The German coalition government of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’ center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) has agreed to write an Economic Security Strategy. It would be the first explicit strategy from a European Union member state and complement the EU’s 2023 economic security strategy.
In 2023 the European Commission published its first-ever Economic Security Strategy, which laid out the triad of “promote,” protect,” and “partner” as its three guiding pillars. It followed up with an Economic Security Package in January 2024 that included a proposal for a European Council recommendation on enhancing research security, a White Paper on R&D in dual-use technologies, a White Paper on export controls, a White Paper on outbound investment screening, and a proposal for a new FDI screening regulation. In late 2025 the European Commission also plans to publish its Economic Security Doctrine, outlining how the different instruments in its toolbox to protect European economic security can work together. Essentially, it is trying to move from identifying risks to suggesting how to mitigate them.
In addition to Germany, other EU member states are also intensifying their economic security measures and conceptual thinking. France, long-time supporter of European sovereignty and more naturally inclined to economic security thinking, included economic security as a core tenet of its 2025 Strategic Review, the country’s national security strategy. The Czech Republic and the Baltic states as well as—outside the EU—Norway and the United Kingdom are also including economic security in their national security strategies or the acknowledgement that economic vulnerabilities can be national security risks. As did Germany in its first-ever National Security Strategy from 2023.
At the Frontline
Germany is Europe’s biggest economy and, in many respects, finds itself at the frontlines of the economic security battlefield. Its governance structures are not inherently built for cross-thematic, cross-ministry topics, which are currently dominating the geoeconomic age, because they formally separate between economic and security spheres. Other European states are not necessarily different, to varying degrees.
Admittedly, German policymakers do understand that cross-cutting issues like export controls, investment screening decisions, or support for strategic sectors need close cooperation, and interministerial cooperation does exist. However, some, including this author, have called for more formal geoeconomic structures and expertise within the government. A National Economic Security Strategy might well be a first step toward aligning different thematic units around a common vision on what policies Germany needs to pursue to become more resilient in its international economic integration and strengthen its economic security.
Conceptual Direction
A National Economic Security Strategy would need to complement the EU’s Economic Security Strategy and could thereby provide a much-needed conceptual direction on how the three guiding pillars of “promote,” “protect,” and “partner” transcend into national policy making.
While the EU’s strategy is based on risks to Europe’s economic security, a national strategy should be grounded in clearly-aligned policy objectives it wants to achieve, given the volatile geoeconomic world Germany is facing. It should take the step from identifying risks to creating a concept of how to mitigate them, but also how to strengthen Germany’s position in global value chains.
This new Economic Security Strategy should not be an extended China Strategy. While China remains a big challenge to European industries, because of its size, industrial capacity, and ability to enact strategic economic policies, economic security should be conceived globally.
Resolving Tensions
The German government must give guidance on how it wants to resolve tensions between security and economic interests, how trade-offs will be determined and, most importantly, address the question of how costs (monetary and non-monetary) will be distributed. This includes naming the costs that resilience and security create for the economy and declaring the sovereign interest to incur them where necessary. If the government is to take de-risking seriously, de-risking must happen in supply chains and procurement alike. Some costs for security should be borne by businesses, in the same way as they carry costs to mitigate climate change or contribute to employees’ welfare.
However, at the same time, it is as much in the national interest to strengthen the private sector; this has to amount to more than simply describing businesses as security actors. The government needs to make clear that concepts like “promote” are not abstract expressions but are rooted in qualifiable and quantifiable outcomes it deducts from the risks the EU has identified. Hereby, it should also specifically acknowledge the role private companies play in achieving economic security and inspire a closer relationship of trust that will be necessary to collectively achieve economic security.
Efforts to “promote” should include the coordination of sectoral and research support measures. Likewise, de-risking and strengthening German businesses also needs the “partner” pillar. Here the focus should be on export diversification. All of these ideas should be derived from the policy objectives formulated in Germany’s future National Economic Security Strategy.
Based on the set policy objectives, the government should identify missions and define action plans on how to achieve the missions, with sequential steps over a defined timeline so that economic actors can plan ahead. Very importantly, a national economic security strategy should enshrine agility in its concept by providing space for adapting the missions and action plans.
Missions and Actions Plans
A National Economic Security Strategy should identify such missions for technologies of strategic importance as identified in the EU’s Economic Security Strategy (microelectronics, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and advanced communication technology), but also for key economic sectors and more abstract policy objectives, such as diversifying supply chains and reducing export dependency.
For these missions, it could develop specific resilience criteria —positive and negative ones. Thereby the strategy can serve as the guiding conceptual piece, which outlines what the government is ready to do to protect German strengths and to promote strategic sectors. These criteria could then be addressed in the smaller action plans. Through such criteria it not only answers the question of what is the risk, but also where do we want to get to?
For example, Germany regards microelectronics as an important strategic technology and enabler to nearly all sectors. It is also developing a dedicated microelectronics strategy. One of the missions in the National Economic Security Strategy could be directly derived from the forthcoming microelectronics strategy, for instance protecting the position of German companies in global value chains or achieving a defined degree of manufacturing capacity for certain semiconductors in Germany. In the latter case, this could be semiconductors that are specifically used in the defense sector or that are essential to another economically important sector, such as automotive. Action plans could then define milestones for public authorities and the businesses to be achieved within set timeframes. These action plans would further define the goals of a microelectronics strategy and specify them from the economic security perspective. Both strategies interact here, but with the crucial addition that the National Economic Security Strategy bridges further into the security realm of the government and possibly includes sectors beyond microelectronics producers.
For this to be incentivized, supply chain analysis capacity is needed within the government. The strategy should argue in favor of endowing the ministries with sufficient personnel capacity to fulfill such analyses and avoid costly mistakes by bringing together industry and economic security units. A business case logic should be part of the conception of action plans while pursuing security considerations, working with the market where possible instead of trying to replace it. Additionally, outside expertise from industry, science, and think tanks should be attracted, building broader in-house expertise within the government.
Another more abstract mission could be to support German business in export diversification through granular trade diplomacy, not necessarily through broad trade agreements, but through specific initiatives for strategically important sectors. The action plan could foresee the creation of a dedicated unit to only focus on analyzing alternative market opportunities for certain sectors, with security and diversification considerations in mind.
Such missions are not a venture into state planning, but rather are necessary to adapt the German economy to a new geoeconomic world, which is highly competitive, fragmented, and overridden with security regulations—one where following rules can no longer always be relied upon and economic coercion is part of the game. The old order is not going to reappear. Economic security is a cornerstone of this new world and Germany should not stand by while it is being defined. Businesses have to adapt themselves to a changing global environment and are already identifying the challenges, for example in machinery, industry, or microelectronics, that governments have to take on together with their private sector.
A National Strategy Within a European Framework
Finally, the strategy would need to include commitments to protect economic strengths through evolving export controls, investment screening, and research security measures, but also to defend national interests vis-á-vis third parties and through the EU where necessary. The National Economic Security Strategy should thus define what should be done at the national level and at the European level. Many economic security instruments, such as investment screening, customs controls, but also many industrial measures or even granular trade diplomacy are within the national level, while they must be complementary to EU efforts and should not run counter to European efforts.
Also, the EU is the best place for harmonizing policy measures and further integration of the European market, but also for protecting European companies against unfair trade practices or the EU against economic coercion. In addition to the federal national level, German policymakers should also pay attention to the role of the state governments in achieving the desired outcomes, as Germany’s 16 federal states can actually support the efforts of the national government and are often more closely involved in economic activities in their regions. In the international sphere, a strategy should promote cooperation and best-practice sharing with interested partners and friends, at least amongst the G7 if not beyond.
Germany has the chance to improve its geoeconomic resilience and strengthen its global economic position by thinking through the challenges and opportunities thrown up by the new reality it is encountering. A National Economic Security Strategy can provide much needed guidance and reassurance on the way forward for both policymakers and businesses alike. It would be good if that opportunity were seized whole-heartedly.
Filip Medunić is Research Fellow for Geoeconomics at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin.
