Russia’s war against Ukraine is now in its fourth year, with no end in sight. One of the major consequences of the war has been the fact that the European Union has accepted Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as EU membership candidates—mostly for geopolitical reasons. And despite the war, Ukraine’s integration into the EU has been moving forward. Indeed, for Ukrainian society, becoming part of the EU is of the upmost importance.
The EU has never attempted enlargement under such conditions. Even with around 20 percent of its territory occupied by Russia, Ukraine is a much bigger country than any of the other candidates in the Western Balkans and Eastern neighborhood. What’s more, the EU and Ukraine have a different understanding about how to go about integrating Ukraine into the EU and what that process means. This bears a risk of alienation between the two sides.
EU Integration as a Security Guarantee?
The first major misperception is about the significance of Ukrainian EU membership: For Kyiv, it is part of security guarantees; for the Europeans, it isn’t.
In the negotiations about a ceasefire agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States, EU integration has been discussed as an element of security guarantees for Ukraine. The idea is that with EU membership secured, it is more acceptable for Ukraine to give up parts of its territories, at least for some time. In contrast, European countries discuss security guarantees in terms of a “coalition of the willing” deploying troops to Ukraine and arming Ukraine in a way that it would be too costly for Russia to attack the country again.
In Ukraine, EU integration is seen as a key element for leaving Russia’s sphere of influence for good. Both the Orange Revolution of 2004-05 and the Revolution of Dignity 2013-14 were expressions by Ukrainians of the fact that they belong in Europe and are not part of Russia’s “near abroad.” Both revolutions raised fundamental questions of identity and where the country is heading. To become a fully-fledged member of the EU, would mean a clear signal to the Kremlin that the country has finally left Russia’s orbit, and now belongs to a “European sphere of influence.”
Ukrainians see this as a reward for their suffering, and for the many who lost their lives at the Euromaidan and in Russia’s war of aggression since 2014. But it is also about “returning to Europe,” where Ukraine belongs.
For the EU and its member states, the decision to open the accession process for Ukraine was and remains a geopolitical decision. The process itself, however, is first of all about the reforms that have to be implemented by any candidate country—to fulfill the criteria to become part of the club. While the decision for EU integration is a political one, the process is an administrative one driven by the EU’s bureaucracy, i.e. the European Commission. And from the commission’s legalistic point of view, it doesn’t matter what Ukraine deserves; the process is all about institutional reforms and fulfilling norms.
Reforms, Not Bargaining
This leads to a second challenge: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has promised the Ukrainians that the country will join the EU at the beginning of 2027, or by the end of that year at the latest. He believes that by means of tough negotiations with the EU, like he did on financial support and weapons supply, he will get what Ukraine deserves sooner rather than later.
This, however, is a misunderstanding of how the EU integration process works. It’s not about hard bargaining or putting maximalist demands on the table to reach a good compromise. It’s all about hard work on reforms, which have to be implemented by the national bureaucracy.
An Associate Membership
When Zelensky met German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in mid-April in Berlin, he demanded EU membership for Ukraine in 2027. Merz rejected this as “unrealistic,” also pointing out that it is technically impossible. However, Merz offered a new format an associate membership for Ukraine. This would mean a pre-accession process that could bring the country closer to the EU than any other candidate has ever been—potentially including participation in European Councils, sending MEPs to European Parliament, and having officials in the European Commission, all without voting rights. In short, Ukraine would sit at the EU table, but would not have a say in the decision-making.
From a Ukrainian perspective, this is not acceptable, since the country wants to become a fully-fledged EU member as soon as possible. Furthermore, such a symbolic membership will not deter Russia from reclaiming Ukraine as part of its “sphere of influence.”
From an EU point of view, the status of associate membership is an innovation. It would give a candidate country access to key EU institutions and a chance to participate in internal discussions, thus having the opportunity to better prepare for future membership. This new status would need a majority vote by member states and a change of the procedural rules in the European Council, which is a major concession toward Ukraine and will have to also be offered to other candidate countries, especially those in the Western Balkans.
Germany is the main driver of this idea, which, according to Merz, has received positive feedback from other EU member states. For Berlin, the integration of Ukraine is a priority, but for the German government it is also important not to leave the countries of the Western Balkans behind. At the same time, given that Berlin is Ukraine’s main supporter now regarding military supply, financial support, and development aid, a merit-based integration process is crucial, the more so since Ukraine is lagging behind in areas like judiciary, rule of law, and public administration reform. Fighting corruption, changing the judicial system, and strengthening decentralization are key reforms Germany want to see as part of the process of Ukraine becoming an EU member state.
Institutions Are Key
That leads to a third challenges: Zelenskiy is trying to build a power vertical. This is because of the war, but also because he does not believe in institutions. Many government positions are handed out not primarily as a result of the appointees’ expertise but their loyalty. Zelensky ignores the parliament when he does not need it and expects it to vote for his proposals (also when it comes to introducing reforms related to EU integration) when he demands it. There are rumors in Kyiv that he doesn’t know more than half of the MPs from his own party.
Ukrainians are overall skeptical about state institutions, and presidential rule supports less, not more institutionalization. When it comes to EU integration, however, everything is about institutions—at its core, it’s about the institutional capacity of a state to introduce and implement very complex legislation.
So as Zelensky demands a quick membership while sidelining institutions, the EU expects Ukraine, in a well-coordinated way between the parliament, government, and president, to implement reforms.
There is a great danger that these misunderstandings will lead to alienation between Ukraine and the EU. Both sides need each other and there is no alternative to integrating Ukraine into the EU. Both sides need to improve their understanding of the other side and work on a process that ensures that Ukraine’s EU accession takes place in a realistic way, while Brussels and the EU member states build a bridge for Ukraine with a staged membership, starting with an associate membership.
It is crucial for both, to send the message to the Kremlin that Ukraine is an integral part of Europe. But both have to move to make this message believable.
This article is informed by interviews the author conducted in Kyiv between April 13 and 23, as part of a research scholarship with the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK).
“The Future Shape of Europe” is a series of articles, run in cooperation with the DGAP's Europe Center, to inspire and inform the debate about EU enlargement and structural changes to the EU's inner workings.
Stefan Meister leads the Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia Center at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
