Until quite recently few outside policy circles would have heard of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), the quietly influential forum linking the Nordic and Baltic states that has gained in political prominence since 2022. Created after the Cold War to guide the newly independent Baltic states toward Europe, the NB8 is now more visible, agile—and arguably more relevant — than ever. Amid Russia’s war on Ukraine, lingering questions about the United States’ long-term commitment to European security and rising geopolitical tensions, the NB8 is positioning itself as a new political force at the heart of regional cooperation. But as visibility and expectations grow, questions also arise about what and whether this informal grouping can deliver.
Historically, the five Nordic and three Baltic states have been interconnected for centuries, with trade—via the Hanseatic Leage in medieval times—playing a crucial role in their interactions. However, the most significant bond was formed toward the end of the Cold War, when the Nordic Council first engaged with Baltic parliamentarians around 1989.
The Nordic countries were strong supporters of the Baltic states’ independence and were the first to introduce visa-free regimes with them. Official cooperation began in November 1991, when the Nordic Council attended the inaugural meeting of the Baltic Assembly in Tallinn. A formal cooperation agreement between the two was signed in 1992.
Initially called 5+3, the format was renamed NB8 in 2000 during a meeting of the Baltic and Nordic foreign ministers in Denmark. Over time, the cooperation evolved, with Nordic countries actively assisting the Baltic states in their integration into the European Union and NATO. This has developed into a collaboration as equals as the three Baltic states have become wealthy developed economies approaching the EU income average.
Assessing the NB8’s Significance
The NB8’s rising profile is closely tied to recent shifts in international politics. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 intensified security concerns along Europe’s northeastern flank, which most notably led to Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO. Russia’s aggressive behavior in Ukraine prompted new threat assessments, and with all eight Nordic and Baltic states in NATO there was now a historically new and forceful incentive toward deeper regional cooperation. This was further amplified by the fact that the Nordic Baltic region is the only NATO territory with a direct border to Russia, a total of 2,555 kilometer ranging from the Barents Sea to Southern Latvia.
At the same time, the second Trump administration’s critical stance toward NATO exposed vulnerabilities within traditional Western security arrangements, prompting European countries to prioritize stronger regional ties and greater self-reliance. More poignantly, US President Donald Trump’s overt flirtation with a formal acquisition of Greenland, an autonomous region of Denmark, have added new and ominous ambiguities regarding the territorial integrity of NB8 countries. Moreover, China’s expanding global influence is adding to a sense of geopolitical uncertainty. In this environment of great power competition, the NB8 has emerged for the region’s decisionmakers as an effective, useful, and therefore increasingly visible framework for regional coordination, diplomatic alignment, and joint messaging.
Key NB8 Initiatives
In line with its increasing visibility, the NB8 has notched several concrete achievements, which indicate a notable shift in its political relevance. With the degrees of commitment to supporting Ukraine varying among EU member states, the NB8 countries realized early on after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion that they all had much in common as staunch supporters of Ukraine. Polls in NB8 countries showed that the public opinion strongly supported military aid while pro-Russian sentiments remained marginal among political parties. Moreover, all the NB8 states have bilateral security agreements with Ukraine and there is strong support for Ukraine’s EU and NATO integration.
Apart from the concrete deliveries of arms, humanitarian aid, and funding to Ukraine, which at €26 billion in February 2025 counts at the top globally both per capita and in absolute terms, NB8 heads of government and state and other ministers have visited Ukraine together and have also invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to meetings as well as undertaken visits in third countries to make the case for Ukraine. This has garnered considerable attention and shown that the NB8 has both the ambitions and ability to act as a political entity.
One example of this was when Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk participated onsite, and French President Emmanuel Macron online, in the Nordic Baltic summit of the Swedish NB8 presidency at the Swedish prime minister's official summer residence, Harpsund, in November 2024. That was the first NB8 summit since 2017. Another was when the NB8 foreign ministers participated in the “Raisina Dialogue” in New Delhi, India, where they conveyed joint messaging in the first ever joint NB8 advocacy trip outside of Europe.
Standing Firmly Behind Ukraine
This has also translated into further joint messaging in the name of the NB8, such as a February 2025 joint statement that the NB8 leaders “stand fully and firmly behind Ukraine” and that “Ukraine must be able to prevail against Russia’s war of aggression, to ensure a just and lasting peace.” It is indicative of how NB8 countries assess the conflict as an existential challenge also for European security, that they issued this public communication just a few weeks into the second Trump administration, adding that “the outcome of the war will have fundamental and long-lasting effects on European and transatlantic security.”
The strong NB8 commitment to Ukraine also relates to the thorny discussion of how the country should be supported with a “reassurance force” if and when a ceasefire or other settlement ending hostilities materializes, and if a US “backstop” to this will be included in one way or another. While it is unlikely that the NB8 would assume responsibility alone for any reassurance force for Ukraine, it looks set to play a key role in collaboration with other major European powers if and when the delicate foundational parameters for such a force have been worked out.
In addition to its firm support for Ukraine, the NB8 has also taken a joint stance in support of the Republic of Moldova. The eight foreign ministers of the NB8 visited Chisinau in October 2024 and issued a statement that “Moldova can count on the full support of Nordic and Baltic countries.” They added that the NB8 was determined to contribute to the stability, security, and prosperity of Moldova. The NB8 has also issued similar messages of support for Armenia’s ambition to deepen its ties with the EU.
There are other recent examples of policy impacts with strong Nordic-Baltic involvement, which have led to concrete operational results, even though there was no readily apparent formal NB8 footprint. These include the January 14, 2025 launch in Helsinki of NATO’s Maritime operation “Baltic Sentry” countering presumed Russian hybrid attacks in the Baltic Sea, the May 16, 2025 decision to reform the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) to “effectively meet the new security environment,” as well as the increased activities within the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), where all NB8 states are members, including political high-level summitry such as in Oslo in May 2025.
Bolstering Regional Resilience
Lower profile activities of the NB8, though no less important, include cooperation on combatting hybrid threats and terrorism. In response to escalating threats—including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and infrastructure sabotage—the NB8 countries have intensified their collaborative efforts to bolster regional resilience. This includes joint cybersecurity exercises, enhanced intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and coordinated strategies to protect critical infrastructure. These initiatives aim to mitigate vulnerabilities exacerbated by geopolitical tensions, particularly those stemming from Russian activities that have directly impacted several NB8 members.
Beyond immediate policy outcomes, the NB8’s civil servant exchange programs and training program for young diplomats help to foster mutual understanding and deeper relationships among the Nordic and Baltic countries. By facilitating study visits, internships, and collaborative projects, these initiatives aim to strengthen networks and promote a shared administrative culture across the region. Such exchanges not only enhance professional development but also contribute to the long-term sustainability of NB8 cooperation by building confidence and familiarity among public officials. The program recently expanded to include participants from Ukraine between 2023 and 2025—reflecting a commitment to inclusive regional integration.
Challenges Ahead
However, it’s not all plain sailing for the NB8. Despite the momentum and its many achievements, the forum is facing several structural and political hurdles that may complicate its future cooperation and effectiveness.
A defining feature—but also a limitation—of the NB8 is its informal nature. Without a permanent secretariat or dedicated administrative infrastructure, institutional memory and continuity can suffer. Leadership rotates annually among members, meaning strategic initiatives risk losing momentum or consistency, especially when confronted with rapidly evolving geopolitical challenges. Similarly, decisions within the NB8 rely on consensus, which, while fostering unity, can hamper swift responses during crises. Achieving agreement among eight countries, each with distinct domestic political contexts and priorities, can slow down crucial decision-making processes, reducing the group’s agility and responsiveness at critical moments.
Then there is the issue of diverging national interests. Of course, even the closest of families have disagreements. Despite their proximity and shared histories, NB8 members all have differing national priorities, particularly on sensitive policy areas like migration, fiscal policy, and economic governance. These divergences can occasionally lead to internal friction, diluting the forum’s ability to articulate coherent regional positions or act decisively as a unified bloc.
Another subtle risk is that increased NB8 coordination could unintentionally create competing sub-alliances within larger frameworks such as the EU, NATO, and CBSS. There could even be such challenges to the NB8 itself when the EU members of the forum, the so called NB6, meet to coordinate ahead of EU meetings. While the NB8’s closer cooperation offers clear benefits for its members, it may thus also fragment broader unity, complicating collective decisions and potentially diluting the voice of, or attracting suspicion within, the larger alliances. Balancing the advantages of deeper regional ties with the broader interests of EU and transatlantic solidarity will be a delicate but necessary task for NB8 leaders going forward.
As the NB8’s visibility grows, so do expectations—both domestically and internationally. Yet limited resources and modest capabilities, which vary among the NB8 countries, may prevent the group from meeting heightened demands or ambitious strategic goals. What international relations theorists call the “capability-expectations gap” poses a risk of disappointment among member states and external partners alike, potentially weakening confidence in the forum’s future cooperation and impact.
Next Steps
As the NB8 format has become more active, more impactful, and more relevant than ever in the security and defense fields in recent years, and as the geopolitical outlook for Europe looks more uncertain now than it has for a long time, future NB8 priorities will presumably include these same areas where most momentum has been generated and much remains to be done.
Denmark, which holds the 2025 rotating presidency of the NB8, has for instance realized that the unexpected geopolitical headwinds stemming from Trump’s wish to acquire Greenland requires even stronger engagement with its closest allies and neighbors, including via the NB8.
The decision cited above to revamp the CBSS toward more security and defense, involving the key NB8 partners and European heavyweights Germany and Poland, is one sign of this policy priority. The perceived value of coordinated external communication and joint visits to third countries will probably inspire more of the same. Coordinated action of this kind strengthens both the message and the view of the region.
Furthermore, acknowledging the NB8’s rising strategic significance, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has been commissioned to produce an independent report on regional security and defense cooperation.While originally scheduled to be published ahead of the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025, the process remains underway. Stoltenberg’s recommendations are expected to push the forum toward deeper integration, enhanced joint military capabilities, stronger deterrence strategies, and greater resilience against hybrid threats. His involvement signals the NB8’s intent to significantly expand its security role amid an increasingly conflict-ridden geopolitical landscape.
Striking a Balance
The NB8 has emerged in a short period of time as a more visible actor in regional security and political coordination. Once a little-known platform, the NB8 has demonstrated its growing relevance through concrete actions: robust support for Ukraine and against Russian aggression, a coordinated stance on Moldova, intensified cooperation against hybrid threats, and strengthened regional resilience through joint initiatives.
Yet heightened expectations now confront longstanding structural limitations. The NB8’s informality, reliance on consensus, and absence of a permanent secretariat may hinder its ability to respond swiftly to evolving geopolitical threats. Diverging national priorities and the potential for fragmentation within broader alliances pose additional challenges.
Looking ahead, the NB8 will need to carefully navigate the tension between deepening regional cooperation and maintaining cohesion within larger frameworks such as the EU and NATO. Its ability to strike this balance—while managing the growing gap between capability and expectation—will determine whether it can transition from an agile forum of like-minded states into a lasting political and economic force for European security.
Jakob Hallgren is the director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
Mark Rhinard is Professor of International Relations at Stockholm University.
