Russian President Vladimir Putin first reacted to Donald Trump’s re-election as US president took place during a discussion at the annual Valdai Forum, where Russia’s leadership likes to discuss the country’s place in the world with a global auditorium. There, Putin praised Trump as a “great man.” He also made clear that he sees Trump as the person to strike a deal over Ukraine, ending the war on Russian terms.
Directly after the forum, the Kremlin confirmed that Putin’s conditions for ending the war have not changed. They consist of recognizing the Ukrainian Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as Russian territory—some of which are currently not even under Russian control— as a precondition for any negotiations. This chimes with the fact that some advisors to the incoming US president have already made clear that Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014, is lost to Ukraine, without realizing how crucial the peninsula is for Russia to attack Ukraine and control the Black Sea.
In the meantime, the Russian army is trying to conquer as much as territory as possible in eastern Ukraine to get in a good bargaining position for the moment when Trump is inaugurated on January 20. Putin even invited North Korean soldiers to help push Ukrainian soldiers out of parts of the Kursk region, which Ukraine occupied in August, in order to have more Russian soldiers available to conquer more Ukrainian territory. This might be a future model for Russia, since a real mobilization of Russians would be highly unpopular domestically; fewer and fewer people are joining the army, even for high salaries. Outsourcing the fighting to countries such as North Korea seems like a smart move from the Kremlin’s point of view and an option to keep the war going at limited costs.
Germany Looks Inward
All this is happening at a time when the German government is falling apart. After sacking Finance Minister Christian Lindner, whose Free Democrats (FDP) have left the government as a consequence, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has now announced a date for snap elections; they will take place on February 23. While the pressure on Ukraine is growing “to end the war” in a very difficult military situation, Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, is unable to act, never mind lead.
There is no agreed budget for 2025 in Germany and currently no fiscal space to step in should the incoming Trump administration cut off Ukraine financially. In the current budget plans, the provisions made for Ukraine assistance are not nearly enough, and we might again see a period where no ammunition and military equipment for Ukraine is ordered for next year.
At the same time, Germany is likely to turn more inward-looking, while populist parties such as the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance) and the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gain ground with slogans about ending the war; both parties recently surged in regional elections in eastern Germany. In a recent poll conducted by the Körber Foundation, 49 percent of western Germans agree that Ukraine should continue the fight to regain more of its territory, while 40 percent say it should trade “territory for peace.” In eastern Germany, 52 percent want to see Ukraine giving up territory as part of a “peace deal,” while only 38 percent support further fighting. It shows how divided German society is on this question, which will definitely become a key issue of the election campaign. Massive Russian disinformation efforts supporting polarization on this topic can be expected.
Berlin’s Weak Position
At the same time, demanding that Chancellor Scholz end the war and start negotiations with the Russian leadership, which also comes from parts of Scholz’ Social Democrats (SPD), is naive, especially from Putin’s point of view. For the Russian president, the only person to negotiate with and end the war is the US president. This is the person who guarantees European security and not the outgoing German chancellor, who has been unwilling or unable to lead Europe since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.
The recent attempt by the German chancellery to send an emissary to Moscow to explore a possible willingness for negotiations has led to nothing. There is also no momentum for negations, which, as outlined above, is defined by the situation on the front line. According to the Körber survey already mentioned, only 46 percent of Germans wants to see their country play an important role in international relations.
However, without improving its bargaining position by investing 3 to 3.5 percent of GDP or more in defense, as Scholz’ Defense Minister Boris Pistorius is now asking for, and a willingness for a stronger engagement and leadership in the EU and NATO, there is very little room for Germany to play a role in ending the war in Ukraine. The announcement by Polish Premier Minister Donald Tusk over the weekend that he wanted to organize discussions with France and the United Kingdom on European defense, but not (yet) inviting Germany, shows where Europe is moving on security policy.
For the Kremlin, Things Are Going Well
From the Kremlin’s perspective, things are going well in Germany, since signs of reengagement are coming from Berlin. The next German government will likely consist of a coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the SPD. That means the next foreign minister is very likely to be a Social Democrat (SPD leader Lars Klingbeil is already being mentioned), something Moscow has had a good experience with. What we are already seeing is a creeping return of elements of the Ostpolitik of the past decades—basically seeking a relationship of mutual benefits with Putin’s Russia, based on the assumption that economic cooperation would eventual lead to a democratic transition in Russia, and thus peace in Europe. There have been renewed attempts to bring disgraced former chancellor and Gazprom lobbyist, Gerhard Schröder, back in from the cold; also, pro-Russian German lobbyists have been meeting with Russian officials and think tankers in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku recently to explore cooperation.
Against this background, is looks as if a serious Zeitenwende, certainly in terms of Germany’s Russia and security policy, is becoming more and more elusive. Germany will be much absorbed by its ongoing economic crisis and deindustrialization due to high energy prices and the protracted economic transition half-heartedly started during Angela Merkel’s chancellorship.
Germany’s next chancellor, likely CDU leader Friedrich Merz, will have to focus on improving the country’s economic situation. If elected, he will end up facing the same budget crisis as Olaf Scholz and will have to decide between more debt or budget cuts. The decision on where Germany is moving in terms of its spending policy will define its ability to act in European politics and on Ukraine.
A New Role
Olaf Scholz’ Zeitenwende speech of February 27, 2022, notwithstanding, Germany still has to redefine its role in Europe and the world. The outgoing government has made only baby steps toward improving Germany’s position in Europe and the world. Since multilateral institutions are in decline and Donald Trump will further erode them by no longer having the US act as guarantor of the global institutional order, authoritarian and transactional leaders such as Vladimir Putin will gain more influence. The willingness to act and to lead in crisis situations and to use all available instruments, including military ones, to enforce interests will dominate global politics even more.
For Berlin, all this is bad news. If Germany wants to help bring about an end to the war in Ukraine and to “freeze” the current military contact line, as some Trump advisors now suggest, it and other European countries will need to send troops to guarantee such a ceasefire. At the same time, the US would arm Ukraine to deter further Russian aggression. This would likely have to be financed by Europe, which is already struggling to find the required financial resources for beefing up its defense. Will Germany and other European countries be willing to pay for arming Ukraine and to send troops to monitor the line of contact? This will likely be the test of Germany’s willingness to really support to end the war, and also redefine its role in European security. It’s now up to the next German government to decide.
Stefan Meister leads the Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
