The founding myth of the European Union is fading. Having begun amid the continent’s self-destruction during two world wars—as the vanguard of an international community of states striving for Kant’s eternal peace—the logic of integration is increasingly turning into its opposite. Surrounded by a Darwinian “jungle” where the strongest prevail, since at least 2022 Europeans have been primarily concerned with self-preservation, defending their own continent from external threats.
In the rapidly changing international order, this defensive logic also requires internal change. In Berlin, this is described using terms such as “turning point” (by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who introduced the German term Zeitenwende to the security policy debate after Russia’s full-sale invasion of Ukraine) and “epochal break” (by his successor Friedrich Merz). In Brussels, it’s about fostering a new pragmatism that prioritizes deepening integration over getting all EU member states on board. Especially on issues concerning the security of Europeans, process is taking a back seat. What matters now are quick results.
Technical to Technocratic
In recent years, the EU has not lacked initiatives for internal reform and external expansion. From Paris’ perspective, the vision of Europe that President Emmanuel Macron outlined in his first Sorbonne speech in 2017 failed due to Berlin’s unwillingness to engage with it. The momentum of the so-called “Conference on the Future of Europe,” in turn, fizzled out without effect; the debate went over the heads of most citizens. Proposals from various expert groups, including a Franco-German one (2023), and reports by two former Italian prime ministers, Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, (2024) were discussed but never implemented. The European Political Community (EPC), which Macron launched in 2022 as a new attempt to stimulate debate, continues to be praised as a forum for exchange. However, the EPC has not yet produced any results.
The many failed reform initiatives have led to a proliferation of small, exclusive formats—sometimes with the aim of including current non-members (an enlargement of sorts). In addition to the Visegrád 4 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), the Nordic-Baltic 8, and Weimar (France, Germany, and Poland, now often including Ukraine, too), there has been frequent talk of E3, E5, E6, and E8. Their core idea is simple and aligns with the historical logic of the EU integration process: A hard core takes the lead, demonstrates what is possible, and convinces other states to join.
It is striking that the “E” initiatives focus on technical issues, such as combating disinformation or strengthening air defense, but don’t address crucial questions regarding the future of European integration (such as the question of a federal state). Such pragmatism is understandable. However, if these initiatives remain limited to technical issues, there is a risk that the major challenges of the future will be addressed elsewhere.
And if, at the same time, the rise of right-wing nationalist ideas continues, the “multi-speed Europe” could soon become a “multi-form Europe.” Here are three examples:
Old Ghosts (1): France’s Dream of a Mediterranean Union
The vision of the “Mediterranean Union” was most recently championed by Nicolas Sarkozy. Under this banner, France’s conservative president (2007–12) outlined a vision of a “political, economic, and cultural” space intended to forge closer ties in the future between the European countries bordering the Mediterranean and the nations of North Africa and the Levant.
Following the significant eastward expansion of the EU in 2004 and the heated debates within the French right over Turkey’s potential accession to the EU, Sarkozy sought to make his mark through the Mediterranean Union. He did this both to counter the fears then prevalent in France of German hegemony in the opening economic space of Eastern Europe and as a distinct geopolitical and civilizational project for Southern and Southeastern European states.
Under Sarkozy’s successors, the Socialist François Hollande and then Macron, the Mediterranean Union ceased to play a role. Macron did, however, pursue an active Mediterranean policy through numerous bilateral initiatives and arms exports. Relations with Morocco were strengthened, arms deals were concluded with Egypt, and in Lebanon, Macron himself sought to assert France’s remaining influence in the former mandated territory.
However, no major geopolitical agenda was apparent. That could change if the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) wins the 2027 presidential election. Even as an opposition party, the RN has sought to pressure the government through an aggressive policy toward Algeria and to distinguish itself by fighting illegal immigration and deporting foreign criminals. It cannot be ruled out that Jordan Bardella, should he become the RN candidate and win, would attempt to establish stricter EU external borders alongside Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, thereby redefining France’s leadership role. A revival of the Union for the Mediterranean, in whatever form, could help him in this endeavor.
Old Ghosts (2): German Hegemony in Central Europe
In the current debates, the concept of “Central Europe” is often attributed to Friedrich Naumann, a liberal thinker during Germany’s Wilhelmine Empire. He saw Central Europe as the ideal arena for the formation of a political and economic bloc under German leadership. The unprecedented violence and systematic logic of annihilation underlying the Nazi expansion into Central and Eastern Europe during World War II made the geopolitical analyses of the “Munich School” in Germany a taboo subject for many decades. References to Central Europe were occasionally invoked as a historical basis for economic rapprochement and efforts to ease tensions in the context of Ostpolitik. However, they no longer played a significant role in the broader public debate, first in West and later in reunified Germany.
That is changing, at least if one follows the debates within the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). For some in the party, the term “Central Europe” has once again become a common reference in essays by leading thinkers associated with the party, and it regularly appears in speeches in the Bundestag. As a geopolitical concept, its initial use has been in the domestic German debate, to suggest the possible compatibility of an AfD-led East German “vanguard” with nationalist-led states in Central and Eastern Europe.
In the context of foreign, security, and trade policy, the Mitteleuropa term is used to describe the new sphere of influence for Germany in Europe, following the end of the war in Ukraine, a partially desired rapprochement with Russia, and the foreseeable reduction of the US military presence on the continent. It is, above all, a counter-model to an Atlanticist, Westernized Europe.
Old Ghosts (3): Polish Influence Between Three Seas
The Polish Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is currently the only geopolitically significant initiative in Europe that has taken concrete form. Launched in 2016 in partnership with Croatia, the 3SI focuses primarily on infrastructure development and the integration of the countries within the triangle formed by the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas.
However, Russia’s war against Ukraine has heightened, at least since 2022, the project’s security dimension. The initiative’s significance is underscored by fact that the US government also participated during President Donald Trump’s first term and continues to position its own companies to this day, using 3SI as a platform to strengthen American influence in a key geopolitical region of Europe.
Although 3SI is generally described in Poland as complementary to European integration, right-wing nationalist interest groups also view the initiative as a counterweight to German and Russian influence in Central Europe and as a “cordon sanitaire” separating two historically hegemonic powers.
Added to this is the proactive counter-narrative to Milan Kundera’s defensive “Return to Europe.” Even more so than the French Mediterranean Union or the Central Europe debates in Germany, the Three Seas Initiative reflects centuries of Polish national experience, which continues to exert a significant influence on the country’s foreign and security policy to this day.
Taking Geopolitics Seriously
Even if the desire to solve technical problems and streamline economic processes often takes center stage as the official justification, as in the case of the 3SI with regard to infrastructure projects, the driving forces behind the Mediterranean Union, Central Europe, and the Three Seas Initiative have one thing in common: They are based on more than just this.
In all these cases, historical experiences play a role. These experiences often date back to well before the start of the European unification process and draw in part on centuries-old collective fears and stereotypes. For instance, when Scholz spoke of “Central Europe” in his keynote speech on Europe in Prague in 2022, it didn’t take long for suspicious reactions to emerge in Paris.
In Europe’s capitals, geopolitical concepts are often dismissed as anachronistic. “Geopolitics” is, admittedly, an omnipresent term across the continent. Most often, it is used either to disparage the supposedly naive EU or to describe the ideal of a “geopolitical European Union” that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen likes to invoke.
However, in both cases, the EU and its member states are meant to be viewed as a collective—in both positive and negative terms. Given current trends and opinion polls across Europe, the possibility that this collective could fracture once again and that competing visions of the continent’s future could emerge must be taken seriously as a potential scenario for the future.
Anyone who uses the term “geopolitics” should be aware that it often conceals historical conceptions of space that were shaped by wars and crises. The EU and the governments of its member states must also prevent European integration, which has made no progress for years, from being undermined from within.
— translated from the German by Kate Brown
“The Future Shape of Europe” is a series of articles, run in cooperation with the DGAP's Europe Center, to inspire and inform the debate about EU enlargement and structural changes to the EU's inner workings.
Jacob Ross is a research fellow at the DGAP’s Europe center, focusing on France and the Franco-German relationship.
