Enlargement is back as a top priority on the European Union’s agenda. “The accession of new member states in the coming years is a realistic perspective,” the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, told an audience when she visited the German Council on Foreign Relations on March 4, but warned: “The EU also needs to get ready.”
There is certainly movement in Brussels. Amid the US-led push to end Russia’s war on Ukraine, which foresees Ukrainian EU membership as early as next year, the European Commission developed several options for accession reform.
The proposal that centers on fast-tracking Ukraine’s membership by formally bringing the country into the European Union first and then conditioning full access to meeting criteria later has faced pushback from EU member states. The same day that Kos visited Berlin, EU ambassadors reportedly rejected this option, which is known as “reverse enlargement” or “phased integration.” Instead, the ambassadors asked the commission to find a more realistic way forward—also in view of political sensitivities and different levels of public support across the 27 member states.
However, despite reservations about “phased integration,” revising the accession model is not completely off the table. But next decisions on candidate countries, as well as the timeframe for accession reform, are now firmly in the hands of EU member states. As ever, their leaders must balance competing priorities and objectives, while their own governments, parliaments, and societies might not be fully onboard with expanding the EU.
A key question is where the German government stands in this debate.
Until recently, Berlin had been passive on this issue, taking a typical “wait and see” approach. In recent weeks, however, it has geared up into a more proactive phase. Initially, strategizing among Germany’s main institutional actors—the foreign office, chancellery, and parliament—was very fragmented and focused on supporting Ukraine. But it has gradually led to clearer national positions and the formulation of ideas on how to revive accession that was to a large extent driven by the anticipation of the commission’s proposals on accession reform.
Internal Dynamics
Within Germany’s current coalition government, the enlargement dossier is firmly in the hands of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU). For the first time in six decades, both the chancellor and foreign minister are from the CDU. This constellation gives the junior coalition partner, the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), little say on EU enlargement.
The internal deliberations of the CDU is likely to be shaped more extensively by its own sister party, the Bavarian CSU, which has recently taken a much more skeptical approach to enlargement. The CSU has expressed a clear preference for prioritizing internal reforms and impact assessment in the next EU budget before any decisions are made on a new accession model.
Notably, Germany’s domestic politics will be influenced by a series of regional elections as voters in five out of Germany’s 16 federal states cast their ballots in 2026—the first one, in Baden-Württemberg, just went the Greens’ way on March 8. The elections are seen as a key test of the national mood as the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) competes for first place in national polls with Chancellor Merz’s CDU/CSU.
Seeing the Logic
Behind closed doors, high-level officials and politicians from the CDU/CSU acknowledge that EU enlargement needs to be seen through “geopolitical logic.” At the same time, they also emphasize the need for applying the Copenhagen criteria and a merit-based approach to candidate countries, particularly in area of the rule of law. The major question from the Germans is how to fast-track Ukraine—which will not be able to meet all the usual requirements divided into sequenced, negotiated “chapters”—while keeping to a merits-based approach.
For the moment, the mood in Berlin is more open to innovative elements in the accession framework that could make the process more dynamic and provide more substance for gradually integrating candidate countries while still keeping full membership as a final goal.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz has not yet taken sufficient interest in EU enlargement. So far, his attention to these issues has been very limited and sporadic, mostly driven by diplomatic occasions and external impulses. At the Munich Security Conference, he answered a question by Montenegro’s President Jakov Milatovic with uch personal conviction, saying that he felt “more and more uncomfortable” with the current approach to enlargement. The EU needed to revive its strategy, the chancellor added, with regard to bringing the Western Balkan countries "closer and closer" to the EU “and, at the very end, [have them] as members.”
A Special Track for Ukraine?
When it comes to Ukraine, Germany is the largest European donor and provider of military, financial, and humanitarian assistance. Its primary objective has always been to ensure the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign, independent state. Berlin has also been a consistent—and crucial—supporter of Kyiv’s EU-related reforms in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and decentralization.
But Germany’s focus has been on Ukraine’s short-term needs in terms of defense, economy, and diplomacy vis-à-vis the shifting role of the United States rather than on its EU future. That might be part of the reason why the European Commission’s push for accession reform has initially raised more concerns in Berlin than enthusiasm. After Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky repeated 2027 as the target date for EU accession in January, Merz rejected this outright.
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul is said to be against a sui generis approach to Ukraine which would leave the Balkan top performers behind, preferring a package deal instead. Moreover, the foreign office considers the internal EU reform agenda as crucial. At this stage, however, Brussels’ focus is almost exclusively on enlargement. The feeling in Berlin is that Brussels has not sufficiently reflected on the internal reform dimension and pre-accession policy reviews.
Montenegro, Albania, Iceland
Indeed, enlargement goes far beyond Ukraine. Berlin sees Montenegro as a solid frontrunner and a potentially success story that can become a catalyst for further enlargement momentum in the Western Balkans. To increase Montenegro’s political profile in Europe, German diplomats convinced the government in Podgorica to chair the so-called Berlin Process format of regional cooperation for this year.
Meanwhile, Albania will continue to be seen as below a critical threshold until it gets a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) from the European Commission. Berlin is taking the recent high-profile corruption cases in Tirana more strictly than many other EU member states. It wants to see suspected ministers not only dismissed from the government but also properly investigated by special prosecutors. But once Albania gets pass this IBAR report, which is the formal condition to start closing negotiating chapters, it might join Montenegro, together with Iceland, as parts of an enlargement package deal which could also include some special ‘pre-membership’ status for Ukraine and Moldova.
The Merz government has tried to keep door open for Serbia. German center-right politicians see the prospects for a successful EU integration of the entire Western Balkan region as closely linked to the accession of its largest country. Another factor is party politics: The ruling party of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is associated with the same European political family as Germany’s CDU/CSU although it is currently facing an internal scrutiny process over democratic backsliding at home. In any case, Belgrade’s failure to deliver on its previous EU commitments on the rule of law, combined with its harsh treatment of student protesters and persistent ties with Russia, have made any upgrade of Serbia’s accession talks politically untenable, at least for now.
Another membership candidate proactively mentioned in Berlin these days is Iceland. If the country's August 2026 referendum on renewing EU membership talks succeeds, it will create the prospect for swift accession process. As Iceland is already integrated into the EU single market and the Schengen Area, it could reinforce the German instinct to focus on low-hanging fruit—small countries, easy cases—before turning to more complex and challenging cases like Ukraine, Moldova, and North Macedonia.
A Positive Outlook
The latest Eurobarometer poll shows that 49 percent of Germans view enlargement positively, which is slightly below the EU average. Perhaps reflecting this, Germany’s parliament, the Bundestag, has been a comparatively weak actor on this topic so far. Although bilateral and security issues in the Western Balkans have often been on its agenda, discussions have more often focused on routine prolongations of the EUFOR and KFOR peace missions rather than on the region’s integration into the EU or its membership prospects.
However, both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the upper house representing the 16 federal states, will play a central role in the ratification of any new accession treaty. In both chambers, the coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD that currently rules Germany will need to rely on the support of some of the opposition to ratify any accession treaty, if it needs two-third majorities. Consequently, a regional state government potentially led by the far-right AfD would not, perhaps, be able to block ratification, but it could increase the political costs for the centrist parties.
NB. The article is based on an upcoming DGAP Policy Brief “Europe’s Next Enlargement: What Berlin, Paris, and The Hague Really Think”, out on March 17, 2026.
Milan Nič a is a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.
Nikola Xaviereff is project manager Western Balkans at the DGAP’s Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.
