Warsaw Memo

Mar 26, 2025

Trump May Unite Europe, But He Divides Polish Society

Relations with the United States “in a new phase,” Poland is experiencing something of a Zeitenwende, or historic turn, when it comes to the country’s fundamental foreign policy orientation. The US president is far from universally disliked, though.

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After a couple of tumultuous weeks of Donald Trump’s American revolution, many in Poland still comfort themselves with the following arguments: The 10,000 US troops stationed in the country have not been removed, NATO’s Article 5 has not been revoked, and the US nuclear umbrella  remains in place. Moreover, Pete Hegseth, the new US secretary of defense, visited Poland in February and was full of praise for the “United States’ best ally.” Hegseth even hinted that Washington was considering an increase of its military presence in Poland. 

Reminiscences from the era of the first Trump administration returned for a moment. During those four years, NATO’s Eastern flank was significantly strengthened by the US despite all the talk about a transatlantic rift. To be sure, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda had to wait for more than an hour to get an eight-minute audience with President Trump on the margins of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). But weren’t both he and even the Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski warmly applauded by the CPAC crowd in a sign of respect for Poland’s accomplishments on the defense front?

“A New Phase”

One is tempted to look on the bright side. But clinging to the illusion that the world of yesterday still exists, is not an option—even in Poland. Under the guise of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s grandiose understatement that “our friendship with the US is entering a new phase,” the country is undergoing a profound reorientation. America is not a safe bet anymore. And pro-Atlanticism, for decades an unquestionable foundation of Poland’s political culture, is no longer a sufficient or viable option. This is the Polish version of Zeitenwende and it affects security policy choices, transforms public opinion, and reshapes party politics. 

To be sure, Donald Tusk did not follow German chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz’ footsteps by declaring that building independence from the US would be his priority. But under Tusk’s leadership Poland has become a driving force behind the efforts to develop European defense capabilities. 

Warsaw has been pushing for EU common borrowing to finance common procurement; it has developed the idea of a rearmament bank; it wants the EU to define ambitious defense projects like a joint anti-missile shield as European public goods; and Foreign Minister Sikorski keeps floating the idea of a European legion, the nucleus, perhaps, of a European army. 

This is quite a turnaround for a country that in the past vehemently opposed the idea of a European defense union or strategic autonomy; both were seen as undermining transatlantic bonds. In a remarkable speech in parliament, Tusk warned that the reset in the US-Russia relations would make Europe’s situation much more difficult. And he underlined Poland’s interest in discussions about European nuclear deterrence signaling openness to starting conversations with France about possible options. 

“Be Quiet, Little Man”

Going more European on security and defense does not mean replacing the US. But the belief that a trust-based cooperation with Trump can be maintained is shrinking fast. When Sikorski reminded Elon Musk that Poland is paying for Musk’s satellite-based Starlink internet service to be provided to Ukraine, Musk told him to “be quiet” and called him a “little man,” while US Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged Sikorski to apologize. 

Most remarkably, faith in America is crumbling in the Polish society, too. According to a poll for the daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita, 46.3 percent of Poles do not consider the US to be a credible ally under Trump’s leadership; only 32.7 percent still believe the opposite. In a recent survey commissioned by More in Common, a minority of 16 percent said that Poland should prioritize the relationship with the United States over the EU, while 28 percent said it should be the other way around. 45 percent believed that both are equally important. 

However, Poles are divided when it comes to their perceptions of Trump. 70 percent of supporters of the ruling liberal coalition reject Trump’s policy as contradicting Polish interests. Meanwhile, 57 percent of the (right-wing) opposition voters maintain that Trump has strengthened Poland’s security. 

Not surprisingly, the crumbling societal consensus on America is also reflected in Polish political life. While Tusk is trying to strike a balance between “no security without America” and “going European,” the opposition—the Law and Justice (PiS) party and the far-right Konfederacja, which, together, enjoy the support of 45 percent of voters—seems to be going “full in” in support of Trump. 

Splitting Opinion

The pro-Russia turn on the part of the US government has thus not necessarily persuaded all Poles to feel negatively about Trump. Rather, Trump’s tough course on Ukraine has encouraged the right-wing electorate and politicians to develop a new approach which is both pro-American and anti-Ukrainian—a novelty in the Polish discourse. For example, they blame Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for his alleged “misbehavior” in the Oval Office and defend Trump against criticism; like the US president, they expect more “gratitude” from Ukraine. 

A well-known anti-Western-European sentiment is responsible for part of this narrative.  Former PiS Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki wrote in response to JD Vance’s speech to the Munich Security Conference: “I have no doubt that Western Europe will sacrifice Poland if necessary.” He added: “When it comes to negotiating the fate of Central Europe, we could become an appetizer on the menu of Berlin, Brussels, and Paris.”

Trump’s policies, therefore, are not only challenging Poland’s security policy fundamentals, but also the long-standing consensus on Atlanticism that used to unite the country beyond party political differences. Trump may have unified Europeans around the purpose of a common defense. But the centrifugal forces he has unleashed in European societies may prove to be no less consequential than the collapse of the US security guarantee.

Piotr Buras is IPQ’s Warsaw columnist and leads the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Warsaw office.

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