In October, the leader of Germany’s Christian Democrats (CDU), Friedrich Merz, quoted French philosopher Michel de Montaigne during a speech he gave in the Bundestag: “Fear is the mother of all cruelties.” Directly addressing Olaf Scholz, he continued: “Mr. Chancellor, it is time for you—it is also time for us to do so—to overcome your fear of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin in order to really end the cruelties in Ukraine together now.”
Merz, who is also his party’s “candidate for chancellor” in early parliamentary elections scheduled for February 23, claimed that his rival Scholz is by no means the self-styled chancellor of prudence who carefully weighs the risks of escalation in the Russia-Ukraine war. Rather, he has been seeking to portray Scholz as the chancellor of fear who gives free rein to Russia’s atrocities.
Similar accusations had already been leveled at the chancellor by two leading CDU MPs, Roderich Kiesewetter and Norbert Röttgen. According to Kiesewetter, the chancellor’s refusal to supply Ukraine with advanced weapons systems is purely an act of “self-deterrence.” He also accused Scholz of “appeasement toward the aggressor.” Röttgen, on the other hand, is convinced that Scholz is afraid of a phantom: “Putin has fully escalated, with all imaginable prohibited and criminal measures,” he said in October.
Such statements render a reasonable debate about the risks of escalation impossible. We should be able to argue about different risk assessments without accusing the other side of fear or appeasement. At the same time, it is misguided and polemic to denounce Merz as playing “Russian roulette” with Germany’s security by advocating a different approach to Russia’s war, as Scholz did in his speech at his Social Democrats’ (SPD) recent election campaign launch. Nor is it appropriate to discredit voices that are, on balance, more willing to take risks vis-à-vis Russia as “hotspurs” (Scholz) or “caliber experts” (German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, also of the SPD).
No Absolute Truth
All sides should recognize that there is no absolute truth when it comes to assessing the risks of escalation in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. If, like Scholz and US President Joe Biden, you have settled on avoiding a full-scale war between NATO and Russia as your most important goal, then this position can well justify restraint. The fact that Scholz has never boldly embraced the goal of “Ukrainian victory” may also have to do with concerns about escalation if Russia really finds itself with its back against the wall. It would be dishonest to simply brush these concerns aside as a form of self-deterrence. What we can—and should—do in the public debate is make our own perspective and the underlying assumptions as plausible as possible.
In this context, it is fanciful to claim that Putin has no options for escalation. Escalation is about much more than the use of nuclear weapons, which is indeed not a plausible risk as long as the situation on the battlefield is not outright catastrophic for the Kremlin. But Moscow has proven, especially in recent months, that it has many other levers to pull.
Russia could, for instance, intensify its attacks against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine or deploy new weapons systems (such as the Oreshnik medium-range missile it already used in the attack on Dnipro). It could also intensify its campaign of sabotage and terror in other European countries. The recent arson attack on a cargo plane owned by the German logistics firm DHL or incidents directed at undersea cables are just two examples of suspected Russian sabotage.
Moscow could also increase its support for proxy enemies of Europe and the United States. Moscow is already supporting the Houthis in Yemen, and Ukraine has already attacked the Russian naval headquarters in Crimea with Western missiles and is targeting support lines deep inside Russian territory. So why—the Kremlin's logic might go—shouldn’t the Houthis attack Western warships with Russian missiles? It doesn’t take much imagination to picture the spiral of escalation if such an attack were to destroy a Western warship. To point out these escalation risks is neither self-deterrence nor, as Kiesewetter claims to have diagnosed, “classic German escalation hysteria.”
A Higher Risk
Germany’s most senior NATO general, Christian Badia, recently assessed the “risk of an unwanted escalation” as “many times higher” than it was during most of the Cold War—and he hardly did so as a typically German hysteric. He did so as a realist. Badia was also right to point out the dangers of so-called hybrid warfare, including sabotage attacks. There is no well-rehearsed script for these incidents. In the words of Badia, “too many gray areas and the resulting miscalculations are the greatest risk.”
At the same time, risk assessments and the conclusions political leaders draw from them in the process must always be subject to an open debate. Chancellor Scholz recently defined his guiding star as “combining maximum support for Ukraine with maximum prudence.” That sounds like an exact formula, but it is at best a starting point for a discussion about how to properly implement such a maxim. And here, too, Scholz has demonstrated blind spots. In a recent speech at the SPD’s headquarters, he stated: “For almost three years, Putin has been escalating—every single day.” Yet it is hard to make the case that the German chancellor has come up with an all-out convincing response to what he calls Putin’s daily escalation.
A Lack of Initiative
For starters, Germany under Scholz has failed to ramp up its own defense-industrial base with the necessary urgency. Doing so would have signaled resolve to the Kremlin, both in terms of supplying Ukraine and when it comes to Germany’s willingness to invest in re-arming the German and European militaries. Since this is a step Germany could have taken with zero escalation risks, there is nothing on the “prudence” ledger that would have cautioned against this.
As far as dealing with escalation risks, one also needs to take into account the consequences a lack of acting out of concern about escalation may bring about. What’s more, certain scenarios warrant taking the initiative: It may be necessary to threaten escalation first in order to prevent further escalation from the other side. Depriving oneself of options for action would be unwise.
Yet, that is precisely what the chancellor is doing when it comes to the much-discussed delivery of longer-range missiles and their use against military targets on Russian soil. Scholz’ hesitation on this issue is understandable; after all, the risks are considerable and cannot simply be shrugged off.
Sharing these concerns, President Biden has also been steadfast in his restrictive attitude toward long-range missiles. That is, until he recently, and after much hesitation, authorized the limited use of the ATACMS system, specifically in the Russian region of Kursk. This once again reignited the German debate about whether Scholz should be inspired by this move and deliver German Taurus missiles (which are significantly more powerful than ATACMS). Scholz would do well to study the reasoning behind Biden’s recent change of heart. This is how Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, explained the president’s decision:
“It’s about the fact that Russia has gone to another country from another part of the world, North Korea, brought in thousands of their troops to the front lines, and … added them to this war. That is a change, a significant change, a change that in fact we warned the Russians about before they did it and said, if they did it, we would respond. And, of course, we will respond.”
This recent military strategy is a good example of how an offensive move can be made to prevent further escalation: In this case, authorizing the limited use of ATACMS, specifically in the area where North Korean troops are deployed, was meant to thwart further escalation via deployment of additional foreign troops.
Ruling out the delivery of longer-range missiles once and for all (as the chancellor has done) is a move that is not so much the height of prudence as it is the epitome of self-restriction. Doing so unnecessarily deprives one of leverage in the face of daily Russian escalation—as observed by Scholz himself. Unilaterally and preemptively renouncing the option of longer-range missile deployment (supposedly in the name of predictability) might well be understood by the Kremlin as a free pass to continue with escalation. The German chancellor was left looking rather sheepish when Putin intensified the attacks on Ukraine the day after Scholz’ perfectly sensible phone call with the Kremlin leader.
The Use of Threats
An alternative course of action would be this (a response also advocated by Friedrich Merz): Germany and its allies convey to Putin that Moscow increasing its attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure would be met with a collective response of phased Taurus missile deliveries and a gradual lifting of range restrictions. Such a threat should not be staged as a public showdown with a 24-hour ultimatum (as suggested by Merz); rather, it should be disclosed to the Kremlin in a series of direct talks. If this scenario includes Germany acting in concert with allied nuclear powers, then Scholz’ argument that “Germany is not a nuclear power and therefore we cannot do this” does not apply.
Of course, such a course of action carries significant risks, not least on the domestic front. It is likely the German government would need a Bundestag mandate to deploy Taurus missiles or face a showdown at the Constitutional Court if it decides to deploy them without a mandate. Putin and the anti-Ukraine forces from both the left-nationalist Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) and the extreme right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) would be quick to exploit this as supposed proof that Germany has chosen to become a direct party to the war.
There is also the question of whether the Ukrainian leadership can be trusted with the use of the Taurus missiles that could reach Moscow, especially in a scenario in which its position on the battlefield deteriorates significantly. These are valid concerns. But if these concerns lead you to decide against the delivery of longer-range missiles, then you need to come up with an alternative idea of what leverage Germany can use together with allies to try to constrain Putin’s escalation choices.
Avoiding Cheap Shots
Last but not least, the credibility of such an approach depends on whether US President-elect Donald Trump plays along with NATO after taking office on January 20. Crucially, such a course of action could very well be in Trump’s wheelhouse. After all, Trump has stated that he would threaten Putin with a significant increase in military support for Ukraine should Putin prove uncooperative when it comes to possible negotiations.
One thing is clear: During election campaigns, cheap shots like “self-deterrence” and “Russian roulette,” when referring to sensitive questions of war and peace, are themselves the “mother of all cruelties.” Black-and-white thinking about the risks of escalation does not do justice to the difficult judgment calls that the next German chancellor will face after the elections on February 23, be that Scholz or Merz (or even Greens leader Robert Habeck). It is high time for all protagonists to engage in a more nuanced debate.
Thorsten Benner is director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin.
