Foreign policy starts at home. After the recent presidential election in Poland the question of how the new domestic political situation could impact the country’s international role has been become particularly pressing.
For sure, the victory of the far-right populist Karol Nawrocki, who was supported by the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, will prolong the difficult cohabitation between a right-wing president (the incumbent Andrzej Duda will step down in August) and the liberal government led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his center-right Civic Platform. However, Nawrocki’s upcoming presidency is not just a harbinger of a political struggle likely to undermine the government’s agenda. More importantly, his victory speaks of a new chapter in the Polish foreign policy marked by deepening domestic political divides and a narrowing societal consensus.
Remaining Center-Stage?
Tusk’s election victory in the fall of 2023 was hailed as Poland’s return to the central stage of the European foreign policy. Tusk’s leadership ambitions were underpinned by solid foundations. First, his personal reputation as an experienced statesman who managed to turn the tide of European politics by removing—after eight years—populists from power. Second, Poland’s key role on Europe’s most important foreign policy front in Ukraine. And third, a broad national consensus—despite polarization and cleavages on many other issues—regarding the priorities of Poland’s foreign policy strategy: the relationship with the United States, high military spending, and support for Ukraine.
Even the EU policy agenda, including Poland’s hardening position on key policy areas like migration, climate policy, and the European single market, somewhat surprisingly, enjoyed bipartisan support despite mutual accusations by the government and the opposition of, respectively, “anti-Europeanism” and being a “Brussels puppet.”
In the last one-and-a-half years, Tusk’s government has used this political capital to revive the Weimar Triangle with Germany and France, position itself as a promoter of deeper European defense cooperation, foster a closer regional coordination with the Baltic and Nordic countries, and join the E3 (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) in important strategic discussions on Ukraine and the United States.
Nawrocki’s victory will not necessarily impede this agenda as the role of the president in the Polish political system is limited. Much more important for the future of Poland’s foreign and EU policy will be what conclusions Tusk will draw from the electoral defeat of his candidate, Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, and what political strategy he will develop ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.
Narrowed Room for Maneuver
There is no doubt that the room for maneuver for an ambitious foreign policy agenda has narrowed. The domestic foundations of Tusk’s relative strength are crumbling. The return of Donald Trump to the White House proved to be signal for a party-political instrumentalization of the relationship with the US along the lines of ideological divides.
Of course, both the government and the PiS opposition believe in the fundamental strategic importance of the transatlantic partnership for Poland’s security and Europe’s interests. But they differ significantly on how this goal should be pursued. Tusk sees no alternative to pursuing closer European cooperation. For PiS, Trump is an ideological and political ally, not least with his criticism of the EU.
Trump received Nawrocki as the presidential candidate in the Oval Office, while Kristi Noem, his hardline Secretary of Homeland Security, openly endorsed Nawrocki just days before the run-off vote on June 1 at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) held in Poland. Nawrocki has strong far-right views, is close to the MAGA movement, and is thus potentially an important asset for the pro-Trumpian camp in Europe. Equating pro-Trumpism with pro-transatlanticism cynically puts Poland’s liberal government into the allegedly anti-American corner. This is how America, for the first time, is becoming a divisive issue in Polish politics. Polish society is divided as well. The majority of right-wing voters believe that Trump’s America is still a reliable ally, while the liberals disagree.
Overall, this politicization is a serious problem for Tusk: Despite the shift in public opinion, accusations of him not caring enough about the strategic partnership with the US could prove to be harmful in the traditionally pro-American Poland.
New Fault Line: Defense Policy
This is how the efforts to strengthen European defense have become the focal point of a heated political controversy. In the past, Polish governments used to be hesitant, to say the least, about the development of EU defense capabilities. The argument that it would undermine NATO and the partnership with the US was shared across the political aisle. This is no longer the case. The Tusk government has pushed for more military cooperation with European partners, signed a security treaty with France, and hailed the adoption of the EU’s “Security Action for Europe” (SAFE) regulation as one of the key achievements of Poland’s EU presidency in the first half of 2025. Nawrocki and PiS attacked this shift in the Polish approach, claiming it would lead to giving away Poland’s sovereignty, pushing the US out of Europe, and helping create a European “super state.”
Unlike in the past, building a European defense union is a pivotal project for EU’s future and security—not least as part of a new bargain with the US. But to what extent will Tusk be able and willing to push for it now, given the increasingly toxic nature of the issue in the Polish domestic political context?
The most consequential shift in the Polish foreign policy debate may concern Ukraine. In the electoral campaign Nawrocki declared his opposition to Ukraine’s NATO membership ambitions. And in the first interview after his victory (with a Hungarian governmental outlet) he said that the country should not join the EU either.
This is a break with the most fundamental principle of the Polish raison d’état (which PiS fully adhered to) defining Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration as the cornerstone of Poland’s security. It is a sign that the worsening societal mood regarding Ukraine (Poland is hosting about one million Ukrainian refugees) has reached a critical political mass.
A Changing Mood Over Ukraine
What’s more, Trump’s policy shift has legitimized a more distanced approach to Kyiv and lowered the bar for the acceptance of openly anti-Ukrainian positions. Polish-Ukrainian trade disputes, grievances about the Ukrainians living in Poland, and historical disagreements have started shaping the public perception more than the reports from the front.
Navigating this new political landscape will be a massive challenge for Tusk at a moment when a new trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine will have to be negotiated and Europe will have to shoulder a greater burden when it comes to support for Kyiv.
Nawrocki’s victory in the presidential election is a bitter reminder of powerful political and societal forces able to constrain Poland’s leadership role in Europe. But it is still Donald Tusk and his political camp who will be shaping the country’s policy over the next two years. Like many other governments on the “Old Continent,” they will have a chance to prove that foreign policy does not need to become hostage to populist mantras. If they fail to do so and give in to their rivals’ pressure, they will push not only Europe but also themselves toward the political brink.
Piotr Buras is IPQ’s Warsaw columnist and leads the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Warsaw office.
