When European leaders met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in London on June 7 to discuss the parameters of a common position on potential peace talks with Russia, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk did not sit at the table. Instead, he was engaged at home in a fierce debate about whether the Ukrainian president should have the highest rank Polish national order revoked. It had been awarded to Zelensky three years ago, for the fight against the Russian imperialism.
These two facts are testimony to a problem which Europe cannot afford to ignore: The Polish-Ukrainian relationship is in crisis, and the fallout is potentially dangerous for the European Union’s policy toward Kyiv.
The Re-emergence of History
The heyday of the Polish-Ukrainian friendship—with Poles welcoming Ukrainian war refugees during the first weeks of the war, and hundreds of Polish tanks being sent to support the country—is long gone. The most recent spat was provoked by Zelensky’s decision to name an army brigade after the “heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.”
During World War II, that army fought against both Soviets and Poles. Ukrainians were a national minority in pre-war Poland. There were ethnic tensions, anti-state incidents perpetrated by Ukrainian activists, and brutal punitive actions by the Polish state. The conflict escalated during the war; 100,000 Poles were massacred by Ukrainians in the region of Volhynia in 1943.
While the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is remembered in Ukraine mainly for its heroic fight against the Red Army, in Poland it stands for mass murder committed against the Polish population. “Ukraine will not join the European Union with Bandera,” [a reference to Stepan Bandera, the UPA’s war-time leader widely celebrated as a national hero in Ukraine],” Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the rightwing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party, has warned many times. Most Poles agree.
Indeed, few things can stir nationalistic fury in Poland as much as the Ukrainian disrespect for the Polish memory of those events. Meanwhile, the new Ukrainian nationalism emboldened by the fight against the Russian invasion has rediscovered traditions that clash with Polish sensitivities and expectations.
The aim of Zelensky’s recent move was apparently to improve morale and please some radical circles. It is difficult to assume that he was not aware of the risks of the backlash it could provoke in Warsaw. Poland’s right-wing president, Karol Nawrocki, who is supported by PiS, was quick to suggest that Zelensky should give back the prestigious Order of the White Eagle; Ukrainian efforts to assuage the Poles brought no results.
On June 19, Nawrocki officially stripped Zelensky of Poland’s highest honor; the Ukrainian president promptly sent back the medal. He also decided to skip the 2026 Ukraine Recovery Conference held at the Polish city of Gdansk on June 25-26—a first. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called Nawrocki’s move “a strategic mistake” und “disrespectful.” That Zelensky seemingly took the likely Polish reaction into account tells us more about the nature of the Polish-Ukrainian conundrum than anything else.
A Worsening Relationship
This relationship has been long marked by an asymmetry in which Poland was a stronger party—and one Ukraine needed more. But this no longer applies. As Edwin Bendyk, the president of the Stefan Batory Foundation, a leading Polish think tank, recently observed, “The Ukrainians have been able to stand up to a stronger enemy. They not only believe in a better future, but also want to shape it themselves.”
Meanwhile, Poland’s role as Ukraine’s key supporter has waned. It is still essential due to the logistics hub in Rzeszow, which operates close to 90 percent of the Western aid provided to Ukraine. This key assistance is often taken for granted by the EU and Ukrainian partners—to Warsaw’s disgruntlement and irritation.
But Poland has been dragging its feet on a number of different issues. It has been particularly vocal in ruling out any participation in a potential peace-keeping force in Ukraine. It has not lifted the embargo on Ukrainian grain imports, despite the EU mandating it. Poland also only belatedly joined the PURL initiative, which finances arms procurements for Ukraine in the United States with European money, contributing a mere €100 million to it.
Most recently, the delivery of Polish Mig-29 fighter jets to Ukraine has been delayed due to Ukraine’s hesitance to share its advanced drone technology with Poland, despite earlier commitments. Lastly, the Polish government has been reducing the social allowances for Ukrainian refugees and organized showcase deportations of some Ukrainian migrants who committed petty crimes.
Little Room for Maneuver
Sixty-seven percent of the Poles still support Ukraine’s integration with the EU, but when it comes to Ukraine policy, it is the significantly worsening public and political mood that is reducing the Tusk government’s room for maneuver to the minimum. According to a CBOS survey from January 2026, only 48 percent of Poles support taking in Ukrainian refugees anymore, whilst 46 percent are now opposed. These are the lowest figures recorded since the surveys began shortly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The nationalist right and far right, which enjoy the support of about 45 percent of the population, thrive on anti-Ukrainian emotions and fuel them. Recently, a disgraceful spectacle saw some right-wing MPs claiming the existence of a Ukrainian fifth column in the Polish administration.
Ukraine’s growing inclination to circumvent Poland rather than rely on its Western neighbor might not look surprising, given this negative spiral. Zelensky’s disregard for the Polish historical sensitivities and his alleged hesitance to add Warsaw to the “E3 [France, Germany, and the United Kingdom] plus Ukraine” format stand for this approach.
Paying Attention
However, this strategy would be short sighted. Poland will remain politically crucial for Ukraine, both as an ally and a potential spoiler. The current Polish government, as much as it is struggling not to succumb to nationalist pressure, is convinced of the fundamental role Ukraine plays for Europe; it wants to anchor it in the EU.
However, Poland’s next parliamentary elections in October 2027 are likely to become a neck-to-neck race between the center right and the right-wing, anti-Ukrainian forces—with Ukraine playing a central role in the campaign. This would not bode well for Kyiv’s cause. Ukraine and its Western European partners would be well advised to pay attention to the Polish-Ukrainian dynamics and not to underestimate their own role in shaping them, for better or worse.
This article is a preview from the IPQ Summer 2026 issue, out on June 30.
Piotr Buras is IPQ’s Warsaw columnist and head of the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Warsaw office.
