Can the European Union accept Ukraine as a new member in 2027, as suggested by the US administration as part of the peace plan it put forward in December? When Kyiv’s accession process started in the wake of the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022, two things were clear. First, it would be a merit-based process. The level of Ukraine’s preparation for EU membership would be crucial, and not any other (geopolitical) considerations. Second, the EU needed to reform itself before new members entered the bloc. This principle was laid down in the Granada declaration of the European Council in October 2023.
Fast forward to the beginning of 2026 and it is clear neither condition is being met. Ukraine is struggling not only with the war efforts but also, not surprisingly, with internal reforms. And the EU has not moved one inch on institutional and decision-making reforms which a number of its member states consider to be a condition sine qua non for further enlargement. The vision, one would assume, of Ukraine and other candidate countries becoming members as early as 2027 is thus a pipe dream not even worth discussing.
Drawing this conclusion, however, would be a mistake. The EU needs to rethink and redesign the enlargement process. And the reason for that is, once again, the situation around Ukraine. A peace settlement may still seem a distant prospect, but may come to pass in 2026. There is a lot of uncertainty about what it could look like. But one thing remains indisputable: Ukraine’s accession to the EU is the only possible scenario that would allow the Ukrainians to claim success in a war that will have cost them thousands of lives and painful territorial losses. Beyond money and rather lofty security guarantees, Ukraine needs to be an integral part of the EU after having successfully defended Europe’s security against Russia. This promise has already been anchored in various versions of European plans for a Ukraine settlement in recent months.
A New Approach
However, the EU will not be able to deliver on this unless it changes its approach on enlargement. The current merit-based process leading to full membership would be out of sync with the political dynamics, which require steps that are of high symbolic value. The promise of membership as soon as Ukraine has closed all the chapters and clusters (while the official negotiations have not even started yet) would not satisfy the legitimate expectations of the Ukrainians. They want their membership of the Europe Union to be irreversible and rubber-stamped beyond all doubts. This is also in the EU’s interest. Prolonging Ukraine’s limbo would be a major risk: It could lead to instability or even turn Ukraine into a country hostile to the EU.
Since there is no viable alternative to Ukraine becoming a member of the EU, this fundamental decision should be taken sooner rather than later. An accelerated procedure should apply to Moldova and the most advanced Western Balkan countries as well—of critical importance should be the rule of law, democratic standards, and foreign policy alignment with the EU. This would amount to the geopolitical enlargement that the European Commission and many EU member states have preached since 2022. It would demonstrate the EU’s resolve and underpin its ambition to be a political actor worthy of the name.
However, granting the candidate countries full membership in a spectacular overhaul of the merit-based enlargement process would be neither politically possible, nor advisable. Many EU member states, including those genuinely supportive of EU enlargement, fear the bloc’s destabilization. So the other side of the coin of accelerated enlargement should be long, but time-limited restrictions of the rights of the new members. They could include suspension of voting rights, suspension of veto power, extended transition periods, country-tailored arrangements regarding the access to EU funds and the single market, rule of law conditionality, verification mechanisms, and others. At the same time, the new members could get better access to EU funds, an observatory role in the EU institutions, and contribute to EU reform, which would allow them to acquire full rights—as soon as they have completed the legal approximation.
The European Commission has reportedly already started developing ideas for what such a new, temporary model of EU membership could look like. Think-tank proposals, like the European Policy Centre’s (CEP) “staged accession concept,” also provide useful suggestions.
Crossing the enlargement Rubicon with such a new offer would help the EU square the circle, and fast. It would provide a powerful political signal that the EU’s European neighborhood irreversibly has to become part of the bloc and provide the candidate countries with more benefits than under the current status. In parallel, it would install necessary safeguards to ensure that the new accession would not derail the European project. The alternative is more of the same in a world that is rapidly changing—certainly not a recipe for success.
Piotr Buras is IPQ’s Warsaw columnist and head of the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Warsaw office.
