IPQ and DGAP will be launching a new articles series on EU enlargement and reform in mid-May called The Future Shape of Europe. This article provides the background.
The latest country reports by the European Commission released in November as part of 2025 EU Enlargement package paint a complex picture. The total of 10 candidate countries can be roughly divided into four categories: one, the Balkan frontrunners (Montenegro, Albania) and Eastern runners-up (Ukraine, Moldova); two, stagnating accession countries at various levels of preparedness, slowed down by lingering political issues (North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo—formally, still a future candidate); three, the backslider (Serbia); and four, the outsiders (Turkey, Georgia) formally with a status of membership candidate but with their accession process now effectively frozen.
The Frontrunners and the Rest
Indeed, Montenegro and Albania have made significant progress in their accession processes, emerging as the new pacesetters. Both have opened—and in Montenegro’s case provisionally closed—a large share of negotiation chapters (grouped into thematic “clusters”), which signals advanced alignment with the European Union’s acquis and a credible prospect of being ready for membership before other candidates. Also, there are no national vetoes looming in their path. For Montenegro, the bilateral issue with Croatia over maritime border demarcation and the war legacy is likely to be resolved as part of closing chapter 31 (which covers political dialogue with the EU and its foreign, security, and defense policy). For Albania, there only remains a bilateral issue with Greece, also on maritime border demarcation.
On the Eastern flank, the trajectory is far less certain. The threat of an Hungarian veto against Ukraine’s EU accession has much receded after Viktor Orbán’s landslide election defeat in early April; earlier, in an effort to overcome Budapest’s resistance, the European Commission and the Danish EU presidency in the second half of 2025 embraced a strategy of “frontloading”: driving forward technical‑level reforms and monitoring their implementation as if formal accession talks were underway, until unanimity was within reach. At an informal meeting of EU ministers (minus the Hungarian one) in Lviv with Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, Taras Kachka, last December, they endorsed a 10-point reform plan to be implemented in 2026.
Moldova’s EU accession process is tied to Ukraine’s through the EU’s “package approach,” which links their dossiers because of their shared eastern partnership origins and their simultaneous candidate status in 2022.
For the other candidate countries, however, substantial movement in the upcoming period currently does not look likely. Many still fall short of EU requirements and show little readiness to accelerate reforms in line with membership criteria.
Is Berlin Starting to Move?
A lot has happened since the European Commission adopted its annual strategy and assessment document on November 4 last year. Amid the US-led push to end Russia’s war in Ukraine earlier this year, which in some documents foresaw Ukrainian EU membership as early as in 2027, the European Commission developed several options for accession reform. The main driver was an idea to fast-track Ukraine’s EU accession by formally bringing the country into the European Union first and then conditioning full access to its policies and funding by meeting criteria later, possibly in a gradual manner.
Until recently, Berlin had been passive on this issue, taking a typical “wait and see” approach. In recent weeks, however, the German debate on EU enlargement within the federal government and in the corridors of Germany's parliament, the Bundestag, has also begun to gain initial steps toward some momentum. Driven largely by the anticipation of the commission’s proposals on accession reform, it had led to a clarification of the national position, and a formulation of ideas on how to revive accession.
However, the following two questions should now be asked in Berlin: What kind of EU accession does Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government want for Ukraine, and what is it willing to do for it within its mandate, until the next scheduled election in 2029? And will it push for full EU membership for Montenegro, when it finalizes its accession talks within the next year, despite the more lukewarm attitude of other member states—or use it as an excuse for further delays?
The Commission’s Bold Proposal
The European Commission has developed several options on how to proceed with the accession methodology. Three of them were presented at a dinner in Brussels attended by Björn Seibert, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of cabinet, and EU ambassadors in early March:
To start with, there is the status quo: Continue with the existing, merit‑based accession process, with all its strengths and weaknesses, without resolving the question of national vetoes. Another model would introduce gradual integration packages, probably linked to negotiation clusters, and would require a new legal basis. Then there is “reverse enlargement” or “phased-in accession” before all technical accession requirements are formally completed. Designed primarily with Ukraine in mind, but available to all candidates, it would split the accession process into two stages: initial integration into a small number of selected EU policies, followed by a gradual extension of rights and obligations of the new EU member states over time.
According to reports about the dinner with Seibert, the “reverse enlargement” option was rejected by most member states. The big surprise was Germany’s strict and outspoken position: Its ambassador argued against a fast-track EU membership for Ukraine, calling it unrealistic in the near future. Instead, an alternative offer for Kyiv should be developed with some benefits of integration front-loaded ahead of membership. More concrete parameters were introduced by Chancellor Merz at the informal EU summit in Nicosia on April 24-25: As an interim step in the accession negotiations, which will continue at an ever-faster pace, Ukraine could be offered an “observer status” in the EU institutions—including regular participation at the EU summits and Council meetings—without voting rights. He said the idea, which has never been tried before, had gained some support during discussions in Cyprus. If endorsed by all member states, it could later also be extended to other accession countries. In parallel, according to our conversations with various officials, there are now groups of member states working on different proposals regarding “enhanced gradual integration” that would be tied to future EU membership.
Meanwhile, Montenegro and Albania will continue with the regular accession process. But the next political fight on the horizon, also in Berlin, will be over the modalities of their own future membership. Even getting Montenegro over the finishing line of accession talks in the coming few months will require direct engagement from Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who has not yet taken sufficient interest in this particular issue.
Uncharted Waters
Several risks loom ahead. First, alienating Ukraine would pose a particularly serious security risk for the EU. Second, the overlooked challenge in the Western Balkans is structural fragility: Without a credible prospect of EU accession to anchor it, the region’s already volatile politics could quickly deteriorate, with knock-on effects for the rest of Europe. And third, there is the legal aspect: Partial or second-class membership is impossible under the EU treaties, which guarantee equality for all member states and a clear set of rights and obligations.
Even the idea of the accession of new members who would voluntarily give up their voting rights, as recently proposed by the chairman of the Bundestag’s European affairs committee, Anton Hofreiter of the Greens, would only be feasible under EU law as a temporary derogation—for a clearly defined and limited time period. However, this does not mean that there is no room for more “creative” solutions in the legal fine print of future accession treaties.
From now on, three strands will be crucial to follow in EU enlargement policy as it evolves in Brussels, Berlin, and other key national capitals: First, the design of the new generation of accession treaty for Montenegro, including safeguards and safety clauses for full membership (which will be a blueprint for other future members); second, the development of a special “observer status” for Ukraine, that could be extended to Moldova and other Western Balkan accession countries; and third, ensuring that EU internal reform doesn’t block or significantly slow down the accession prospects of the current frontrunners.
Currently, the German government seems to be dealing with these complex and interlinked policy issues in a very fragmented, piecemeal manner. The chancellor’s office is in the lead, but coordination with other policy actors such as the German foreign office and Bundestag seems to be very limited. At the moment, German politics in general is not paying sufficient attention to these policy streams; they do require far more public and expert scrutiny to ensure EU enlargement is a success. And even once Montenegro gets its accession treaty, there is an extra obstacle to overcome: It will need to be ratified by all 27 EU member states. That will be much easier in Germany than in France, which is constitutionally required to ratify any new EU accession treaty by a three-fifth’s majority in both chambers of the French parliament (Assemblée Nationale and Senate) or through a referendum.
Biggest Challenges Are Internal
While pressing frontrunners to deliver reforms at breakneck speed, EU member states must also redouble efforts to forge consensus when it comes to the bloc’s own enlargement readiness.
The EU’s “absorption capacity” is a precondition for accepting new members. The real measure of its absorption capacity is whether member states can reach political consensus about when to enlarge and under what conditions. Various national interests, power relations, public opinions, and expectations regarding the end goal of the integration process inform this debate. These considerations are ultimately far more important than technical or legal ones.
This needs to be a necessary part of the debate—even if many EU governments do not want to hear it. Enlargement without reform risks paralysis; reform without enlargement risks irrelevance. And for the moment, the train of internal reform has not even left the station.
Decision-making and Institutional Reform
One dimension is reforming the EU’s decision-making processes as well as its institutions. Member states skeptical about further enlargement argue that internal reform is needed first in order for the EU to enlarge without harming itself, and to ensure that any new member state has strong foundations to be, first and foremost, a rule-of-law-abiding country.
One proposed remedy is to expand the use of qualified majority voting, which requires at least 55 percent of member states (currently 15 of 27) to support a decision, and those states must represent at least 65 percent of the EU’s total population. So far, however, efforts to make this shift have stalled, as several member states, such as Hungary and Austria, have resisted giving up their veto, fearing that EU decisions would end up being dominated by the larger member states.
These disagreements have paralyzed the EU, which has been unable to even form a coherent strategy for enlargement. At Granada in October 2023, the EU heads of state and government solemnly committed to prepare the EU internally for a larger membership, explicitly tying deep institutional reform to the renewed political push for enlargement. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen then doubled down at the start of her second mandate in late 2024, promising an enlargement policy review within her first 100 days as the flagship follow‑up to Granada. However, this has since been repeatedly delayed and is now unlikely to be released before May 2026.
Budget and Financial Strain
Then there is the financial dimension: Skeptics fear that bringing in a large group of new member states will put some strain on the EU budget; historically, newcomers require substantial financial aid to navigate the accession process and align their legislation with that of the EU. Even though the financial impact of enlargement would be “fiscally manageable,” some adjustments will need to be made. Funds to support economic convergence and agricultural subsidies will be needed. The next long-term EU budget, starting in 2028, will almost certainly have to factor in at least some new members. This means the next seven-year budget will need fresh revenue sources and innovative financing tools so the EU can continue to support existing member states as well as new potential members.
Elections and the Far Right
And last but not least, there is the political dimension. The accession process is further complicated by insufficient public support for enlargement across the EU, and the rise of far-right parties coupled with the spread of illiberal ideologies. Apart from Italy, far-right parties in government do not see enlargement as a positive development for Europe; they would like to see national sovereignty strengthened and fewer decisions taken by Brussels. This dynamic has the potential to hamper the design of a credible enlargement strategy by the mainstream European parties.
In France and Germany—two EU heavyweights—the electoral calendar could threaten the enlargement momentum. With far-right parties surging ahead of France’s 2027 presidential vote and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) topping polls in several German states and recently even nationally, voters seem ripe for persuasion that EU enlargement spells economic pain and institutional overload. In Germany, where 65 percent of citizens admit scant knowledge of the issue, this skepticism could harden into outright opposition during key ratification windows for the frontrunner candidates around 2027–2029.
The Eurobarometer polls shows that the most skeptical publics are in Austria, France, and the Czech Republic. Only 45 percent of Austrians back enlargement (10 percent strongly, 35 percent somewhat), with 47 percent fearing uncontrolled migration. In France, 44 percent admit scant knowledge (and 30 percent say they have none at all) about the enlargement issues. In both the Czech Republic and in France, only 43 percent back enlargement.
Prospects for EU Enlargement by 2030
In a few months, a new impulse for the EU’s enlargement debate could come from the north. Iceland has announced its intention to hold a referendum on August 29 on resuming EU accession talks, which ended a decade ago when it withdrew its membership application. If Icelandic voters say “yes”—which is not a given—Iceland could move quickly through the remaining steps; It is already aligned with two-thirds of EU legislation and is already part of the European Economic Area. That said, the EU’s procedures still impose a certain tempo, with calendar requirements that cannot be compressed indefinitely.
If the EU manages to complete its internal preparations for admitting new members, in the best‑case scenario, Montenegro with Iceland and perhaps also Albania could end up joining at roughly the same time in the 2028-2029 period, depending on the pace of ratifications across the EU-27.
The EU’s priority for the remainder of this decade should be to complete the accession of Montenegro, Iceland (if the country votes “yes” in August), and Albania. Such tangible successes would then show other candidates that accession is a realistic prospect and help soothe some concerns in more resistant existing member states.
Ostensibly, member states and the European Commission face a daunting task to reconcile enlargement, internal reform, and insulating the EU and its neighborhood from threats—not only coming from Russia but also other hostile actors. For the next phase of EU enlargement —as the most effective foreign policy tool to date, to be successful it will take small groups and coalitions of the willing to overcome the current stagnant and often narrow outlook on the process and put it on a more strategic footing. The current window of opportunity to consolidate the European neighborhood will be wasted unless there is a greater sense of urgency at the national level, particularly in Berlin and Paris. With French President Emmanuel Macron due to leave office within a year, it is up to Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his chancellery to show more focus and leadership on this issue in the coming weeks and months.
N.B. The writers have been drawing on previous research published by the ECFR and DGAP.
Engjellushe Morina is a senior policy fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) European Security Program.
Milan Nič is a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.
