European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, could hardly be more optimistic. “The autumn of enlargement is coming,” she declared in Dublin on September 4, at an informal get-together of the EU’s European affairs ministers. The idea was to lighten the mood dampened by the narrow loss of the Iceland referendum on opening up negotiations about joining the EU and ahead of a potential victory of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in a regional election in Germany.
She is right on the substance, but out of tune with the shifting political mood across Europe.
Yes, questions surrounding the EU enlargement season will come to the fore this fall, but the window of opportunity is very narrow. The ultimate risk is the outcome of French presidential elections in April and May next year: If Marine Le Pen of the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) wins, it could lead to a complete shake-up of the EU’s political and budget architecture, never mind sensitive policies such as EU enlargement. Moreover, there will be national elections in almost a third of EU member states, including Italy, Spain, and Poland in the course of next year.
What can be achieved before spring 2027 should be more or less clear by the end of the next EU summit in mid-October, which is set to hold strategic discussions among leaders on enlargement and institutional reform. This is something owed to the most advanced candidate countries, with a possible exception of Montenegro, the small state close to reaching the finishing line in its membership talks (which should be closed by early 2027 at the latest). As the only candidate with a clear and realistic path to acquiring EU membership soon, it will not be on the leader’s menu.
The agenda of October’s European Council is also long overdue since the EU has postponed dealing with the subject earlier, because of its own lack of internal preparations. Now it will be all about solidifying the process of EU enlargement before EU’s “super election” year of 2027, which could well produce a less favorable climate.
The idea is to agree on some simplifications and “automatic elements” along the long way of accession talks for the current eight candidate countries—Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia (some of which have been negotiating membership for over a decade) as well as more recent ones Moldova and Ukraine—while talks with Georgia and Turkey are currently frozen.
Crunch Time
Two days in the EU’s political calendar deserve particular attention: September 30 and October 15.
On the last day of September, after almost a year of delays, the European Commission will publish its pre-enlargement policy reviews. It will outline the impact of enlargement on the main EU policies and institutions; and it will set out the first proposals on how the future enlarged EU of 30 or more member states would function.
With less fanfare, the European Commission will also release a working document that will focus on communicating the EU enlargement strategy. Usually part of the annual “enlargement package” of progress reports on all candidate countries with recommendations, this year it will be adopted a few weeks early: the intention is to contribute to the preparations for the October EU summit and pre-summit deliberations among the member states.
This document is likely to include assurances on the EU’s capacity to enlarge as some candidates approach the finishing line of membership talks; safeguard mechanisms intended to deter backsliding on the rule of law once candidate countries become full members (the key point for the accession treaty with Montenegro, already being drafted in the European Council’s ad hoc working party); and more ambitious gradual integration. The last point will be the most technical, but also the most crucial for the candidates. It will outline strategic sectors of the European single market to which they can gradually be admitted once they qualify along the accession talks.
And then comes the European Council on October 15-16. Its first day will be devoted to EU enlargement. This was a tactical decision, strongly supported by Germany, in order not to overburden the June EU summit with half-baked proposals. That should have also given national capitals more time to develop ideas and prepare common ground.
This was also the lesson of the “Merz letter” by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on Ukraine’s EU membership, which was received unfavorably not only in the key EU capitals, but also in Kyiv. Berlin wants to set up Ukraine’s EU accession on a more “automatic,” predictable, and exclusive path (to be achieved within a decade). The emphasis will be on institutional inclusion, which should help Kyiv to settle in with the EU system before getting a full vote.
The task also includes developing a parallel blueprint for the “old candidates”—the Western Balkan countries—whose supporters among the member states (usually led by Austria and Italy) have been unwilling to support a special EU accession path for Ukraine unless they also got an upgraded, and more realistic, path to membership.
No Focus on a Special Status for Ukraine (Yet)
At the October EU summit, however, the sensitive discussion about a “special path” for Ukraine is likely not to take center stage. It’s more likely that it will be shelved until December or possibly later.
Although Ukraine remains the key enlargement country for Germany, there is now less urgency for a fast-track accession plan. The peace talks with Russia, in which accession was to play a role, have not materialized and are unlikely to do so in the near future, as Russian President Vladimir Putin escalates his war against Ukraine. To the EU leaders, this means less urgency to agree the parameters of Ukraine’s special accession path, as part of the package of a “substantial security guarantee” to Kyiv.
At that time, one of the core arguments behind the Merz’ letter was that a wartime Ukraine needs an immediate political anchor in Brussels, based on some innovative solution beyond the standard enlargement. The idea, however, was met with strong criticism and resistance in Ukraine, where it was perceived as a potential “waiting room” trap, diluting the pledge of full membership. As Kyiv is not (yet) ready to discuss such proposals, the whole topic is unlikely to feature high on this summit’s agenda. Even the chancellery in Berlin seems to have pressed a pause button.
Instead, the summit will probably focus on the politically “least sexy” set of proposals to improve the overly bureaucratic process for the other candidates, while keeping it “merit-based.” Questions such as simplifying the rigid procedures and dealing with bilateral disputes may take center stage. The key question will likely be how to allow more automatic differentiation among the would-be members en route to EU membership. In Berlin at least, there is greater willingness to separate, or decouple, Moldova’s EU accession path from Ukraine’s, so that political delays facing Kyiv will not hold back Chisinau's progress.
So overall, expect greater focus on gradual accession, allowing candidate countries to be more closely connected to the EU and its single market before qualifying to become full members. Upgrades of individual countries in their own accession process will then be on the agenda of the December summit.
Given the latest developments in Germany, though, there is the question of whether a politically weakened Merz will still have enough sway to push for agreements. The window to enlarge the EU and make it stronger through small adjustments (we should not even call them “reforms”) is very narrow. The alternative is a politically paralyzed enlargement process, which will invite greater instability in EU’s immediate neighborhood.
Milan Nič is a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.
