In Germany, it is only since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that most people have realized how wrong they were about Russian President Vladimir Putin. Finland was neutral for a long time and only recently became a NATO member. Do you see any parallels?
Finland has been the target of Russian and Soviet aggression for much of our history. After the Second World War, we were lucky enough to retain our independence. We had to cede territories, but we were able to develop as a democratic market economy. Our Baltic friends fared differently, and this is important when we talk about the future of Ukraine today. The people of the Baltic states lived under Soviet occupation for 50 years, in a “peace” that deprived them of their personal freedoms and impoverished them, while tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, were deported.
Finland had not been neutral, in the way in which we would interpret the word, for 30 years when we joined the European Union. At least from the time of the Lisbon Treaty, with its assistance and solidarity clauses, it was clear that we would help a member state if it was attacked. So, for Finland, joining the EU was also a security issue from the outset, not just an economic one.
And yes, some people in Finland also believed in “change through trade.” We tried to build economic ties and supported Russian civil society in the hope that Russia would also become a true democracy.
Nevertheless—and this is where Finland differs from Germany or Sweden—we also consistently invested in our own defense, because we knew that the day could come when it would become clear that Russia was different and would not develop as we had hoped. That day has come.
Finland has a strong army, defense readiness is high, and society is considered very resilient. If you had to draw a “European map of resilience,” which regions would you mark as particularly resilient?
A very good question. In a true alliance, within NATO and the EU, there can of course be no “weak” or “strong” regions because, as a community, we are all strong or not. We very much hope that in NATO all allies will at least achieve the promised defense spending of 2 percent of GDP, regardless of who becomes the next president of the United States. And we hope that new European Commission will also place particular emphasis on strengthening our defenses against hybrid attacks by Russia. These fall less within NATO’s remit and have increased significantly in recent months. These include disinformation, sabotage, cyber-attacks—not so much against Finland, but against other countries. We should really recognize that we are all in the same boat. And we need to develop this resilience, not just in the traditional military direction.
Recently, there has been much talk of the strategic weight within Europe shifting to the east and north. Prominent foreign policy voices come from Poland, the Baltic states, Sweden, and your country. Do you also see this shift? And what does this mean for Europe in the longer term?
I do not see a shift in the sense that this would change the balance in the European Union. Of course, firstly, it is very important to listen to the countries that have long invested not only in their own security and defense, but also in that of the entire EU when it comes to security and defense policy issues. Secondly, we seriously recognize that Russia will be an existential and unfortunately—as it looks now—a long-lasting threat to us all. We must draw the necessary conclusions from this.
It is therefore very important that we become stronger as the EU and as NATO. Four years ago, in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, the European Union set up a financial rescue package that was larger than anything we had ever seen before. And all EU member states contributed according to their economic strength. Of course, we were all affected, but the southern member states were particularly hard hit, and they received a particularly large amount of help.
Now we should show solidarity in the other direction. It is not the case that only individual states, for example on the eastern flank, were affected by Russia's aggression. The Russian disinformation campaigns are directed primarily against Germany, for example. We must recognize that we can only become strong against this threat if we work together. Funds must be found for this in the EU budget.
To remind you of the scale of things, the COVID-19 rescue package had a volume of €750 billion, our aid for Ukraine amounts to much less. And if you look at how much individual member states have “paid in,” for example investing in military defense or deterrence, then the differences are still very, very large.
How do you view the presidential election in the US? Is it enough for Europe to keep its fingers crossed for Kamala Harris?
I am a big fan of democracy and I value the outcome of any free, democratic election. I assume that elections in the US are conducted fairly and transparently, and you can only respect the result. So, in that sense, I'm not rooting for anyone.
Perhaps another Donald Trump presidency would present us Europeans with greater challenges than would be the case if Kamala Harris were to win. But Trump has previously demanded very clear defense spending of at least 2 percent of GDP from NATO partners, for example, and we can only support that. If you agree on this, as NATO did in 2014, then you also have to deliver, which is important for the political credibility of the alliance too.
In fact, we have very little influence on what the future US president intends to do. Relations will continue and I don't really expect any major changes within NATO. However, it is very important that we concentrate on what we can do ourselves, which is to strengthen Europe. We spoke earlier about resilience—this is also about safeguarding our values, democracy, human rights and the rule of law for the future. We need to become stronger economically and remain competitive. As far as the development of new technologies is concerned, we in Europe have been falling behind for 10 to 15 years. That worries me in two respects. We can only stand up for our values if we are economically strong. In addition to these military capabilities are already very closely linked to technological expertise.
My message to our friends on the other side of the Atlantic would be that we need to focus more on free trade and come closer together instead of relying on protectionism. That is the key to ensuring that the transatlantic alliance will remain economically strong.
What would you like to see from Germany in terms of security and defense policy?
First of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks for the way that Germany has stood up, not only for Ukraine but also for our common security over the past two years. I naturally hope that Germany will continue along this path. The turning point is not just a matter for Germany, but for all of us. For Finland, this means joining NATO; we must now fully integrate ourselves into the structures. The new era demands a lot from all of us.
I would like to see Germany play a clear leadership role in Europe, especially when it comes to security and defense. We think very similarly when it comes to the most important things, the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Together, we must defend these as vigorously as possible. And this also involves Ukraine. Anyone who talks about “freezing” the conflict should bear this in mind. We want nothing more than peace in Europe, and I say this as the next chair of the OSCE. Finland will take over the chairpersonship in 2025. We need peaceful alignment in Europe and peace in Europe. But at what price?
Russia has switched to a war economy and is arming itself very strongly. The state-controlled Russian media are systematically building up a hostile image of European states, which, according to our analysis, is very strongly directed against Germany and even France.
If we force Ukraine to the negotiating table from a position of at least relative weakness, this will have consequences. How can we trust Russia, which has been waging war on Ukraine for 10 years? We really need to think about what such a “peace” would mean for us. If you give Russia what it wants today, it will come back tomorrow and demand even more.
This interview was conducted by Martin Bialecki, Henning Hoff, Uta Kuhlmann, Luisa Latella, and Joachim Staron.
