Defense has always been among the most problematic—if not the most problematic—chapters of Franco-German cooperation. The incompatibilities between the two countries go back far in time. Attempts at bringing them closer, including joint defense industrial projects, have never really had the desired effect. As the current flagship undertakings, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) again illustrate, they tend to result in conflict, frustration, and disappointment rather than greater overlap in strategic outlook. Whether the plan, announced in May, to develop long-range missiles together with Italy and Poland yields any different outcome remains to be seen. While France and Germany have long been able to play the role of an “engine” for European integration in other policy areas, Franco-German leadership in defense never truly materialized. Decades of cooperation notwithstanding, France and Germany have not developed a shared strategic outlook or even a joint vision for European security.
Yet, Europe is in desperate need of leadership when it comes to security. With a war raging in Ukraine, Russia continuing to pose a serious threat, and the strength of the transatlantic link more uncertain than ever, the question of who can provide guidance arises even more acutely. Since February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the thinking in both Berlin and Paris seems to have evolved: While Germany announced its “Zeitenwende,” France is now much less focused on expeditionary operations in Africa and French President Emmanuel Macron’s statements about avoiding a “humiliation” of Russia are a thing of the past. The question of course remains: Have Paris and Berlin actually moved closer to each other?
On the Surface: More Convergence
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine indeed seems to have answered at least some of the questions that used to shape the European defense debate. For many years, this debate centered around priorities in terms of threats: Was the East (read: Russia) more important and more urgent, or the South (read: instability and terrorism, mostly in Africa)? This debate divided Europeans into two different camps, and France and Germany were not in the same one: Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Germany’s focus was on territorial defense, though with very low intensity in practice.
Even before, Germany was extremely reluctant to send its Bundeswehr into so-called out-of-area operations. France, with its military operations in the Sahel, was in contrast actively engaged in the South. Since 2022, it became obvious to almost everyone that Russia poses a palpable threat to the continent’s security. In parallel, France’s troubles in Africa (some of them actually caused by Russia) and ultimately the retreat of its armed forces meant that Paris stopped its efforts to obtain its European partners’ military support. As a result, the current version of the European security debate is more or less exclusively focused on Russia, deterrence, and strengthening NATO. Europe is (almost) united behind supporting Ukraine and the idea that the European security order will need to be rebuilt around a hostile Russia.
President Macron’s new discourse, as rolled out in his 2023 GLOBSEC conference speech, brought France closer to mainstream rhetoric on Russia, in particular on the so-called Eastern flank. Of course, Paris was never pro-Russian in the first place. Yet, its traditional approach to Russia was never really understood in places like Warsaw or Tallinn, raising suspicions that still linger. That said, many in France remain skeptical of the more essentialist discourses on the Eastern flank that ascribe an aggressive and inherently imperialist nature to Russia. Overall, however, there is today much more coherence in European security discourses than in the pre-2022 era, including between France and Germany.
The Transatlantic Factor
The trouble with the answers Europeans found to the new realities is that they rely heavily on the United States and the security guarantees it provides. France and Germany, however, have long held very different views on the likely trajectory of the transatlantic (security) relationship. This, in turn, made it almost impossible for Berlin and Paris to agree on the way forward for European defense and the buzzword that was at the center of this past decade’s debate: European strategic autonomy.
President Macron made the—at least in his view—“progressive and unavoidable disengagement of the United States” a starting point for his reflections on the future of Europe in his 2017 Sorbonne speech. Germany, in turn, again made it clear in its Zeitenwende that it is fully betting on US security guarantees, e.g., by publishing a very Atlanticist National Security Strategy in 2023 or by choosing to buy US-made F-35 fighter jets over any European solution.
Very importantly, these differences are not merely about policy preferences or simply affinities for the United States (or alleged Anti-Americanism as far as France is concerned). Rather, various capitals’ assessments on where NATO and credible US security guarantees for Europe are headed are crucial in determining their respective takes on whether Europe needs to start thinking about a Plan B.
The same is true for their willingness to put any real effort into it. As the strategic autonomy debate has shown, France and Germany are far from being on the same page on this matter. German politicians have now started talking about the need to “Trump-proof” Europe, which may sound as if Berlin has now finally come around to supporting French ambitions for European strategic autonomy. In reality, however, not much in Germany’s actual policies points in that direction.
Still No Shared Vision
Franco-German incompatibilities have thus not faded away in light of a new security environment. Currently, they are just hidden behind shared concern about Russia’s war in Ukraine. Disagreements will likely come to the fore in the future, as they already did for instance when it came to the German-led Sky Shield Initiative on air defense. For Paris, this initiative came close to an affront. This was not only for substantive reasons, but also because it was viewed as undermining the long-standing French objective of a strengthened European defense industry: Germany’s plans foresee German technology, as well as buying off the shelf from the United States and Israel.
It didn’t help that this announcement came shortly after the German government decided to purchase American F-35 fighter jets, although France and Germany are currently developing the FCAS. As seen from Paris, the German decision poses a threat to that project. Its demise would be a massive blow for France, which ultimately needs to replace its own Rafale but cannot afford to go it alone (again) yet considers it a core element of its national strategic autonomy to use its own systems. German promises that the FCAS’ days are not numbered have so far failed to completely convince Paris.
These German decisions first and foremost illustrate that there is no shared vision between Paris and Berlin as to where European security is headed. Other, more structural, differences remain as well: The fact that it has now become fashionable to be “hawkish” in Germany does not necessarily mean that the country has developed a strategic culture rooted in coherent analysis. The asymmetries between France and Germany when it comes to the depth of thinking about security and defense consequently also persist. The way in which Germany discusses nuclear deterrence could be seen as an illustration of this observation.
So, Who Can Lead Europe?
The diagnosis thus is the same as ever: The absence of true strategic dialogue is the main obstacle to better Franco-German cooperation and leadership in defense. The unsatisfactory state of the Franco-German relationship in areas beyond defense makes all hopes for starting such a dialogue seem unrealistic at the time being. The rise of populist forces in both countries obviously doesn’t help—not least because in France, where populist forces on both ends of the spectrum are explicitly anti-German.
As a result, any joint Franco-German leadership in European defense doesn’t appear to be on the horizon. Rather, it seems as if both Paris and Berlin are currently seeking to play a certain leadership role, yet separately and with different means: Germany through commitments like a permanently deployed brigade in Lithuania, France by positioning itself as a nuclear power (yet without clarifying concrete implications).
Whether a single country can even realistically aspire to lead Europe on defense remains an open question. Other formats could thus be more promising at this point. The Weimar Triangle—France, Germany, and Poland—may be able to step up. However, like Germany, Poland has no strategy that does not involve strong US commitment. Mini-lateral formats such as the British-led Joint Expeditionary Forces also have potential.
The challenges are in any case tremendous: Russia will continue to pose a threat to European security in the foreseeable future. Even if Kamala Harris wins the US presidential election, uncertainties about American security guarantees will remain and never go away again. Merely talking about “Trump-proofing” NATO or Europe more broadly will not be enough. In fact, reducing Europe’s dependence on the United States is an endeavor that will take decades and require massive investments. Moreover, the fact that the South currently doesn’t play a major role in today’s European security debate may only be temporary. The situation in the Sahel and elsewhere could deteriorate quickly, with consequences for Europe—not least because Moscow could use its influence in Africa to ensure exactly that.
The European security debate, in short, is far from settled. The lack of strategic convergence between France and Germany will only become more problematic as Europe is bracing for turbulent times.
Barbara Kunz is a Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Director of its European Security Program.
