The US presidential election in November will possibly be the most momentous election in the history of transatlantic relations since 1945. If the Democrats do win—and they have a much better chance of winning after President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race—Europeans can breathe a sigh of relief. Although Kamala Harris being elected president would be no reason to sit back—her government would certainly not put as much focus on transatlantic relations as Biden’s—Europe would gain four years to invest heavily in its own security and that of Ukraine.
However, there is still a chance that the Republican Party will win and if Donald Trump becomes president again, with an anti-European JD Vance as his running mate, not only will support for Ukraine be uncertain, but so will the future of NATO.
Despite having a long time to prepare, Europeans are still finding it difficult to correctly assess just how bad for European security and the future of transatlantic relations a possible second Trump presidency could be. They need to develop joint options for action. Instead, they are vacillating between alarmism and appeasement.
Those who wish to appease often express themselves in platitudes, “It’s only four years” or “Last time it wasn’t so bad in the end.” In doing so, they ignore the structural changes in the Republican Party and in American foreign policy. They see Trump as a historical accident, not an entrenched trend, and hope that the checks and balances in US politics will work.
The alarmists, on the other hand, see Europe slipping into a war with Russia sooner or later, abandoned by the United States and NATO. They predict either the end of American democracy or even the end of the entire West. Alternatively, they see Europe, and especially Germany, which has no nuclear weapons, entering a new era of appeasement toward Russia and China, unable to defend itself. In response to this uncertainty, European visitors to Washington have been trying for several months to gain access to the Trump wing of the Republican Party and predict what policies Trump would actually pursue.
A New Approach Is Needed
However, trying to predict Trump’s policies if he were to win is the wrong approach. His actual positions would largely depend on personnel decisions he might make and which of his advisors would have the greatest influence on him at any given time. Trump already pitted his team against each other in his first term of office. At the same time, the various ideological groupings in the Republican Party are trying to make use of Trump for their own agendas. As the ultimate showman and reality TV star, Trump also knows the power of a surprise twist.
Instead of speculating on what policies Trump would pursue in office, Germany and Europe should prepare for how Trump would make policy and develop a blueprint for how Europeans can deal with his tendency toward extortion and his transactional political style. Instead of potentially courting Trump’s favor and allowing themselves to be divided, following his rhetoric of “good” and “bad” Europeans, Berlin and Brussels urgently need to invest in their own ability to act quickly and cohesively.
Germany and Europe are not yet institutionally and procedurally prepared to deal with a second Trump administration that would use all available leverage against Europe to achieve its goals.
What will happen if a Trump-led White House pulls out all the stops and puts pressure on the Europeans on several fronts at once, such as Ukraine, NATO, and China policy? For example, if Trump were to convene a peace summit for Ukraine and negotiate a bad deal, should Europeans reject this deal even if Trump threatens to jeopardize NATO? What if Trump were to demand drastic sanctions against China from Europe or announce the end of all American aid to Ukraine if the Europeans do not support his deal? Confronted with such conflicting objectives, key questions arise. What priorities should the European Union member states pursue? Who speaks for Europe?
The European Union must not be paralyzed by these dilemmas. It is important to prioritize, proactively formulate offers for Trump and coordinate them with each other. If he wins, Europe will receive less and less attention in Washington. Indeed, it will probably be the similar if Harris wins, compared to the Biden presidency. This also means that a European offer must be on the table at critical moments when there is an opportunity to exert influence.
Europeans need new ways to coordinate European policy across departments and institutions. Up to now, a silo mentality has dominated: At the national level, the finance ministries deal with debt and the defense ministries with security. The European Commission is responsible when it comes to introducing tariffs on trade with China, NATO is there to organize European defense, and everyone takes a little bit of responsibility for aid to Ukraine. It cannot go on like this.
Moreover, it is already clear that Trump would also have supporters in Europe. Some are ideologically close to him and some want to opportunistically exploit his political instincts, for example, to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible or to weaken the EU.
More interdepartmental action and coordination is therefore needed at national level in Berlin. As there is still no German National Security Council, there needs to be a transatlantic committee at state secretary level that meets regularly, similar to the one that was set up during the war in Ukraine, to develop policy recommendations between the ministries, weigh up conflicting objectives, and coordinate communication. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’ divided coalition will urgently need this kind of additional level of coordination to deal with a possible second Trump term.
The “Sept” Partnership
More action and coordination are also needed at a cross-departmental and cross-institutional European level. To this end, we propose—analogous to the “Quad” (United States, Australia, India, Japan) and “Quint” (United States, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) partnerships in international politics—the establishment of a “Sept” arrangement at the European level: regular, informal coordination between a European representative of NATO, the European Commission, and the key countries France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom.
This European “Group of Seven” must act as a kind of “rapid deployment group” to jointly develop red lines, prepare negotiations with the US government, and proactively identify policy areas in which Europe can cooperate with Trump. The composition of this group should make it easier to find majorities for the proposals developed in Europe and to pool expertise and ideas from all areas—from trade to security. Cooperation with Italy is central to this, hopefully involving Giorgia Meloni in European coordination processes at an early stage and thus keeping her out of a destructive transatlantic-populist alliance with Trump, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán & Co.
A Trump Peace Conference: What to Do?
What could such a new form of coordination look like in individual cases? How could it bear fruit?
A possible scenario: Trump is elected and plans a peace conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky immediately after being sworn in. He is keen to get a photo of himself standing between the two as they shake hands—the photo that is supposed to earn him the Nobel Peace Prize and his voters the promised withdrawal from expensive European affairs that do not matter to them in any meaningful way.
Trump demands that the Europeans join in and support any deal he negotiates. He forces Ukraine to the negotiating table with the threat of stopping all aid and threatens Russia with the doubling of US military aid to Ukraine. At the summit, Putin demands the lifting of all sanctions without a “snapback” mechanism and the withdrawal of all NATO troops stationed in Eastern Europe after May 1997. In return, he will agree to the ceasefire demanded by Trump; he plans to play for time in the hope that his war economy will give him an edge over the West in the medium term.
Europeans would be faced with key questions: Would they accept such a peace conference as unavoidable? Would they try to influence the negotiations in the background? And could they withstand the pressure from Trump, with his demands for European support for his peace plan in return for American security guarantees in NATO? The concrete scenario of a “dormant” NATO is popular enough in Republican circles for Europeans to take such a threat seriously. How can Berlin, how can Europe prepare itself to respond to such a scenario with unity?
At the national level, state secretaries from all ministries could coordinate and unite to prepare an increase in support for Ukraine and national defense spending. After the potential shock of a Trump election, such a budget and the associated fiscal compromises—with regard to loosening the debt brake at the national level or picking up common debt at European level—might be easier to push through among the population.
At the European level, the “Sept” partnership would meet to draw up two new promises. The first, to Ukraine, that Europe stands ready with weapons and sanctions and that any violation of the Trump deal by Russia would result in more support from the Europeans. The second, the promise to Trump to increase European defense spending to 3 percent by 2035 (and to invest a set proportion of this in American weapons systems and a proportion financed by the EU in European projects) and to reposition the alliance in such a way that the US can gradually withdraw from Europe and orient itself toward the Indo-Pacific.
Trump would want to present himself as the US president who finally got the Europeans to drastically increase defense spending. He does not see the value proposition of NATO, but rather regards it as an account that others should pay into. So why not proactively come forward with a high target? This should be an easy decision for the European, because they have to invest anyway—not because of Trump, but because of Putin. And also, because it is very likely that all US presidents in the coming years will distance themselves more from Europe.
It is quite possible that these initial steps will not be enough, and that Trump would not accept such a “deal” on European security without a China component. He could, for example, demand that the Europeans increase tariffs on Chinese imports and impose drastic sanctions against China’s support for Russia.
The China Factor
China is likely to dominate a second Trump presidency. For him, the main issue is to change unfair practices in trade and economic relations between the US and China. The Republicans, as well as many Democrats, are dissatisfied that the Biden administration has not exerted more pressure on Europe to distance itself from China. Trump’s main instinct here is to avoid being shortchanged by the Europeans, who do good business with China and at the same time want to see their security guaranteed by the US.
In such a scenario, coordination between a European representative of NATO and the European Commission within the “Sept” would be particularly important. Where is there scope for the Europeans to prevent China’s support for Russia without entering into a trade war with China? Which Republican-led US states are reliant on economic cooperation with Europeans and may therefore be willing to exert a moderating influence on Trump? And which tariffs might even be in Europe’s interest?
The “Sept” can prepare a European consensus, which can then develop traction and facilitate the cross-departmental coordination of state secretaries at national level. In this way, Germany could also rid itself of its position as the brakeman in Europe’s China policy.
Despite Harris’ current strong polling, the election is still too close to call. Europe must prepare for a second term of Donald Trump not only in terms of content, but also organizationally and institutionally. A European “Sept” format can prepare a proactive European policy with clout.
Instead of freezing somewhere between alarmism and appeasement and frantically trying to predict Trump’s decisions, Berlin and Europe could develop concrete tactics to position the continent intelligently for a possible second Trump term. This includes thinking creatively about forums for cooperation, leverage, and ways to exert pressure. The aim must be to counter Trump's transactional political style with self-confidence and European unity, instead of moralizing and complaining.
What If Harris Wins?
If Kamala Harris wins the November elections, those efforts at coordination and preparation would not be in vain. Of course, this would be a relief to Europeans—Harris believes in the international order and cares about Ukraine and America’s European allies. But there is a difference between optimism and recklessness. Europeans should not repeat the mistake they made in 2020 when Joe Biden was elected, mistaking US efforts to repair what had been broken under Trump for a return to business as usual, i.e., maximum reliance on the United States. All the structural factors—demographic, geopolitical, and domestic—that are pulling the US away from Europe remain in place.
A Harris-Walz administration will not be guided by the same sense of nostalgia for the transatlantic relationship that Biden inherited from Cold War times. Instead, it will regard China as the top foreign policy priority—everyone in Washington does—and expect the Europeans to alleviate the US burden in Europe.
It is worth remembering that even if Biden had not dropped out of the race and gone on to win a second term, he would not have been able to continue putting Ukraine front and center, as other crises, chiefly in the Middle East, are taking up political attention in Washington. This will be true for a Harris-Walz administration, too. Harris has gained extensive foreign policy experience during her time as vice president—on Europe, the Middle East, and Asia as well as on issues that younger voters care about, such as climate change and technology. Based on these experiences, in the fourth year of her mandate, she spoke at the 2024 Munich Security Conference about working with allies and partners not based on the virtues of charity, but on strategic interest. Europeans should keep this in mind.
And finally, US presidential elections come every four years. Trumpism is not leaving America. And if Europeans do not want America to leave Europe, they must act now.
Sophia Besch is Senior Fellow in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), based in Washington, DC.
