It was a piece of good news that was urgently needed.
On Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that members of his country’s air force were flying the first US-made F-16 fighter jets, which they had received in recent days. “F-16s are in Ukraine. We did it,” Zelensky said at a location undisclosed for security reasons. “I am proud of our guys who are mastering these jets and have already started using them for our country.”
The delivery of F-16s has been a longstanding item on Ukraine’s wish list; policymakers, not least in Germany, had considered it “escalatory,” pointing to Russia’s nuclear threats, and dragged their feet. Now that they are in Ukraine, nuclear Armageddon is not imminent. Rather, the F-16s should be able to shoot down the Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles the Putin regime used inter alia in July to attack a children’s hospital’s cancer ward in Kyiv. They may also help against Russian glide bombs, which Ukraine has next to no defense against, by attacking the Russian planes that transport them, or at least by keeping them away from the frontlines.
According to The Economist, Ukraine now has 10 such jets and may have 20 by the end of 2024, delivered by the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. However, 12 jets are needed to keep at least one plane in the skies on any given day. Eighty are needed to guard Ukraine’s airspace, and at least 128 (the number Kyiv is actually asking for) to also use them for offensive operations in support of ground troops. They will also need long-range weapons to hit Russian air defenses.
Meanwhile, Russia, after the near-total failure of its offensive against Kharkiv, is now advancing in eastern Ukraine. It may lose as many as 1,000 soldiers per day, but Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inhumane “meatgrinder” tactics have led to slow, but steady progress. And with former US President Donald Trump and his vice-presidential pick JD Vance—who has said that he is willing to advocate a “peace” with Russia on the basis of Ukrainian “neutrality”—possibly the next occupants of the White House, Putin has no incentive to change his approach.
Weakening Resolve?
In such a situation, Europe and Germany would be expected to double down, signaling that the “as long as it takes” (German Chancellor Olaf Scholz) approach is not just talk. This summer, however, Europeans seem to be elsewhere: Paris is taking a break from its domestic political turmoil by enjoying its Olympic Games, London is battling homegrown far-right unrest, and Berlin once more seems to feel that it is now the rest of the world’s turn to step up.
In its 2025 budget, the government of Olaf Scholz quietly halved its designated military help for Ukraine from €8 billion to €4 billion, nixing the strong move it made earlier this year when it went in the opposite direction. “Ukraine’s financing is secured for the foreseeable future thanks to European instruments and the G7 loans,” German Finance Minister Christian Lindner loftily commented on July 17, showcasing once again his failure to grasp what is at stake and what Germany’s security needs entail.
Lindner was referring to a June G7 agreement to provide Kyiv with loans worth $50 billion secured by the proceeds from Russian assets mainly frozen in Europe. However, it is currently unclear how quickly the loans will materialize and whether they will be “front loaded” in order to “Trump proof” them. And while Germany sees itself as being in the lead when it comes to beefing up Ukraine’s air defense, it doesn’t see any role for itself in helping to ensure a speedier supply of F-16s to Ukraine (Germany’s air force doesn’t use the model, but it could nonetheless help with three-way aircraft deals and pilot training).
On the economic front, after a successful Ukraine Recovery Conference held in Berlin, the follow-up efforts have been lackluster. It was therefore all the more commendable for outgoing US Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery, Penny Pritzker, to push once more for greater efforts. The five-point “Pritzker Plan” presented on July 31 at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC—which includes the urgent development of a whole-of-government reconstruction planning capacity in Kyiv, the rapid increase of “shovel-ready” projects, the continued drive for reform and anti-corruption efforts, the marshalling of more capital to invest in Ukraine, and greater assistance in creating conditions under which Ukraine’s 10 million refugees and displaced can safely return—needs the Europeans in particular to support it or at least show the same sense of urgency.
Dozy Summer
With Europe in “holiday (from history) mood,” many seem to think that some sort of negotiations will stop Russia’s war. Did the recent spectacular multi-country prisoners swap with Putin, personally overseen by Scholz’s foreign policy advisor Jens Plötner, not show that one can do deals with the Kremlin?
It would be a great tragedy if such self-serving thinking prevailed. There is no deal to make; Putin’s aims have not changed. He wants to wipe Ukraine off the map—and “neutrality,” with the country left insecure outside NATO and without real “security guarantees,” would be a step in that direction. Indeed, the Kremlin’s various, unacceptable preconditions seem to show that Putin is just not interested in stopping his war.
To pressure Putin to come to the negotiating table for real negotiations, Ukraine’s backers—the Europeans first and foremost—would need to beef up their support now and decidedly, rather than continue giving Kyiv just a little and seeing how Putin reacts. This is the most costly way to do it.
Henning Hoff is Executive Editor of INTERNATIONALE POLITIK QUARTERLY.
