“Poland is back,” announced Donald Tusk when he became Poland’s prime minister for a second time in December 2023. After eight years of rule by the right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party, this sounded reassuring. Observers expected that Warsaw would mend fences with Brussels and Berlin and would give a boost to liberal and integrationist forces within the EU. In short, it would revive the European spirit.
One year on, Poland has taken over the European Council presidency (on January 1, 2025), amidst profound concerns about Europe’s future and hopes that Tusk would provide the leaderless EU with sense and direction. The upcoming months, however, will be crucial not only for the EU, but also for Poland’s political trajectory. Tusk will need to steer the EU through uncharted territory and at the same time defend his political project in Poland’s presidential election in May. It is the interplay of these two goals that will shape Poland’s EU agenda and and define the scope of its ambitions.
After his impressive victory in October 2023, Tusk was rightly celebrated as the tamer of populism, but his success was not complete. While his three-party coalition government has a stable majority in parliament, it is divided on issues of key importance for the voters, such as the liberalization of abortion laws. Most importantly, the outgoing president, PiS loyalist Andrzej Duda, holds veto powers and is keen on preventing any legislation at odds with the current opposition’s interests.
For the same reason, the restoration of the rule of law, which Tusk has promised and which requires a complete overhaul of the judicial system, has dragged on. And while the intimidation of judges has stopped, the legal chaos has persisted, deepening the political conflict to a dangerous degree.
Liberal Comeback Under Threat
Poland’s liberal comeback seems today more vulnerable than a year ago. In January, PiS overtook Tusk’s Civic Platform party in the polls. Satisfaction with the government’s work has plummeted with voters wishing to see quicker changes. The combined support for the populist (PiS) and far-right (Konfederacja) parties reached 49 percent in the European Parliament elections in June 2024. That was a warning. The victory of a right-wing candidate in the May presidential election is not a far-fetched scenario even if the liberal candidate, Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski, is the frontrunner in the race.
For Tusk, the stakes could not be higher. Should Trzaskowski fail, a domino effect could be set in motion: Tusk’s reforms would come to a stop, the prime minister would lose legitimacy. A collapse of the coalition and snap elections could well follow. In such a scenario, PiS’ return to power could be just a matter of time—which in turn would end the European dream of a Polish leadership role. Thus, the battle is not just about Tusk’s political record and legacy, it’s about the country’s future.
Despite being a committed European, Tusk’s EU policy will have to be subordinated to this fundamental goal. Liberals and EU enthusiasts may already have been disappointed in recent months. Tusk supported the suspension of the right of asylum as an instrument against the weaponization of migration by Belarus. He pushed war-torn Ukraine to solve bilateral disputes with Poland before opening the EU accession talks. He also opposed the EU-Mercosur trade agreement.
In the coming months, Warsaw will push for progress on EU security, supporting initiatives for new EU funds. That Tusk recently defined defense as a European public good reflects a major shift in Poland’s traditionally staunch transatlanticist position. But on many other issues Warsaw will be happy to delay rather than seek quick decisions—in order to avoid a domestic backlash that could put at risk the strategic goal of defending Poland’s political course.
For example, Poland will not want the EU to take decisions on the CO2 reduction goal for 2040 that the European Commission is pushing for. The issue is too toxic in Poland’s domestic context. The same is true for the future of the EU-Ukraine trade relationship (the current framework based on the so-called autonomous trade measures expires in June). The debate on this is likely to be pushed back until after the Polish presidential election. Furthermore, there are many reasons why Warsaw is skeptical about plans to deploy European troops in Ukraine, as proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron and others, but the need to avoid a public controversy before the crucial May vote is certainly one of them.
Juggling domestic constraints and European tasks will be a difficult balancing act. As a consequence, the Polish EU presidency may turn out to be not as ambitious as some expect. Poland’s leadership may end up being less visible than needed. The real test of Poland’s new role in Europe will only come if and when the domestic political conundrum has been solved. Importantly, it will coincide with the formation of a new German government. If not only Warsaw, but also Berlin is then “back,” the chance for their renewed leadership in the EU must not be wasted.
Piotr Buras leads the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Warsaw office.
