Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine represents not only a rupture of Europe’s security order, but also demonstrates the transformation—and increase in importance—that the space domain has undergone in recent years. The war, which began with a cyberattack on an American satellite communications provider that affected Ukraine’s military communications, exemplifies the growing role of space in modern warfare.
A Risky New Space Age
Space-based capabilities have long since become strategic enablers for multi-domain operations by providing satellite communications (SATCOM), positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The war also illustrates the paradigm shift whereby the former state monopoly of critical space technology has given way to the innovative power of private actors and their contribution to national security, all the more so as space technology is dual-use in nature.
Commercial companies, most notably Elon Musk’s Starlink, are influencing the war by providing Ukraine with open-source information and other essential services to such an extent that the war has already been characterized as the “first commercial space war.” Russia’s related threat that commercial space assets used for military purposes could become “a legitimate target for retaliation” and Moscow’s reported plans to deploy nuclear-armed weapons in space underscore both the growing risk posed by counterspace technologies and the potential for space to become a battleground—a no longer entirely unrealistic scenario that led NATO to declare that “attacks to, from or within space” could trigger Article 5.
The increased dependence (and therefore vulnerability) of digitally networked societies and modern militaries, along with the new characteristics of the space domain, are embedded in the international strategic competition. This competition, particularly between the United States and China, is evident not only in the worldwide modernization of military space programs but also in national initiatives to bolster domestic space industries and in the pursuit of pivotal civil space milestones. At the same time, international regulation of the use of space lags behind political and technological developments. Also, there is no comprehensive international consensus in sight to rein in the arms race that is unfolding beyond the atmosphere.
Europe’s Promising Foundations
This highly contested, congested, and competitive orbital environment also poses serious security challenges for the Europe Union as European member states own space assets and heavily depend on the free use of space for civilian, economic, and military purposes.
At first glance, Europe is in a promising position to strengthen European defense and contribute to overall security as a traditionally experienced and capable space power. In terms of relevant space assets, Europe boasts a range of sophisticated systems and resources—both those of the European Union and those of the more space-capable member states such as France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The EU’s space systems include Galileo, which constitutes Europe’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). It is more accurate than the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS) and can provide highly encrypted services to security forces through the Public Regulated Service (PRS). The European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) serves to enhance the precision of the navigation satellite system.
In contrast, Copernicus represents the Europe Union’s primary Earth observation system, providing crucial data through the monitoring of EU borders and critical infrastructures. The next major initiative, if it materializes in the face of mounting obstacles, is IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite), a multi-orbit satellite constellation to provide secure SATCOM and reduce external dependence on the likes of Elon Musk.
Enabler of Europe’s Strategic Autonomy
On a strategic level, the EU recognized space as a strategic domain in its 2022 Strategic Compass. In 2023, the first EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense reaffirmed Europe as a global space power and highlighted the critical role of space for European strategic autonomy.
Marking a clear shift from the previous predominantly civilian and research-oriented approach to a security and defense-focused EU space policy, the strategy proposes a series of measures to, first, promote a common understanding of space threats among member states; second, increase the resilience of European space systems by providing a common framework for intra-European coordination and information sharing, ensuring the security of relevant supply chains, and reducing Europe’s dependency on critical technologies; third, improve the EU’s ability to respond to space threats through the use of member states’ Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and space exercises with a focus on solidarity mechanisms; fourth, optimize the use of space for defense by better exploiting synergies in public-private cooperation to develop dual-use capabilities with military requirements in mind; and fifth, strengthen engagement with like-minded partners on international norms for responsible behavior in space and deepen cooperation with the United States and NATO on space security.
In addition to the security-oriented strategic direction, several EU initiatives aim at closer cooperation within Europe to build up critical defense capabilities. In this context, EU member states are working together in four space-focused PESCO projects that explicitly address the development of space-related capabilities: Defense of Space Assets (DOSA) to enhance operational efficiency, a European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network (EU-SSA-N) to develop an autonomous and interoperable Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability, a Common Hub for Governmental Imagery (COHGI) to improve the exchange of classified imagery, and the EU Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS) to advance EU military PNT capabilities.
Overall, these steps are promising if they are backed by sufficient political will at the national and European levels. In order to successfully address the centrality of space-based capabilities for security and defense in the long term, however, “typically European” obstacles need to be overcome: a lack of coordination and divided responsibilities among a variety of national and institutional actors; the difficulty of ensuring coherence in the face of different strategic approaches, levels of technological know-how, and capabilities across Europe; an overly fragmented industrial base; a clear underinvestment compared to other relevant space actors; and the pronounced dependence on external actors, in particular the United States. This leads to the following priorities:
Enhancing Intra-European Coordination and EU-NATO Cooperation
First and foremost, there is no single European space policy, but rather a multitude of actors, leading to diffuse governance structures. The defense sector is particularly fragmented. On the one hand, since the military use of space is a sensitive area of national security, states develop their military space capabilities at the national level, with the differences in the sophistication of national space capabilities and in strategic approaches to responding to threats to their satellite systems complicating comprehensive action at the European level. Not to mention the multiplicity of relevant European actors within (e.g., the European Commission’s newly established Commissioner for Defense and Space or the EU Agency for the Space Program/EUSPA, the European Defense Agency/EDA or the European External Action Service’s Space Task Force) and outside (European Space Agency/ESA) the EU.
On the other hand, Europe’s heavy reliance on US space-based capabilities requires close cooperation with Washington, which is why NATO, as the central transatlantic forum, is at the center of defense policy considerations. At the operational level, exclusive formats such as the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) have emerged among capable space nations, with only a few European states participating.
It is therefore imperative to reform and strengthen intra-European coordination in order to develop a common understanding of space-related threats and to ensure a coherent stance among European member states, particularly France and Germany, whose competing space industrial interests are putting them increasingly at odds. It is also necessary to enhance EU-NATO cooperation, without creating unnecessary redundancies, but bolstering the resilience of European satellite systems and increasing joint SDA.
Strengthening the European Space Industrial Base
So far, the European space industry has been well positioned and internationally competitive, but Europe risks losing more and more ground to the United States and China. As detailed in the recent Draghi report, Europe has world-class space capabilities and the EU space program supports more than 250,000 highly skilled jobs and generates €46-54 billion in added value.
However, for a number of reasons, including a severe lack of both private and public investment, especially in R&D, the absence of a unified regulatory framework for the space sector, which the EU Space Law aims to provide, and insufficient coordination among European states, between the space industry and military demands, Europe’s competitive gap with other actors is bound to widen.
The World Economic Forum estimates that the space market will be worth $1.8 trillion by 2035. It is not only for economic reasons that Europe should be interested in participating in the growing market. With the commercialization of space, it is no longer the states themselves, but the private sector that is the main driver of innovation in space technology, including in the military sector.
The war in Ukraine impressively underscores the current dependence of states on commercial actors for the provision of critical capabilities. This growing civil-military interdependence makes it imperative for Europe to improve civil-commercial-military cooperation in the development of critical advanced space capabilities and adopt policies to exploit dual-use synergies.
Increasing Investment in Space and Defense
While Europe has the relevant know-how and industrial ingenuity of its dynamic NewSpace sector, the lack of investment and access to finance threatens the European space industrial ecosystem. Whatever statistics you look at, it is clear that Europe’s spending on space is too low by international standards to remain competitive.
While the EU and its member states spent about $13 billion on space in 2023, they were surpassed by China with $14 billion and the United States with $73 billion—a trend likely to continue in the US and China. The discrepancy is even more pronounced for space defense expenditure. Globally, government spending on space security and defensereached an all-time high of $58 billion in 2023. The top spenders were the United States at $38.9 billion, China at $8.8 billion, Russia at $2.6 billion, and France at $1.3 billion. Japan, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Germany also made substantial investments, each surpassing $500 million
While commercialization has lowered the access barriers to space, space technology, especially R&D, remains a costly endeavor. Significantly more investment in space in general, and in space defense in particular, at both the national and European level is essential (e.g., through the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU’s budget, starting 2028). Furthermore, it is important to increase incentives for private investment and reduce barriers for both small and medium enterprises or start-ups.
Lastly, cost savings (and greater interoperability) should be sought through more European cooperation, for example in developing next-generation space defense capabilities through the European Defense Fund, or through joint procurement initiatives for space defense capabilities using the newly established instruments (e.g., EDIRPA).
Hardening European Space Systems and Expanding Critical Capabilities
The number of launches and objects in space demonstrate the superiority of the United States in space and Europe’s dependence on its capabilities for defense. Nevertheless, European space systems such as Galileo and Copernicus make an important contribution to European security. The focus should therefore be on improving the resilience of these systems against attacks.
At the same time, Europe is well advised to expand its space-based capabilities to reduce external dependencies—not to become independent, but to add value to European security alliances and underscore Europe as a reliable and attractive partner. This applies in particular to European SSA, SATCOM, responsive space, and launch capabilities, where reliance on the US and formerly Russia has been evident since the start of the war in Ukraine and has challenged Europe’s independent access to space.
No Time to Stay on the Sidelines
The importance of space for Europe’s security and defense can no longer be denied. The trends and characteristics of modern, space-based warfare, already evident in Ukraine, will play an even greater role in the future, and Europe must prepare itself. No individual EU member state will be able to meet these challenges alone, and Europe will certainly only be able to do so in cooperation with its partners, first and foremost the United States.
However, Europe needs greater autonomy to enhance the overall space-related resilience of the transatlantic partnership and to increase its defense readiness in the event of conflict. To quote French President Emmanuel Macron: Europe has missed many important strategic moments in the past when it comes to space security—it can no longer afford to remain on the sidelines.
Andrea Rotter is the Head of the Foreign and Security Policy Division and the Deputy Director of the Academy for Politics and Current Affairs at the Hanns Seidel Foundation, a think tank based in Munich. This article expresses the author’s personal views.
