By calling into question the continued value of the US troop presence in Europe, US Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and other senior officials in the second Trump administration have thrown the transatlantic relationship into turmoil. Their emphasis on the need for Europe to take care of its own defense, instead of relying on the United States for protection, represents a sudden and decisive break with the decades-long tradition of close-knit cooperation in matters of security. In response, Europe has been scrambling to manage the threat of a possible US withdrawal. Observers across the continent have begun an intense debate about how to best mitigate the strategic fallout from this abrupt policy reversal.
By framing the prospect of a significant US retrenchment as a threat, however, the current debate paints a distorted picture of Europe’s new geopolitical reality. What leaders and pundits alike have largely overlooked, is that it represents an important opportunity European leaders should welcome: It forces Europe to acknowledge the risks inherent in depending on another state for security; it paves the way for Europe to become an autonomous player on the geopolitical stage; and it creates an environment where inter-European cooperation on defense becomes more feasible.
Confronting the Risks of US Hegemony
Since the end of World War II, the United States has wielded predominant influence over Western Europe. While usually framed in terms of a “transatlantic community” or “partnership,” the relationship was never one between equals. US hegemony first emerged as a response to the threat the mighty Soviet Union’s forces posed to the continent and continued throughout the Cold War as part of the strategy of containment.
Yet, even after the fall of the “iron curtain” in 1989 propelled the United States to the status of an ultimately secure unipole, Washington remained deeply involved in European affairs. The goal was no longer just to ensure no single European state would dominate the continent. Instead, American policy now also worked to guarantee Europe’s pro-US orientation and secure US military and economic interests on the continent. In the words of Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, who helped construct the post-Cold War order in Europe, US leaders worked hard “to ensure a central place for the United States as a player in European politics.”
A Beneficial Arrangement
It is not surprising that European leaders readily accepted this arrangement. After all, it proved remarkably beneficial. It allowed them to escape the need for any form of serious defense or security policy, as they could “pass the buck” of carrying the burden of European defense onto the United States. Instead of spending precious resources on military capabilities, they could focus on investing in their economies and tend to other issues of concern to their domestic constituencies.
Unfortunately, what Europe has long failed to appreciate, is that this arrangement comes at a steep price. Relying on a supposedly benevolent hegemon to guarantee your security only works if said hegemon remains committed to providing it. As soon as it judges that continuing the relationship is no longer in its interest, for whatever reason, its dependents are left high and dry. It takes as little as the arrival of a new administration ready to break with the foreign policy establishment and re-evaluate its strategic priorities to throw existing commitments into question. In short, relying on another state for your security always carries with it profound strategic vulnerabilities.
A Forgotten Lesson
Tragically, this is not a lesson that Europe failed to learn, but one that it seemingly forgot. During the Cold War, leaders in Paris, London, and Bonn were acutely aware that the United States might withdraw its troops at any time. This sparked serious cooperative efforts—including the formation of the European Community—designed to enable the continent to better prepare for the possibility of American abandonment. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, the idea that the transatlantic relationship might deteriorate, and that the United States might move to re-evaluate its presence on the continent, was occasionally discussed, but never seriously considered.
It is in this sense that the Trump administration’s public embrace of retrenchment rhetoric has done Europe a much-needed service: It has forced officials to confront the grim reality that international politics is a fickle business in which even longstanding cooperative relationships can change at short notice. In the long run, trusting in the continued benevolence of a hegemon is not a winning strategy. What you can trust are your own military capabilities.
Seizing Strategic Autonomy
Embracing emancipation from US hegemony not only promises to reduce strategic vulnerabilities but also opens the way for a decidedly European, not “Western” or “transatlantic,” foreign policy that no longer subordinates the continent’s interests to those of the United States. While both sides of the Atlantic undoubtedly have a series of interests in common—for instance, promoting free market economies and containing violent extremism—their interests also diverge across a wide array of issue areas.
For one, Europe has no interest in being dragged into the incipient trade war between Beijing and Washington. The continent already trades in goods almost as much with China as with the United States and stands to benefit most by retaining close economic relationships with both great powers. Against this, US President Donald Trump has clearly signaled his intent to force Europe to firmly choose a side—his side—in the age of economic competition he himself heralded with his recently announced set of tariffs. But Europe has no reason to enter this economic war of attrition on either side: For now, economic non-alignment remains the most prudent course of action.
Similarly, as the Russo-Ukrainian war drags on, the two sides of the Atlantic are likely to harbor different preferences about how it should be resolved. Trump and his closest advisors have long been pushing for a negotiated settlement, declaring the end of the war their primary policy objective. From the Europeans’ perspective, meanwhile, limiting Russian gains and thus deterring it from further aggression constitutes the primary objective.
As divergences between US and European interests across a variety of issue areas appear destined to grow, Europe should welcome any opportunity for seizing greater strategic autonomy. A US turn away from the continent will give European leaders the freedom to design foreign policies targeted at promoting their states’ interests even when they conflict with those of the United States.
Crafting a Unified Response
Some have doubted Europe’s ability to confront the current geopolitical moment as it should, namely, by developing its own conventional—and possibly even nuclear—capabilities that can serve as the basis of an independent security and defense policy. Their pessimism is understandable. Whether during the 2015 migration crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, European states repeatedly failed to come together and cooperate on policy issues of common concern.
What is more, many European leaders are currently plagued by domestic political constraints. To name just one example, the new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz needed two tries to even be formally elected chancellor by the Bundestag, calling into question his ability to rally the support necessary for his ambitious foreign policy program. Finally, some observers have warned that building independent European capabilities would take too much time to be feasible strategically. To them, somehow re-securing Washington’s commitment is the continent’s only real hope.
Embracing, Not Fearing, a Post-American Europe
Yet, research on great power politics and the consequences of retrenchment provides reasons to be cautiously optimistic. First, in contrast to migration or public health crises, whose effects on national security are limited and diffuse, Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe poses a direct, military threat to European security. Such threats are extraordinarily effective at fostering sustained cooperation among states, even if they disagree on a host of domestic and ideological issues. Now that the US commitment to Europe has been revealed to be uncertain at best, European leaders—for the first time in post-Cold War history—will be forced to put their differences aside and make real progress toward forming a mighty balancing coalition if they hope to guarantee the continent’s security against external geopolitical threats.
Second, the argument that rearmament efforts are doomed because it will take too long to replace American with European capabilities is unconvincing. Even if the chances of success were slim, Europe must still try—there is no strategically feasible alternative. The argument also fundamentally misconstrues what US retrenchment from the continent would look like in practice. Historically, great power retrenchment rarelyoccurs overnight, and usually does not take the form of outright abandonment. In any realistic scenario, the United States will remove its conventional capabilities gradually and continue to offer extended nuclear deterrence. There should thus be a sufficient window of opportunity for Europe to take the necessary steps to adjust to its new reality.
In short, rather than viewing Trump’s turn against the long-standing tradition of transatlanticism primarily as a risk requiring mitigation, Europe should welcome the idea of US retrenchment. It should readily embrace a future in which the United States no longer plays a predominant role in European affairs and realize its long-suppressed strategic potential.
Moritz S. Graefrath is postdoctoral fellow in security and foreign policy at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute in Williamsburg, Virginia, and a nonresident fellow with the Institute for Global Affairs in New York.
