The sense of déjà-vu is nowhere stronger than when it comes to debating EU reforms. In the words of Karl Valentin, the pioneering German comedian of the early 20th century—everything has already been said, but not yet by everybody.
During the past decade, the EU has turned in circles. There was then European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s White Paper process (2017); there was the Conference on the Future of Europe (2019-2022), inspired by French President Emmanuel Macron; there was the Franco-German Working Group (2023); and there was “The Granada Declaration” in the same year, when EU leaders finally committed to pursue internal reforms in the wake of the EU’s enlargement.
Where has all this led us? Nowhere, really.
Financial Leverage Instead of Institution Innovation
When the EU did see advancement during the past decade, it was not so much the result of institutional innovation, but rather due to the use of financial incentives as leverage for reforms. The post-COVID-19 recovery instrument NextGenerationEU, which dispersed grants and loans across the EU financed by common debt, gave the European Commission greater power to exercise political steering when it came to reforms in EU member states. The new “rule-of-law conditionality” tied access to EU finances to upholding EU rules and values. And the National and Regional Partnership Plans, which are part of the proposed next EU budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework, or MFF, for 2028 to 2034) are supposed to work this way, tying access to EU money to domestic reforms.
There are two main reasons for this: First, all EU leaders acknowledge that the current EU rules stem from a different era (the Treaty of Lisbon, also known as the “Reform Treaty,” was signed almost 20 years ago) and have led to dysfunction, certainly when it comes to decision-making, which still requires unanimity in many cases. At the same time, however, most member states are quite happy with this situation. The thinking goes: Ultimately it is advantageous that one’s sovereignty is protected by a veto in the last resort.
Second, the supporters of a broader EU reform agenda have been making their case rather quietly. For example, today’s debate on introducing more Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is largely framed within the context of overcoming political blockages (as German Foreign Minister Johann Wadepfuhl stressed in May 2026). This is certainly important, though not necessarily helpful when it comes to convincing those EU member states reluctant to give up their veto power in more areas.
Showcasing Benefits to Skeptics
Rather, the European Commission and those governments supportive of institutional advancement should argue that majority voting actually strengthens small member states, as they have a vested interest in an EU capable of acting, while non-action rather strengthens the big member states, as Manuel Müller elegantly put it this September.
Furthermore, persistent blockage undermines trust in the EU to deliver on policies, fanning euroskeptic sentiment in member states. This is especially pertinent in policy areas linked to support for Ukraine, where most of the EU’s frontline states want to show their voters that “Europe” is delivering against the Russian threat.
Finally, a European reform agenda would keep the club together in times when pressure to deliver is high. Strengthening decision-making structures would enable upholding the EU’s integrated order so that decisions are not outsourced to smaller clubs acting in parallel to EU structures. Here, again, is an incentive for smaller member states that historically fear “directorates” of bigger member states running the show.
What Will an Enlarged Look Like?
As enlargement looms, the leaders of member states as well as candidate countries need to ask themselves: What sort of EU are we enlarging or joining, respectively?
In their pre-enlargement policy reviews, published this week, the European Commission brings up a number of both well-known and pertinent reform options: Inter alia, it is calling on the European Council to increase the use of QMV, decrease the number of Commissioners, and make more use of passerelle clauses—a clause in EU treaties that allows the alteration of a legislative procedure without a formal amendment of the treaties—instead of updating them wholesale.
Interestingly, the policy reviews do not include an assessment on how future accession treaties could be used for treaty reform. Currently, an accession treaty is under negotiation with Montenegro, the most likely next EU member state. As every accession treaty is, de facto, a change of the EU treaties, it could be used for tweaks to improve the functioning of the EU, such as changing the calculation of QMV or phasing out unanimity in some policy areas.
Germany’s Role
What is also lacking is an answer to the key underlying question: Why did the reform paths of the past decade essentially go nowhere?
This requires deeper strategic thinking about how to get EU institutional innovation done. Effective steps needed to be taken to concretely bridge different member states’ interests. This is not something the European Commission is institutionally able to accomplish; it would need the European Council—the assembly of EU member states’ heads of state and government—to invest enough political capital to make this process work.
And to make it all work, Germany should hone the art of the package deal. If Berlin is serious about wanting institutional innovation and a reformed and enlarged EU, why not, for instance, tie a compromise on the next MFF to a binding reform agenda?
At the same time, institutional innovation needs to be prepared. After the super election year in 2027 (starting early with snap elections in Spain on November 29) politically the EU may look quite different. Discussions about reform steps currently taking place should consider such a scenario, also allowing for member states to move forward in smaller groups, as the European Commission acknowledges in the enlargement policy reviews as well. Therefore, member states should use negotiations on accession treaties to prepare for easier processes of enhanced cooperation under the EU treaties.
An enlarged EU can be a better EU, but that process must start now.
Linn Selle is the Alfred von Oppenheim director of the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Europe Center.
