The turbulent global events of the past few months have laid bare the state of Germany’s foreign policy under Chancellor Friedrick Merz.
When Israel and the United States launched their war against Iran on February 28 and killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had just returned from a first visit to Beijing, seeing Chinese President Xi Jinping. Now he was getting ready for another visit to US President Donald Trump in Washington—a neat coincidence that, in previous times, would have been read as showing Germany’s importance and high standing in world affairs. If anything, it signaled the opposite.
China and America
Merz, until very recently, had self-identified as something of a “China hawk,” at least by German standards. In Beijing, however, he had gone out of his way to find common ground with the Chinese leadership, with a business delegation of 30 CEOs in toe. Focusing on the bilateral economic relationship, or so the thinking went, would be the approach most beneficial to Germany’s still weak economy. That was the chancellor’s new priority. And why not talk of wanting to “deepen” the “strategic partnership” with Beijing, if that pleased the Chinese leaders?
With a rapidly expanding trade deficit of €90 billion in 2025 (30 percent higher than the previous year) and Chinese exports threating to erode Germany’s industrial base, there was much reason to be skeptical of Merz’ approach. A different stance—one of contributing to a united European front vis-à-vis China, as Germany’s industry lobby BDI had advised—was, apparently, not even considered. Instead, while claiming to have addressed difficult issues openly with Chinese counterparts, the vibe was one of caution and deference. Back home, a video of Merz made the rounds (and waves in China) that showed Merz telling members of his center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) “that we [Germans] are simply not competitive enough anymore.” With a direct reference to his China trip, it sounded defeatist.
“Business first” thinking seemed also to inform Merz’ approach to Washington. Having been tipped off only shortly before the assault on Iran, and by Israel, not NATO ally the United States, Merz let it be known that he wouldn’t “lecture” the White House with regards to international law. While doubtful, perhaps, about the means, the German government was in full agreement when it came to the ends. He was “relieved,” Merz said, to witness the Iranian regime’s demise.
Later, when sitting silently next to Trump in the Oval Office, Merz maintained to his supportive stance and did not contradict Trump when the US president lashed out at Spain and the United Kingdom for rejecting, or only slowly agreeing to, American requests to use air bases in the respective countries for attacking Iran.
Reality Bites
It was only when Merz arrived back in Germany, and possibly only then realized the potentially catastrophic consequences for Germany’s and Europe’s economy—not to mention for Ukraine amid an acute shortage of air defense systems and a Russia emboldened by sky-rocketing oil prices—that his government started to U-turn.
Merz warned of an “endless war” and of Iran collapsing, neither of which would be in the German interest, he said on March 7. A week later he forthrightly criticized the Trump administration for “temporarily” lifting its ban on Russian oil exports amid energy markets in ever-deepening turmoil. “We believe it is wrong to ease the sanctions,” Merz said on March 13. “We must further increase the pressure on Moscow.” Support for Ukraine should continue despite the conflict in the Middle East. “We will not allow ourselves to be deterred or distracted from this by the war with Iran,” Merz vowed.
Merz also ruled out any German participation in the war even after Trump had threatened that NATO would be facing “a very bad future” should allies not help to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. On March 18, Merz told the German parliament that he and his government would have advised against the war (if they had been asked, which they weren’t), but then peddled back somewhat, saying that he did not want the Iran war “to become a burden to the transatlantic partnership.” Back to square one.
Lacking Foresight—and Strategic Sense
It is surprising and unsettling that Merz and his advisors appeared to have misjudged the wider consequences of Trump’s war against Iran—and that Merz, once again, indicated that international law meant little to him, and to German foreign policy more generally. Also, the fact that he didn’t manage to find a way to formulate an adequate response to Trump’s diatribes against partners like Spain and the UK made him look weak as a European leader (at first it was reported that Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, an early and principled critic of the war, had refused to take Merz’ calls afterwards for days—until it emerged that Merz had repeatedly tried a delisted number).
The early months of 2026 speak of a German foreign policy deeply confused, in crucial moments more or less being made up as Merz goes along. In Beijing or Washington, this boils down to little more than the chancellor’s gut feeling. In Europe, there is a greater willingness to lead, but even on their own continent Merz and his government are far from well-prepared, circumspect, and strategic.
One recent example is the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)—the Franco-German-Spanish 6th generation fighter jet project that seemed moribund in February. Even Merz’ closest advisors indicated so, while the chancellor was telling the “Machtwechsel” podcast that the problem was one of fundamentally different requirements: “Concretely, the French are looking for a plane that can carry nuclear weapons and land on aircraft carriers. We, in our Bundeswehr [armed forces], currently do not have these requirements.”
But then the penny seemed to have dropped when French President Emmanuel Macron offered to Europeanize the French nuclear deterrent (including its deployment in a partner country) in a historic speech on March 5. And Merz, in a well-choreographed move, was the first to publicly accept the offer. Maybe, just maybe, Germany, as a future partner in the French nuclear deterrent, will end up needing some nuclear-enabled FCAS, too? Discussions have now been extended to April.
“Culture Eats Structure”
When Merz took over almost a year ago, the foreign policy message was one of “newness.” Germany was “back,” Merz and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul claimed. Plus, the country would revamp its whole approach to foreign policy, that in the previous government had been represented by the Greens’ Annalena Baerbock: values were out, interests were in.
Indeed, the foreign policy setup of new government differs substantially from its predecessor. Wadephul is from the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the party that Merz leads. One has to go back six decades, to 1961-66, to find the last (West) German CDU foreign minister: a Gerhard Schröder (not to be confused with his namesake, the Social Democratic chancellor of the late 1990s and early 2000s).
Also, the CDU/CSU agreed with its coalition partner, the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), that a National Security Council would be set up, consisting of key ministers as well as the heads of the military, the security services, and the national police, with its own secretariat, potentially the place for foresight and strategic decisions. It was initially led by Merz’ head of office, Jacob Schrot, who left the government in January. Merz’ foreign policy advisor Günter Sautter has since taken on responsibility, which is not unduly taxing, as the body will remain small, and many positions still need to be filled (see also the article by Sarah Bressan and Philipp Rotmann in this issue).
However, with the chancellery and the foreign office in the hands of the same party and the new NSC plus secretariat to coordinate, Germany will potentially finally be able to deliver a “comprehensive” foreign policy, as promised by Wadephul. So far, this only works on paper. “Culture eats structure for breakfast” is an insight that certainly seems to apply to the German foreign policy apparatus more strongly than anywhere else.
Following in Scholz’ Footsteps
Much of what has been happening since Merz took over is not exactly new, when compared to the Scholz’ government’s general approach (which had the benefit, until January 2025, of a benevolent US President Joe Biden in the White House).
Like Scholz, Merz is reaching out to “new partners”—the chancellor visited India before he went to China, he also courted Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (which are currently taking the brunt of Iranian counterattacks, provoked by Trump’s war). Wadephul concentrated on Japan and other countries in the Indo-Pacific, promptly drawing Beijing’s ire when he criticized aggressive Chinese behavior in the region. (The foreign minister has since toned down his China criticism.) Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) is also busy strengthening military ties with partners in Asia, as a recent trip showed, demonstrating growing German awareness of the interlinkage of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific theaters.
The building of new alliances is certainly the right way forward (see also Andreas Rinke’s article in this issue), but the efforts still lack a coherent aim, prioritization, and a geostrategic focus. Is this primarily about trade and economic relations, with a Germany in the search of new markets as its previous model based on US security guarantees, Russia hydrocarbons, and a China welcoming German high-tech exports collapses? Or is this about building an alliance strong enough to at least uphold a rule-based global trade system, potentially creating a counterforce to Washington and other rule-breakers? (US diplomacy had been nervous about European outreach, uncoordinated with the US, to countries of the so-called Global South even when Biden was in office.)
Schrödinger’s World Order
And just like in the case of Scholz’ foreign policy approach, there lies a contradiction at the heart of Merz’ conception.
Scholz’ idea was to prepare Germany for that often-proclaimed “post-American” multipolar world order (a term first promoted by Russia and China back in the 1990s). When it came to security and especially countering Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, however, Scholz did not move an inch without an approving nod from Washington.
In a 2023 Foreign Affairs article, Scholz wrote of “the end of an era” and declared a “global Zeitenwende” (his trademark term meaning “historic turn,” which makes most sense when applied to Germany at last getting serious about defense, starting in 2022). In it, he defined the avoidance of a new Cold War as the overriding aim of Germany’s global approach. But the West still sounded pretty much intact when Scholz wrote toward the end: “[W]e can still turn back the tide of aggression and imperialism. Today’s complex, multipolar world renders this task more challenging. To carry it out, Germany and its partners in the EU, the United States, the G7, and NATO must protect our open societies, stand up for our democratic values, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships.”
Three years on, Merz wrote in Foreign Affairs (such articles now seem compulsory for German chancellors within a year of taking office) that the big aim now is to “avert the tragedy of great-power politics.” He claims that the international order “that was based on rights and rules … no longer exists,” acknowledging euphemistically that Washington is “drawing radical conclusions” from this development, “and it is doing so in a way that accelerates rather than slows down this dangerous game.” A few paragraphs on, however, readers are reassured that “we [presumably meaning “we Germans”] are not at the mercy of this world but can shape it. We can and will preserve our interests and our values if we act decisively, in European unison, and with confidence in our own strength as well as the strength of the transatlantic relationship.”
German foreign policy seems to be inhabiting a world where everything has changed—journalist Jörg Lau, in IPQ in 2023 and now in book length, has written about German foreign policy having reached “a kind of zero point” as all traditional assumptions have proven wrong and all concepts no longer work—and at the same time, nothing really has. In the German foreign policy mind, the current order is akin to Schrödinger’s cat—both dead and alive. This creates giant black hole where a German strategy should be.
The Lacking Masterplan
There is next to nothing Germany can do about Trump and whether or not the US president blows up the transatlantic relationship, which has already taken the form of something akin to “zombie transatlanticism.” While it’s probably wise not to declare it as definitively over, it’s still prudent to reject US policy where it breaks international law and certainly when it transgresses German and European sovereignty. Beyond that, German foreign policy should focus on the things it actually can do something about. And act.
The one big difference between Scholz and Merz, of course, is that the Merz government now has far fewer limits when it comes to defense spending, thanks to a constitutional change that Merz rejected when he was opposition leader. (In other words. Germany’s large-scale catch-up operation to seriously contribute to a credible conventional deterrence vis-à-vis Russia could have started two years earlier, under the SPD leadership; but Merz preferred to “do this once I’m chancellor.”)
The German defense build-up is now under way, but mostly as a national affair. That is a mistake.
Berlin is able to spend on security and defense like no other European country, including its French and British peers, and thus be at the center of the effort to defend the continent, if necessary, without American assistance. Indeed, Merz talks often about Europe (“We defend our freedom with our neighbors”), in which Germany is “firmly anchored,” but there is no masterplan, no overarching idea about how Berlin could facilitate and coordinate the strengthening of Europe to the degree necessary to keep Russia out—also out of the free part of Ukraine once Moscow agrees to a ceasefire. Berlin’s current position on that matter—to support of potential “coalition of the willing” force in Ukraine “from a neighboring NATO country”—is not tenable.
Courageous and generous steps are required, a determined outreach to key partners—first of all Poland, where the debate about EU defense funding has taken a dark and dangerous turn (as Piotr Buras writes in this issue), but also France and the United Kingdom, to make clear to Germany’s closest partners that jointly organizing the defense of Europe, and fast, is indeed the key aim. Germany will end up as the strongest conventional military force in Europe, as both Scholz and Merz have said that’s what they’re aiming at, but that’s secondary at best. One way of showing sincerity would be by pushing for an activation of Article 47.2 of the EU Treaty, as Europe expert Nicolai von Ondarza has suggested, and moving toward a common European defense.
Energy Security and Growth
Once fulfilling this role is made the key priority, further elements of a German strategy would fall into place. When it comes to EU enlargement and reform, Berlin needs to do more than saying what it doesn’t want; now is the time to clearly state what future shape the EU is supposed to take as far as Germany is concern—once more, the aim is to keep, or push, Russia out. This will likely mean a special sort of EU membership for Ukraine and a faster process for other countries that have spent far too much time in the EU’s waiting room, which has led to backsliding and opened easy inroads for Russia.
Two other priorities are energy security and the EU’s internal market: Merz’ Economy Minister Katherina Reiche has been busy slowing down Germany’s green energy transformation—a major own goal that Trump’s war on Iran and its consequences for Europe have now made obvious. Becoming independent of fossil fuels, as fast as possible, is of major strategic importance.
Also, it’s been clear for some time that a return to solid growth, in Germany and the EU in general, are only possible by a rapid deepening of the EU’s single market—and by stopping China from eroding Europe’s manufacturing base, which will only be possible if Berlin co-crafts, and then upholds, a common European approach to China. Merz has been implementing the former, but not the latter. Getting Germany’s economy growing again will be key for the remaining three years of his term. His approach so far—cutting red tape and regulation at EU level—is nowhere near ambitious enough.
It is only if Europe—with Germany at the core of the effort—is able to look after its own security, pursues an energy strategy that makes it more independent, and uses its single market as a motor of growth and innovation, that Washington, Beijing, and Moscow will start taking the Europeans seriously again. Without such a masterplan, finding new partners in new alliances to salvage a rules-based world order will be all the harder.
Henning Hoff is executive editor of INTERNATIONALE POLITIK QUARTERLY.
