In our new age of neo-imperial great-power rivalry, the European continent has taken on new meaning as a safe haven—standing up for territorial sovereignty (for Ukraine), facilitating economic development and prosperity (for Southeastern Europe), and offering shelter from geopolitical fallout (potentially for Iceland and Norway). A shifting tide in the ocean of geopolitics could bring the European Union from currently 27 to 28 member states by 2028, and to maybe as many as 35 by 2035.
But for the rising tide to lift all boats (to borrow a famous phrase from former US President John F. Kennedy) size alone is not enough—quality matters, too. Ukraine would gain nothing from acceding to an EU that is unable to deliver on the security it seeks, nor would the countries of the Western Balkans benefit in their pursuit of economic development. For enlargement to be meaningful, the EU itself must develop a credible capacity to deliver on those promises—not only to its new members, but to its community as a whole.
Accession as a Driver
History shows that the accession of new members has always been a major driver of institutional innovation, reshaping the European architecture. The Single European Act of 1986 was in part developed to accommodate a more heterogeneous group of 15 members. The Monetary Union was conceived as an integration step to embed—and tame—a unified Germany within the then European Community’s institutional structures. And the move toward a constitution that failed but eventually led to the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon was set in motion in anticipation of the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004.
An EU of 35 by 2035 would be the most encompassing enlargement of the EU in over 30 years. The accession of Ukraine alone—being the second largest country in Europe with a gross national income (GNI) of $16.000 per capita (less than half of the EU average)—would bring dramatic changes to how the EU budget is allocated, how cohesion between member states is measured, and how to incorporate a war-ridden society and economy into EU structures. Also, institutionally this would have a drastic impact on the structure of Qualified Majority Voting and the composition of the European Parliament, to only name two.
Viewed against the historical backdrop of linking a credible enlargement debate with a credible reform perspective, the current debate presents a striking anomaly: Not only is there a lack of discussion about a broader reform agenda, but there also appears to be no political will to even engage with it, on the grounds that there are “more immediate problems to solve.”
Overcoming Aversion to Reforms
"At the current stage of development, it is by no means solely a question of creating additional institutional integration mechanisms. What is crucial, rather, is that the existing mechanisms are utilized more decisively." These words do not come from a current European head of state or government, but from former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, back in 1978—a statement of integration realism delivered just a few years before one of the most consequential phases of European integration got under way. Deliberated from 1984 onwards, the Single European Act laid the foundation of the EU Single Market, took the first steps toward a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and expanded the European Community’s competencies in monetary policy, research, and the environment.
That new impetus came in the form of joint proposals by the German and Italian foreign ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Emilio Colombo (the “Genscher-Colombo Plan”), in the early 1980s. They recognized that a larger European Community required institutional structures capable of enhancing its ability to act. Institutional innovation was conceived to break potential deadlocks in an expanded union and to capture low-hanging fruit through deeper (economic) integration.
Lessons from the Past
What does this mean for today's debate on enlargement and the future architecture of the EU?
First, timing. Viktor Orbán's crushing electoral defeat in Hungary opens the door to a rethink. With the threat of an automatic Hungarian veto gone, other EU member states—even ones skeptical about reform—will likely be unwilling to expose themselves the way Orbán did. This creates a window of opportunity that will remain open roughly until the spring of next year, when the French presidential election looms. That window needs to be used to significantly advance EU enlargement institutional innovation.
Second, actors. Institutional innovation in the wake of enlargement needs drivers and alliances. One alliance capable of bridging existing divergences and driving the process is the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany, and Poland)—particularly because it brings together non-like-minded countries and because it acknowledges the eastward shift in the EU’s political center of gravity.
The Weimar Triangle was established 35 years ago with the explicit aim of smoothing Poland’s accession to the European Union. Now it needs to help facilitate Ukraine’s EU membership in the context of a reformed accession process, or at least build the foundations for the necessary institutional adjustments. The heavy lifting, however, will fall to Germany: As the most credible champion of enlargement, and given its own history of broadening national sovereignty through integration, Berlin has both the standing and the obligation to lead.
Third, process. Every successful innovation requires not only political alliances and creativity, but also a process. It was precisely the absence of a credible political process that left the Conference on the Future of Europe in 2021 too weak to gain political significance. Former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz used to hold regular “reform breakfasts” with colleagues ahead of European Councils. To build a process for institutional innovation in the run-up to enlargement, those member states that are aligned on both EU reform and enlargement should now come together again to foster a convergence of ideas. That process should be driven primarily by heads of state and government and their “sherpas” (in most cases their European affairs advisers), also incorporating the perspectives of candidate countries.
A Culture of Cooperation
An enlarged European Union cannot simply be the current EU with more members. Enlargement opens a new window of opportunity to rethink the policy areas that will be decisive in shaping prosperity and security on the continent—including a fundamental rethink of what the EU should actually be responsible for delivering. This could foster a new culture of cooperation—something that is sorely needed to make enlargement a genuine success.
“The Future Shape of Europe” is a series of articles, run in cooperation with the DGAP's Europe Center, to inspire and inform the debate about EU enlargement and structural changes to the EU's inner workings.
Linn Selle is the Alfred von Oppenheim Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Europe Center.
