Friedrich Merz is a dyed-in-the-wool transatlanticist. The Christian Democrat (CDU) chairman keeps pointing out that he visited the United States more than 150 times before becoming German chancellor. The conviction that the US and Europe belong together has had a profound influence on the thinking of the former chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, an association that promotes German-American understanding. It explains why Merz, despite the unpredictability of US President Donald Trump, still remains committed to preventing a breakdown in relations between Washington and Berlin.
But the chancellor’s policy has nonetheless shifted in the first year of his government: Step by step, his thinking is gravitating toward the world beyond the US. Step by step, Merz is moving toward a policy that, at least on this point, resembles that of his predecessor, Olaf Scholz: It is about building a new coalition of middle powers prepared if necessary to form a counterweight to the US and China.
Following in Scholz’ Footsteps
Scholz, from the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), had been forced to step up his efforts to woo the Global South following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After 2022, German policymakers made the painful discovery that the loyalties of countries like Brazil and South Africa by no means automatically lie with Ukraine and Western democracies. Berlin had to work all the harder to drum up support for its positions.
As early as May 2022, the German government was using the term “middle powers” to refer to the nations it needed to court. Scholz called for a partnership of equals and warned that Germany must maintain good relations with the dominant nations of the future—meaning the rapidly growing emerging economies—to even retain a say in global affairs.
The first few months of Merz’ chancellorship, however, were dominated by the tight schedule of inaugural visits, a focus on the Ukraine crisis, and urgent efforts just to keep the US and Europe together. This proved far more difficult for him than it had for Scholz, who had been dealing with the multilaterally-minded US President Joe Biden. But the G20 summit in South Africa in November 2025 proved a turning point in Merz’ thinking. He got a firsthand sense that there is a very large world outside the US that thinks differently, and that it’s wise not to bow to all of Trump’s whims.
The US president had boycotted the G20 summit in Johannesburg, citing the alleged systematic persecution of white people in South Africa. Merz, by contrast, decided to attend, as did the other European leaders. He was visibly surprised to see that the US played only a minor role in the discussions among the rest of the world. “It was not a good decision by the American government to be absent here,” Merz said in Johannesburg. “It was good for us to be here.” The chancellor earned some brownie points, which Germany will need, not least to secure enough votes in the UN General Assembly to be elected to the UN Security Council for a two-year term in June.
With each new Trumpian twist and turn, Merz became more convinced that Europeans—and Germany in particular—needed to find new partners around the world in addition to the transatlantic alliance. Trump’s threats to annex Greenland, which belongs to Denmark, as well as to impose new tariffs, accelerated this shift in thinking in early 2026.
In three speeches—at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 22, to the Bundestag on January 29, and to the Munich Security Conference on February 13—Merz outlined his vision of an alliance of middle powers, even though, unlike Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, he did not use that exact term. The Canadians had felt threatened by Trump’s America much earlier and much more directly. Carney therefore not only intensified contact with the Europeans but also with many other countries around the world, speaking of “variable geometry” in alliances and an “alliance of middle powers.”
For Merz, still shocked by the US threats to annex Greenland, Davos also marked the beginning of a sharper distancing from the US in his public statements. “Autocracies may have subordinates; but democracies have partners and reliable friends. This principle will guide us,” he emphasized, without naming specific countries. The new world of great powers was based on power and “when it comes to it, on force.” But this new reality did not have to be accepted as fate, he said. “We do have a choice.”
He made his position even clearer on January 29 in the Bundestag: “Throughout this rapidly changing world, there are emerging nations with open and growing markets that are actively seeking what we have to offer: partnerships based on mutual respect, trust, and reliability.”
European Reshuffling
Germany’s primary level of cooperation is within Europe. This isn’t new, since every postwar (West) German government to date has sought close coordination with its European partners. What is striking, however, is that Merz is reordering Germany’s relationships, and his thinking is no longer confined to within the European Union’s borders.
On the one hand, Trump’s policies have also alarmed other European nations: the United Kingdom and Norway are seeking closer ties with the EU while Iceland is seriously considering EU membership. On the other hand, trust in France, the most important partner, is waning within the bloc. From Germany’s perspective, President Emmanuel Macron is no longer able to push through agreements on certain issues domestically as his term nears its end. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether France will elect a far-right or far-left president in 2027 who might end decades of close Franco-German cooperation. From the chancellor’s perspective, Germany needs to take the precaution of finding more pillars for its European policy.
That is why Italy is receiving greater attention. That is why new formats are emerging: Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul supplemented the Weimar Triangle (Germany, France, Poland) with the “E5” (Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain). Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil established the “E6” (E5 plus the Netherlands). Above all, however, Merz is increasingly focusing on “E3” coordination with France and the United Kingdom. He has come to the conclusion that issues such as the war in Ukraine, as well as uncertainty about Trump’s commitment to NATO, mean that Europe can only survive with close ties to the UK as a nuclear power and G7 partner.
In this context, Merz is calling for a new sense of self-confidence among Europeans: “We should not underestimate how attractive all of this is to new partners and new alliances: We also represent a normative, values-based alternative to imperialism and autocracy in the world. We have something to offer economically and, above all, in terms of ideals,” he said on January 29.
Reaching Out
Merz’ foreign trips have highlighted this new foreign policy approach. He visited Turkey in 2025 and in the first two months of 2026 has traveled not only to India but also to China. The financially powerful and energy-rich Gulf states were also on his itinery.
Whereas Scholz’ government had focused primarily on partnerships with like-minded democracies, Merz believes he can no longer afford that luxury. To be sure, Germany’s closest coordination remains with European nations and the G7 countries Canada and Japan. But Merz has now emphasized a shift in the definition of “partners,” clearly distancing himself from the more moralistic approach to German foreign policy that had been pushed primarily by the Greens and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) in Scholz’ three-party coalition. Rule-based politics, not greater democracy, is now the new guiding principle.
“Our partners may not all share the same values and interests, but they do share the understanding that we need an order in which we can rely on agreements and treat one another with respect,” the chancellor argued at the conclusion of his Gulf trip in early February. “We need such partnerships more than ever at a time when major powers are increasingly dictating policy,” he added by way of explanation. While Germany was not uncritical, Merz said, it did not place the Gulf states “under blanket suspicion.”
He went further at the Munich Security Conference. “Measured by its resources, Germany’s foreign policy in recent decades has had something of a normative surplus,” he said on February 13. “With the best of intentions, it has criticized violations of the international order around the world. It has often admonished, demanded, or reprimanded. But it was not concerned enough about the fact that the means to remedy the situation were often lacking. This gap between aspiration and capability has become too wide. We are working to close it.”
Merz made it clear what that meant during his trip to China from February 24 to 26: On the one hand, he too counts China among the major powers to be viewed critically given, for example, its threat of violence in the case of Taiwan. But on the other hand, China, unlike Trump, wants to uphold the multilateral order based on the UN and WTO systems. Instead of repeating the previous government’s (and the EU’s) view of China as a triad of “partner, competitor, and systemic rival,” Merz in Beijing emphasized the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between the two countries.
This new definition of “partner” greatly enlarges the pool of potential desired cooperation partners. There is a new acceptance that political systems differ. The paramount criterion is now that partners adhere to rules in international and economic relations.
Coordinated Action
Merz isn’t on his own in this approach. President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), in particular, is a key ally in courting new partners. Like Scholz and now Merz, Steinmeier is convinced that Germany must expand its relations with emerging economies. The German head of state has traveled to South Africa, Brazil, Vietnam, Thailand, Japan, and, most recently, Mexico and is often accompanied by business delegations. In addition, the president has been plugging some gaps in Africa left by the chancellor. A trip to Indonesia is scheduled for the coming weeks. In early March, Agriculture Minister Alois Rainer visited South Africa. Foreign Minister Wadephul travels widely and also brings corporate representatives along as often as possible.
The shockwaves caused by President Trump are also leading to changes in the EU which has suddenly concluded free trade agreements with the South American Mercosur countries and India after those deals had been stalled for years. Merz is urging the EU to quickly rework or conclude new agreements with Australia, Indonesia, and Mexico as well. The EU is conducting further trade talks with countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Industry is also driving this trend: The more uncertain the US market becomes, the more German and European companies need secure markets in other parts of the world. While the US remains the world’s largest economy, its share of global trade was already just 10.8 percent in 2023, according to the Federal Statistical Office. That percentage is likely to decline due to tariff disputes. This is why WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala told the Munich Security Conference that nations should stop lamenting about US tariff policy. The other countries, which account for the remaining nearly 90 percent of global trade, should simply defend and expand the existing rules-based trading system in the world, she said.
Limits to the New Strategy
However, efforts to forge a new alliance of rules-based nations are running into obstacles. Merz, too, is learning firsthand how difficult it is to escape the influence of the major powers, and especially of the United States. There is massive dependence on the US and China for IT products and raw materials. Just recently, Trump, together with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have demonstrated how quickly a superpower can impose its agenda on the rest of the world when it uses its military power without restraint.
The nations’ room for maneuver is also limited by security concerns. Merz’ scope is confined by his desire not to jeopardize America’s protective role for Germany and to prevent the lifting of US sanctions against Russia. When the Trump administration “temporarily” lifted sanctions on Russian oil exports on March 13, Merz strongly criticized this.
Added to this is the time factor, especially in democracies. The wars waged by the major powers, Russia and now the US, inevitably occupy everyone’s attention. The more the chancellor, but also the foreign minister, have to focus on crisis diplomacy on Ukraine and now Iran, the less time they have for increased engagement with many other countries. This comes on top of an enormous domestic policy agenda, which Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, who is also SPD co-chairman and vice chancellor, is handling. Economy Minister Katherina Reiche, who by virtue of her office should be dealing with foreign trade, is being kept busy with energy policy issues.
The litmus test of how serious Merz is about the new alliance strategy will come in November. That’s when the next G20 summit is scheduled to take place, this time in the US. Trump has already announced that he does not intend to invite South Africa, a G20 member. That will be the moment of truth. Merz will have to decide where his greater loyalties lie.
—Translated from the German by David Crossland
Andreas Rinke is Reuters’ chief correspondent in Berlin.
