At the time of writing, the consequences of Ukraine's Kursk incursion for the overall war remain uncertain. Yet, what currently seems to be a short-term success in the Kursk region cannot hide the overall bleak strategic situation of Ukraine and Russia’s military success in other places, such as in the Donbass. If the war continues as it had before, it is still likely to end in a Russian victory brought about by Ukrainian exhaustion.
Slowly but steadily, Russian troops are advancing, especially in the Donetsk region, and will occupy even more Ukrainian territories. In the long periods of material shortages due to low Western support, such as when the United States’ aid package was stuck in Congress, Ukraine has lost high numbers of its military personnel built up over years. The recent new mobilization law may alleviate the personnel problem somewhat, but will not solve it. Ukraine has also struggled to systematically build and expand defense fortifications. Russia is continuing to systematically destroy the livelihoods of the population, especially critical infrastructure such as energy supplies, and is therefore trying to de-populate the country.
Ukraine lacks the means to counter this: There is a substantial shortage of air defense systems, modern fighter aircraft (despite the recent delivery of a first batch of F-16 jets), ammunition, precision strikes capabilities, drones, counter-drone defense, but also maintenance and repair, replacements of destroyed equipment and additional supplies, such as infantry fighting vehicles.
Russia has switched to a war economy, ramped up its arms production and it is intensifying its cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and China. It has at least temporarily solved its personnel problem and is mobilizing domestic political support by presenting its invasion of Ukraine as a war by the West against Russia. Moscow is convinced that it can win this war over time through attrition.
However, it is not a foregone conclusion that Russia will win. Four factors are determining the course of the war: the secure supply of materials, including spare parts and maintenance; personnel (numbers and training); economic and financial support to keep the Ukrainian state running; and political support, such as that in the United Nations, of the G7, NATO, and the European Union. In all areas, Ukraine largely depends on the West, with the extent and speed of support having a direct impact on the front line—both negative and positive.
Toward a Ukrainian Success by Military Means?
Many experts, including the authors, have argued that it is possible to strengthen Ukraine militarily in such a way that it can exert pressure on Russia and force Moscow to change its cost-benefit calculation and engage in serious negotiations. Wars rarely end with clear victories. More common is a stalemate: The parties end the fighting because they expect more from a cessation than from a continuation (which involves the risk of defeat). The combination of sanctions, arms supplies, and political efforts by the West are aimed at making ending the war more attractive to Russia than continuing to fight. Ukraine should thus be put in a position to end the war on its own terms.
This has been partially successful. Ukraine has managed to liberate part of its land occupied by Russia since February 24, 2022, to regain partial control of the Black Sea and to put so much pressure on Russian positions in Crimea that Moscow has had to redeploy forces. In August 2024, Kyiv took Moskow by complete surprise and occupied Russian territories by advancing into the Kursk region. As to the Russian army, it has not yet been able to strategically exploit its numerous territorial gains and its air campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Besides, Moscow's advantage in terms of personnel and resources is not sustainable. If Russia were to continue to deploy its resources as it did in recent months, its army could run into problems in the course of 2025 and encounter serious limitations by 2026. It is suffering high losses, consuming more equipment than its industry can reproduce despite ramping up arms production, and depleting its stocks. In view of the high number of Russian casualties, the incentive systems for recruiting soldiers may no longer be sufficient in the future and further mobilization might be required.
If Ukraine’s supporters in the West were to mobilize the necessary resources to ramp up the production of equipment and ammunition quickly and in a coordinated and long-term manner, while lifting restrictions (e.g., on the use of long-range weapons systems) and underlining this with political messages, there would be a chance of forcing Russia into negotiations without preconditions.
Realistic Developments
However, Western reactions since February 24, 2022 cast doubt over whether Europe and the United States are willing or able to do so. It is true that they have supported Ukraine since 2022 to an extent unimaginable before the Russian invasion. However, the deliveries often arrived too late (e.g., battle tanks), or after lengthy debates (e.g., ATACMS). Others took a very long time (F-16s), or have been subject to conditions (long-range systems); and they almost never arrived in the numbers required. Now it is to be feared that support will not only stagnate, but will decrease.
Firstly, there is a lack of funding: The months of wrangling in the US Congress over aid for Ukraine at the beginning of 2024 have shown that this could be the last US package. Even if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the presidential election in November, the US is likely to push the Europeans to take up a greater share of the burden of the war. The Europeans would have to provide much more money for Ukraine in the future, both bilaterally and via the EU budget. Yet, many see themselves as unable to do this and the idea of joint European borrowing for armaments for Kyiv is facing considerable resistance. Support for Ukraine is already being played off against other budget items and is being instrumentalized in election campaigns.
Secondly, crucial supporters such as the US and Germany have made it clear that while they want to weaken Russia in Ukraine, they do not want to defeat it, because they fear that a such a defeat could lead Moscow to vertically escalate the war (in other words using nuclear weapons) or to break up as a state. They seem to weigh these risks as higher than the danger of a Ukrainian defeat and its consequences. While they don’t want the invasion to pay off for Moscow, they are drawing red lines in their military support for Ukraine (instead of enforcing red lines toward Russia). Eventually, it is unlikely that the West will be more willing to take risks in the future and support Kyiv militarily in such a way and scope that it will be in a position to not only defend itself but also liberate more territory and end the war on its own terms.
Thirdly, the West and Ukraine have not succeeded in isolating Russia internationally. Even beyond Iran, North Korea, and China, many countries in the so-called Global South are not prepared to exert pressure on Russia to stop President Vladimir Putin's war of aggression. At the conference on peace in Ukraine on Switzerland’s Bürgenstock mountain in June 2024, countries such as Brazil, India, and Saudi Arabia didn’t sign the final declaration, even though it was boiled down to a few points.
It is therefore unlikely that Kyiv will receive enough military, political, and financial support at the right time to not only reach parity with Russia, but also to gain a superiority that would force Moscow to the negotiating table. Perhaps this opportunity has already been missed because Western support has come too late and has been so meagre, with Ukraine having to pay an extremely high price in human lives and equipment in the meantime, which is almost impossible to make up for.
Yet, even a prolonged “muddling through” scenario, where the support remained at current levels, would not be enough to force Russia to make concessions. It would likely result in the slow but steady bleeding of Ukraine.
A look at the current figures and plans also shows that less support, rather than more is predicted. Unfortunately, this makes another scenario plausible, in which Western support drops massively from 2025 (especially if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election).
If the quality and quantity of support remains at current levels or decreases, Ukraine is likely to be forced to end the war on Russian terms—i.e., a dictated peace or capitulation—and at least 20 percent of Ukrainian territory and population would remain under Russian occupation for the unforeseeable future. Without NATO membership or bilateral/multilateral security guarantees offering protection equivalent to Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty, a resulting Ukrainian rump state would have no chance of security, or of political or economic survival. In view of the uncertain situation, a demographic and financial exodus could be expected. Weakened in this way, Ukraine would be an easier target for the next Russian attack.
We expressly recommend substantially increasing the support for Ukraine. However, there is currently nothing to suggest that Western supporters are working toward this. These prospects force us to consider how a worst-case scenario can be prevented in this case. How can Ukraine emerge from the war as a sovereign state, as strong, secure, and prosperous as possible, even if it is unable to restore its territorial integrity in the short term due to a lack of support?
How to Prevent the Worst-Case Scenario?
Russia's conditions for negotiations amount to a Ukrainian capitulation. These include the demand that the four oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—along with Crimea—which Moscow annexed in violation of international law but does not fully control, be recognized as Russian. Moscow is also demanding the replacement of the democratically elected government in Kyiv (“denazification”), neutrality, and the reduction of the Ukrainian army to a size that makes defense impossible (“demilitarization”). The result would be a vassal state under Moscow’s control. However, this would not mean stability for Ukraine (and Europe); on the contrary, there would be a risk of the country sinking into chaos.
Even if Ukraine were able to refuse some of the demands and retain an independent government, a temporary surrender of Russian-occupied territories in return for an end to the fighting would be likely. The price would be enormous. Ukraine would have to accept that its population there would be permanently subjected to Russian occupation. As already visible in currently or formerly occupied Ukrainian territories, Russia aims to eliminate everything Ukrainian through its brutal Russification policy. It distributes Russian passports, forcibly recruits into its army, bans the Ukrainian language, deports, tortures, and murders—and brings in Russian settlers. The longer the occupation lasts, the more Russia is effectively incorporating these territories into the Russian Federation and erasing Ukrainian identity.
A forced end to the war with a “land-for-armistice” deal would fundamentally shake Ukraine’s political order. President Volodymyr Zelensky recently emphasized that territorial integrity is essential, but that military means are not the only way to restore it. Above all, he emphasized that only the Ukrainian people could decide this issue. Currently, the majority is still against ceding territory. Support for doing this in return for peace and independence has risen from 10 percent (May 2022) to 32 percent (May 2024). However, rejection remains high: 55 percent are against territorial cessions (82 percent in May 2022). A large majority still refuses to accept the Russian conditions.
However, ceasefire agreements have the greatest chance of success if they are supported, actually implemented, and any violations are sanctioned. Should the Ukrainian government attempt, or be forced to sign such an agreement against the will of the majority of the population, it be unlikely to survive politically. There is therefore a high risk that agreements without the support of the population and without reliable safeguards for a free Ukraine could end in domestic political chaos. Russia could use this as an excuse to continue the war (now under better conditions for Moscow) and it could mean the end of a sovereign Ukraine in the long term.
If Western supporters want to prevent a total defeat of Ukraine, they must ask themselves—and discuss this with the Ukrainian government—under what conditions might a ceasefire agreement even be conceivable for Kyiv? When could a Ukrainian government accept an end to the fighting, even if Ukrainian territories remained temporarily occupied by Russia? And how could Kyiv declare this a success (or at least not a defeat) when it would be obvious that Russia’s military logic had prevailed?
Three criteria are conceivable: Politically, the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign and democratic state would already be a success—because Russia wanted to destroy it. Economically, it is about secure reconstruction, irreversible integration into the EU, and thus the prospect of prosperity. Thirdly, in terms of security policy, Ukraine could ensure deterrence and defense against Russia by joining NATO after an end to the fighting or through bilateral and multilateral security guarantees, which would offer an equivalent level of defense to NATO’s article 5. This should be demonstrated by stationing Western troops in Ukraine, preferably from the nuclear powers, and the adaptation of NATO’s planning, structure, forces and posture. The security agreements already signed with the G7 since January 2024 states don’t offer this kind of guarantees—they promise support but not defense. These kinds of reliable guarantees would only come into force after a ceasefire—but they should be given in advance in order to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position.
In short, sovereignty and prosperity secured by Ukraine’s irreversible anchoring in Euro-Atlantic organizations could be an opportunity for Kyiv to stop the war under conditions that previously seemed unacceptable. At the same time, it must be clear that the annexation of the occupied Ukrainian territories will not be recognized.
As with the course of the war, Western partners also have a decisive influence here: because they have the instruments to enable sovereignty, security, and prosperity through offering Ukraine NATO and EU accession, reconstruction, and bilateral cooperation, thus making it clear that Russia has failed to achieve its central goals. So far, however, Western states have not credibly offered such a package: Ukraine has been given the prospect of NATO and EU membership, but both are a long way off. Of course, the accession of a country one fifth of whose territory is occupied carries major financial, legal, and security policy risks. Therefore, the existing considerations regarding “phased accession” to both institutions should be developed further. Until the accession to NATO and EU becomes a reality, Ukraine needs sound and reliable transitional solutions.
The issue of security is central as long as the political conflict between Russia and Ukraine persists. Without security, there can be no reconstruction, and without security and prosperity, democratic processes risk coming under pressure. A demilitarized Ukraine would be just as vulnerable to Russian aggression as a neutral Ukraine. As long as Russia sticks to its revisionist goals, rejects an independent Ukrainian identity and statehood, and has the means to pursue these goals militarily, an independent Ukraine will remain threatened. Any pause in the fighting then risks becoming merely an opportunity for the Russian armed forces to take a break to regenerate.
Ukraine rightly has little trust in Russian promises, as Moscow has repeatedly broken them in the past. If Kyiv were to accept a ceasefire or comparable agreements, the Western states would have the responsibility to ensure the implementation of these agreements and Ukraine’s sovereignty. Thus, an end to the fighting would not mean less, but more support for Ukraine; and it would need to be long-term and cover the three substantial areas of Ukraine’s survival: security, sovereignty, and prosperity.
Serious Consequences
Without Western help, Ukraine would no longer exist as an independent state today. But the approach of using military pressure to force Moscow to the negotiating table and to make concessions has not been implemented consistently. Ukraine did not receive the military support it needed and, unfortunately, there is little to suggest that this will change in the foreseeable future. In the event of a Republican victory in Washington, the situation could deteriorate dramatically. Ukraine could be forced to accept an end to fighting on Russian terms. Western supporters should work with Kyiv to prepare for such a scenario to avert a complete Ukrainian defeat.
A total failure would have serious consequences for Ukraine in particular, but also for Europe. Both the EU and NATO would emerge from the war weakened. They would have to invest even more in their own security, defense, and resilience. Millions of refugees would come to Western Europe from a ruined and, in parts, Russian-occupied Ukraine. Russia's leadership would feel both vindicated in its policy and convinced that waging war is not only legitimate but also effective. Other countries might conclude that they too can achieve their goals through war, move borders by force and, if necessary, use nuclear weapons to secure wars of conquest. Particularly for Europe, which depends on the globally functioning flow of raw materials, goods, and finance, a world in which the law of the strongest overrides international law could become a normative and economic catastrophe.
The West must therefore ensure that Ukraine emerges from the war stronger and with a positive vision for the future, even if it does not succeed in liberating all the territories occupied by Russia. Neutrality is not a solution for Kyiv—it would only increase its vulnerability. The West must irreversibly integrate the country into Euro-Atlantic structures in the long term in order to ensure the survival of a sovereign, prosperous, secure, and democratic Ukraine.
The long-term costs of a Russian success in terms of human suffering, rebuilding and securing Ukraine, defending Europe and the economic and international order could be significantly higher than the support required now. And the West risks losing credibility. The countries of the Global South have registered the West’s promise to support Ukraine “for as long as necessary.” They will measure this promise against the outcome of the war and conclude how serious the West should be taken when promising to be a security provider.
Claudia Major is head of the International Security division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.
Jana Puglierin is senior policy fellow and head of the Berlin Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
