant progress in its relations with both India and Vietnam, but both relationships are struggling to fully turn the historical page. Furthermore, some countries in the region are hesitant about getting too close to the US for fear of being seen as taking sides in the new great power competition.
The EU and European states can therefore play an important role as an alternative partner. Europe is often perceived as an economic actor and a self-interested trading partner, rather than a focused geopolitical actor. There is an opportunity for Europe, however, via its member states and the EU to target its engagements, to exploit the perception of Europe being a more benign collaborator. France, for instance, has become an important defense partner to India. The EU should also leverage its comparative advantage based on the fact that as a bloc it has a relatively short history and therefore lacks the same historical baggage that of former colonial powers, such as France, the Netherlands, and the UK.
This does not mean Europe should pursue some Gaullist third way between the US and China. On the contrary, Europe should seek to build leverage and influence in the region to advance its interests, including preserving peace and stability and countering Chinese coercion, all of which align with US strategic objectives. The United States would of course prefer that countries buy from US companies, but it is better that they buy from a European ally than from a Russian or Chinese manufacturer.
Fourth, Europe should be a loud advocate of a rules-based international order. It can be diplomatically awkward for the United States to forcefully defend the Law of the Sea Treaty and push back on China for upending the rules-based international system, as Washington has not ratified the treaty. Europe has more credibility and could be an even stronger voice. Furthermore, the US turn against free trade agreements also creates an opportunity for the EU to potentially join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), as the UK has done, which would expand the EU’s presence and profile.
Fifth, Europe’s military engagement needs to exude strength and build Europe’s credibility. Europe’s naval missions to the Indo-Pacific are an important tool to demonstrate Europe’s seriousness. Too often, European naval deployments have lacked any strategic purpose. Instead of exuding strength, they showed hesitancy, reflecting a sense that Europe is there not to send a message to China, but to appease the United States. That may be changing. Italy recently sent a carrier strike group to the region, which Alessio Patalano explains was not just about “flying the flag” but was part of a broader engagement strategy and “to underwrite [Italy’s] ambition to develop a robust relationship” with Japan.
Germany’s recent passage through the Taiwan Strait and its participation in the biannual US-led RIMPAC multinational naval exercises also demonstrates a new degree of seriousness. Perhaps most impactful would be for the EU to set up a naval mission for the region. This would coordinate Europe’s naval activities under an EU flag and would critically link the chief deterrent Europe has vis-a-vis China, Europe’s economic strength and its single market, with its military power, sending a much stronger message.
Lastly, Europe should use security assistance and defense industrial cooperation to build ties and lay the groundwork for a more robust European military role in the future. There is already significant defense industrial cooperation between Europe and the Indo-Pacific—French arms sales to India; the UK, Italy, and Japan are working together on a future next generation fighter jet; and South Korea has sold tanks and howitzers to countries like Poland and Estonia.
The political-military relationships established through arms sales and security assistance often help undergird broader diplomatic engagement. Europe also has the potential to become a key security assistance partner in the region. The EU’s European Peace Facility, which has been used to help arm Ukraine, is one such vehicle that Europe could use to provide security assistance. This would be of significant added value to allied efforts in the region, as the US has struggled to establish robust security assistance partnerships with many Indo-Pacific countries. Additionally, as Europe modernizes its forces, it will inevitably divest equipment. While much of this equipment may head to Ukraine, naval ships, for instance, will not. Old US coast guard vessels form the backbone of the Philippines navy, providing a model that Europe could emulate as it divests naval ships over time.
The goal for Europe—and for the US—should be for Europe to become another significant player in the region. That requires Europe to develop its military capacity and be seen as a credible military actor first at home and then abroad. Over the next decade, Europe will need to deepen its relationships with Indo-Pacific countries and to act more as one, as Europe. This would fundamentally transform relations as well, as Europe would then be acting and operating not as an American dependency, but as a great power ally.
Max Bergmann is Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center for Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.
