The Polish-German relationship is the missing link in Europe’s response to the new era of geopolitical instability.
New formats and coalitions were established in recent years in the search for practicable ways of creating more European coordination to tackle Russia’s war against Ukraine, US retrenchment, and defense. The United Kingdom moved closer to the European Union and played its full role again within the E3—the European leadership trio with France and Germany. Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni mended fences with Brussels to gain influence and respect. Poland closed ranks with the Nordic and Baltic states in a successful bid to increase the influence of the region most endangered by Russia. The Franco-German axis is notoriously underperforming but it remains stable.
Warsaw and Berlin, however, two key capitals and neighbors in Central Europe, keep talking past each other. Or barely talk at all. This is worrisome. Germany and Poland are emerging as Europe’s military powerhouses, and their closer coordination will be instrumental for the continent’s defense and stability.
Failed Attempts at Warmer Relations
It’s not that Warsaw and Berlin haven’t tried to do better. The first attempt at a new opening took place after Donald Tusk became Poland’s prime minister in December 2023. It followed eight years of the rule by the populist and anti-German Law and Justice (PiS) party which had wreaked havoc on Poland’s relationship with Brussels and Berlin.
Then German Chancellor Olaf Scholz offered a closer relationship, and the long-stalled cooperation within the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany, and Poland) was revived. Setbacks followed swiftly, however: Berlin opposed Tusk’s request for European co-financing of Poland’s fortifications of NATO’s Eastern border, while Warsaw rejected—as unsatisfactory—the German offer to pay €200 million in compensation to surviving forced laborers and victims of Germany’s occupation of Poland during World War II, in a bid to close the prolonged spat over war reparations. The resulting mutual disappointment and lack of engagement lasted until the end of the Scholz government.
The chancellorship of Friedrich Merz offered a new opportunity for a relaunch. Merz underlined the importance of Poland in his election campaign and seemed to be genuinely interested in making Warsaw a key partner in leading Europe in the Trump era. It was reportedly upon his insistence that Tusk participated in crucial meetings of European leaders on Ukraine and defense.
But the new beginning was spoiled before it really started. On the day of Merz’ visit to Poland, Berlin tightened border controls and started boasting about pushing back asylum seekers to the neighboring countries. This set off a nationalistic frenzy in Poland and put Tusk under enormous pressure—fighting back against Germany became once more a national mission. The opportunity to overcome the impasse was lost again.
A Ticking Bomb
For Tusk, the German issue is a ticking bomb in terms of domestic politics. Anti-German campaigns run by the opposition are in full swing, and sympathy for their neighbors across the River Oder is declining rapidly. According to a recent Polish-German poll, only 33 percent of Poles express sympathy for Germans—a record low in 20 years of polling.
Unable to obtain anything from Scholz and Merz that he could “sell” as a success at home, Tusk now seems to be more interested in limiting any potential domestic political damage caused by engaging with the Germans rather than in forging closer bilateral ties. In Berlin, meanwhile, policymakers are just shrugging their shoulders. A close relationship with Warsaw would be nice-to-have, but not necessarily worth taking political risks for to make happen.
Unsurprisingly, the latest Polish-German intergovernmental consultations took place on December 1, 2025, amid low expectations and dashed hopes. Tusk had no interest in big words or symbolic pictures; Merz did not have anything particular to offer apart from a welcome gesture—the overdue restitution of some valuable cultural artefacts to Poland.
Still, both sides agreed to set up a working group to explore opportunities for closer military cooperation and announced that a bilateral security agreement will be signed in 2026. Last May, Tusk signed a security treaty with France in Nancy, and a similar arrangement will be concluded with the UK very soon. That the cooperation with Germany is lagging behind speaks of the poor state of the mutual trust between Warsaw and Berlin and is also a worrying signal for Europe.
Key in European Defense
Germany and Poland are of key importance for Europe’s defense, both politically and militarily. This is not just because of their geographical location and strategic relevance from the perspective of NATO defense plans. Most importantly, it is Poland and Germany that are among the most serious when it comes to investments in defense. They are likely to reach the ambitious NATO spending goal of 5 percent of GDP spending agreed in The Hague in July 2025. Neither France nor the UK have realistic financial pathways to reaching that goal.
As a result, the future conventional defense of Europe will disproportionately rely on Germany and Poland as the countries with the largest and hopefully best equipped land forces. A proper EU defense union or even a European pillar of NATO to which all European nations would contribute their equal shares seems a pipedream today. Rather, a coalition of willing and able countries will have to play a key role as the EU’s Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030 admits. Therefore, Berlin and Warsaw should strive to form the continent’s strongest defense axis, regardless of their current bilateral underperformance.
Europe’s upcoming massive military buildup, even if not evenly distributed, is as much a necessary adjustment to the new geopolitical reality as a risk factor for the continent’s stability. History tells us that rising nationalism and accelerated militarization—with both happening in parallel—may lead to the unraveling of the European order. This lesson needs to be recalled not in order to discourage European nations from investing in their defense but to make them do so in a responsible way.
Strengthening national armies without also paying enough attention to coordination, joint procurement, entanglement of national defense industries, and sharing resources would be a grave mistake and a missed opportunity. Germany should understand this better than any other country. It bears a particular responsibility for the push for such a Europeanization (not to be mistaken for supra-national integration) of defense—in its own interest.
Making Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, the “strongest conventional army in Europe” with a German defense budget two or three times larger than that of her biggest partners in the EU will be met with appreciation or fear, depending on how intertwined German power is with that of other countries. Germany’s legitimacy as Europe’s leading power will hinge on whether and how the current financial and political efforts to enhance the country’s military clout will be anchored in the European framework.
Facing Fundamental Challenges Together
Just as German reunification came hand in hand with the decision to introduce a common European currency, Europe’s military awakening—with Germany as its lynchpin—should entail a qualitative leap forward in defense coordination and integration.
This is where Polish-German relations come in again. Overcoming the existing impasse with Warsaw should be Berlin’s foreign policy imperative even if Poland may sometimes seem like a difficult partner. Germany deployed two Patriot batteries (until December 10, 2025) to protect the Rzeszow logistics hub for military aid to Ukraine, and sent five Eurofighters and around 150 personnel plus additional support units to Malbork in Poland in support of the NATO Air Policing mission. In addition, several dozens of Bundeswehr soldiers will be deployed as of April 2026 to help build the so-called Eastern Shield, a fortification of the Polish border with Belarus. It is a very significant contribution to Poland’s and the NATO Eastern flank’s security.
However, a closer, and more structured, industrial, military, and procurement cooperation between Poland and Germany would be necessary for their partnership to live up to its potential and needs. That Warsaw opted for Swedish—and not German—submarines to be purchased until 2031 was a disappointment for Berlin. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to give up on deepening this relationship in the realm of defense.
Berlin should use its fiscal space and investments in the Bundeswehr in a strategic way, with an eye not only on national industrial interests but also on its leadership role in Europe’s rearmament efforts. The upcoming Polish-German security agreement will be an opportunity to prove that realignment is possible. It will require both Friedrich Merz and Donald Tusk to throw their weight behind it and take some political risks. In light of the imminent threat from the Russia, along with the ramifications of the US’ new National Security Strategy, they need to rise to the occasion like other great European leaders—Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle or Helmut Kohl and Tadeusz Mazowiecki—did in the face of the fundamental challenges of their times.
Piotr Buras is IPQ’s Warsaw columnist and head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
