When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz attended the meeting of government leaders from the European People's Party (EPP) in Zagreb on January 31, 2026, he described the new credo of his European policy in a single sentence. “It can’t be that it’s always the last one that sets the pace,” Merz, who leads Germany’s center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), told journalists. Now that qualified majority voting was widely used in the European Union’s internal market, he said, this step must also be taken in foreign policy. The chancellor is more convinced than ever that the ability to take action must take precedence over unity in the 27-member EU in the future.
This sounds like “business as usual” in German European policy given that abolishing unanimity was already on the agenda of former Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the Social Democrats (SPD), who are now Merz’ junior partners in government. But two decisions in recent months show that something fundamental has changed, that theoretical debate is becoming concrete policy: first, 24 of the 27 EU member states decided that Ukraine would receive a €90 billion loan for the coming years. Second, the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement was pushed through by a qualified majority—against France’s vote. Merz said this was regrettable, given the traditionally close coordination between Germany and France, but added that the completion of the agreement was more important.
All this shows that Germany’s European policy is becoming ever more focused on effectiveness. It is no longer based solely on the Franco-German pillar and is likely to shape the EU in the future, with all the opportunities and risks that this entails.
The Precursors
The idea that not all EU member states pull in the same direction is almost as old as the EU itself. The interests and worldviews of EU governments are often shaped by historical, political, and geographical factors, regardless of party affiliation. This gave rise to ideas such as a Europe of concentric circles, a core Europe, an avantgarde group, or a multi-speed Europe in the past. Since Merz was strongly influenced by the CDU’s leading thinker on European policy, the late Interior and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, in his early political career before he ventured into business, these ideas are not foreign to him. Merz also often refers to his time as a member of the European Parliament between 1989 and 1994.
In the wake of its enlargement, the EU and the views of its member states have become increasingly diverse and heterogeneous. In fact, the current structure of the EU shows that previous governments accepted this very early on. Although this is rarely acknowledged in public speeches, the EU is already a smorgasbord or a “Europe à la carte”; and it is precisely the latter term that has always been used to warn against the EU drifting apart. The euro, which is so important strategically, has only been introduced by 21 of the 27 member states. The Schengen Agreement on passport-free travel does not correspond with EU membership, either.
Nevertheless, the desire remains for the EU to make decisions jointly and unanimously—especially in Germany. When chancellors ignored “small” countries in agreements, they routinely came in for criticism that was amplified by the media; it was a staple accusation levelled at governments by the respective opposition. There was also kneejerk criticism when Berlin reached intergovernmental agreements with other capitals because they weren’t making progress on getting EU-wide deals. The era of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl was often cited as an example of a better European policy, although he ran the government in a much smaller, more homogeneous EU and a more stable international environment.
Two events have decisively changed German thinking about how the EU works: The Brexit vote of June 2016, which showed that the tensions between increased internal EU integration and the national desire for independence have become too great for some countries; and Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which requires very painful decisions and is driving a wedge between the majority of leaders and pro-Russian heads of government such as Hungary's Viktor Orbán. In addition, there has been the rise of right-wing populist parties in a number of EU member states, which can further complicate unanimous voting. It was not without reason that former German Chancellor Scholz, in his Prague speech on Europe on August 29, 2022, six months after his famous “watershed” speech on defense and security following Russia’s attack, called for a watershed in European policy as well by extending qualified majority voting to foreign and financial policy.
Merz’ New Pragmatism
In Merz’ first government statement to parliament on May 14, 2025, the focus was still on other aspects. His European remarks centered on emphasizing agreements with France and Poland and pushing for policies to boost competitiveness. This shaped the first months of his term—and was primarily directed against the European Commission. Together with French President Emmanuel Macron, and later with other heads of government, he pushed for a reorientation of EU policies: the Green Deal—i.e., the focus primarily on a climate-friendly policy by Brussels—is to be replaced as a priority by the pursuit of greater competitiveness. He wants to reverse the trend of the US and China outpacing the EU on economic growth, Merz recently emphasized in another government statement to the Bundestag on January 29, 2026. Much of his activity in the first months of his chancellorship was therefore directed at Brussels, with the aim of reducing bureaucratic burdens. At times, he voiced this stance in a very tough tone toward the European Commission and the European Parliament.
Above all, however, the chancellor focused on very strong intergovernmental coordination from the outset. His swift inaugural visit to Kyiv took place with the French president, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, but not with the leaders of the EU institutions. On the one hand, this was in line with Merz’ mentality. On the other hand, this trend toward coordination between heads of government was accelerated by the actions of US President Donald Trump. His decision to cut aid to Ukraine and his tariff policy, which was perceived as erratic, led to an ever greater need for “top level” coordination in Europe.
To be sure, the European Commission did negotiate the EU-US tariff agreement in Scotland in July. But in the days and weeks leading up to it, Merz made little secret of the fact that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was in close consultation with the large member states in particular—and that the German chancellor was insisting on a decisive role in setting the EU's course. It had already become clear in the summer that France's president and parts of the European Parliament wanted to take a much tougher line against Trump.
Although von der Leyen was among the seven European leaders who traveled to Washington in mid-August 2025 to discuss the Ukraine crisis, contacts with Washington increasingly shifted to the capitals. Germany's Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul established the E5 group (Germany, France, the UK, Poland, Italy) and “Weimar plus” (the original Weimar Triangle regional alliance of France, Germany, and Poland plus Italy and EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas) because agreements between the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland were no longer sufficient.
At the chancellor’s level, coordination increasingly took place within the E3 framework—that is, between Merz, Macron, and Starmer. Fresh back in government, Merz’ conservative CDU/CSU bloc suddenly forgot how vehemently it had criticized Merz’ predecessor, Scholz, for conducting an E3 meeting (excluding Poland) with then-US President Joe Biden visited Berlin back in October 2024, while it was still in opposition. Merz and his team have justified their E3 focus by pointing out that he had very quickly informed Warsaw and Rome, as well as EU leaders in Brussels, of the results of the talks. But the E3 meetings themselves became increasingly frequent—driven by a sense that, given the absence of the US, at least the three militarily and economically strongest European countries must adopt a common line.
Further Policy Change Since October
A decisive shift in the chancellor's thinking came at the EU summit in October 2025. Shortly beforehand, Merz had published a concept on how frozen Russian state assets in the EU could be used to provide billions of euros in credit to Ukraine. The reason for this was, on the one hand, the accusation that the Commission had allowed the question of Ukraine's future financing to drag on for too long. On the other hand, there was growing concern in Berlin that Germany would end up alone as Ukraine's main source of finance. After the US pulled out, it became apparent that the UK, France, and Italy were either unable or unwilling to ramp up their aid to Ukraine. By contrast, Merz’ government had already earmarked €8.5 billion in military aid for Ukraine in the 2026 federal budget —an amount that was then increased to €11.5 billion.
However, no agreement was reached at the EU summit. This was not only due to resistance from Belgium, where the majority of the more than €200 billion in “frozen” Russian assets are located; France objected to the inclusion of assets held by French private banks. In the end, the EU took an unusual step in December: Using a modified procedure, it activated an interest-free loan of up to €90 billion for Ukraine.
Although this was decided jointly and secured through the EU budget, only 24 of the 27 EU member states are contributing to the costs. Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have refused to join in. This was made possible because the EU resorted to so-called enhanced cooperation under Article 20 of the EU Treaty. This stipulates that, following a unanimous vote, at least nine EU countries can move forward and others can then follow. By that time, it had already become common practice for EU summits to end with a statement by the president of the European Council rather than a joint declaration by all member states.
From a German perspective, however, the realization that the Franco-German axis was no longer a viable basis for European decision-making was likely to have been even more decisive. One example is the Franco-German-Spanish project for a new air combat system, FCAS. France's president, who no longer has a majority in the National Assembly, was unable to dissuade the aerospace company Dassault from claiming a clear leadership role in the project instead of sticking to its negotiated share of the work. It therefore became increasingly unlikely that the three European countries would be able to jointly build an alternative to US 6th generation fighter jets. “Macron can no longer deliver,” said one EU diplomat, summing up his disappointment.
It also became clear that France would under no circumstances support the conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement, which had been under negotiation for 25 years, despite repeated improvements to protect EU farmers. In Berlin, there was talk of an increasingly irrational, cross-party stance in Paris that Macron was no longer able to override. As early as October 2025, German government officials were therefore saying there was no longer any point in seeking approval in Paris and Warsaw: the focus, also of the European Commission, was now on Italy, whose votes would provide the necessary two-thirds majority.
At the December summit, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni promised both Brazilian President Ignacio Lula da Silva and Merz that she would agree, asking only for a postponement of a few days. In January, the agreement was reached as promised. “I could have imagined that everyone would agree, but if that’s not possible, a decision must be taken by qualified majority,” Merz said tersely on January 29. Both the chancellor and Meloni then pushed for the agreement to be provisionally implemented, even though the European Parliament voted in a highly controversial decision to have the treaty reviewed by the European Court of Justice, creating fresh uncertainty.
Germany’s new flexibility on EU policy is also being fueled by another issue that is not being discussed openly: Berlin is not alone in harboring doubts about who will govern in Paris after the 2027 presidential election. If Europeans are now looking for a common response to the US president, they must also bear in mind that the old “core Europe” will hardly work if France no longer has a pro-European president.
As a result, consultation with Paris is losing its significance as a cornerstone of Germany’s European policy. That is why Merz and his cabinet members are increasingly turning their attention to other EU partners. Scholz, as chancellor, had already praised the miraculous transformation of Italy's post-fascist leader Meloni into a pro-European, pro-Ukrainian, and pro-American EU partner. In January, Merz decided to present a paper on competitiveness in Europe together with Meloni at a special EU summit on February 12 that he initiated. This chimes with the decision of the national-conservative ECR group in the European Parliament, which includes Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia party, to help push through the German government's efforts to reverse EU legislation such as the Supply Chain Directive.
New Formats, Within and Beyond the EU
German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil got a lot of attention when he announced a new E6 format among finance ministers on January 28. Together with his colleagues from France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands, he wants to try to break the deadlock that has blocked progress toward a genuine capital markets union for years. “We are providing impetus, and others can join us. The key is to strengthen our competitiveness and defense capabilities. As six major economies in Europe, we now want to be the driving force,” said Klingbeil, referring to the initiative coordinated with Paris.
The media suddenly discovered the trend toward a “two-speed Europe.” But Klingbeil’s move merely completed what the chancellor and foreign minister had previously established in terms of new formats. Furthermore, the E6 format shows how far removed the old ideas of a fixed “core Europe” have become. The leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, Jens Spahn, referred to a “Europe of pioneers” in the Bundestag on January 29. That can take many different forms. Alliances are being formed along geographical and thematic lines. Incidentally, there were also examples of this approach under Scholz: The former chancellor launched annual meetings between Germany and the Baltic states, as well as with the Nordic countries.
Since the UK’s traumatic exit from the EU, which took place in early 2020, alliances have been forming that reach beyond EU borders. One example was the North Sea Summit in Hamburg on January 26, 2026, which promoted the expansion and protection of offshore wind energy—with partners including Norway and Iceland, neither of which are EU members. The aid provided to Ukraine and the defense against the Russian threat have already shown that strong NATO partners such as Norway and the UK are key players. And US President Trump’s threats of annexation against Greenland have also led to very close coordination between the northern Europeans and Canada.
New Dangers
However, the principle of “effectiveness over unity” is not without risk. The migration crisis of 2015 already showed the limits of qualified majority voting. For this system to work, it is necessary that countries that are outvoted in a democratic community of values abide by the decisions that are made. This didn’t happen when it came to the allocation of refugees among EU member states, because the Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary) simply ignored the decisions. Now, Poland has already announced that it does not intend to implement at least part of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The EU has the option of imposing penalties for this. However, Eastern European member states such as Hungary have shown that they are willing to accept billions in cuts to EU payments for violations motivated by domestic and party politics. The path of enhanced cooperation, which Hungary did agree to when it came to financing for Ukraine, could therefore be the better option.
However, this is not possible in areas of policy that are communitized, such as trade or euro policy. Here, Germany and France proved in 2002 and 2003, when they violated the deficit criteria of the Stability Pact, that large countries can flout EU law with impunity—which undermines confidence in the rule of law and encourages others to follow suit. Today, France is nowhere near the permitted budget deficits.
And there could still be repercussions from the Mercosur trade agreement. As satisfied as Berlin may be with the outcome, the provisional implementation now being demanded by almost all parties in Germany is being condemned in France as undemocratic by all parties and by the government. One consequence of this could be a further boost for parties critical of or hostile toward Europe ahead of the French presidential election in May 2027.
Translated from the German by David Crossland
Andreas Rinke is chief correspondent of the Reuters news agency in Berlin.
