The post-World War II European security order has collapsed. The writing was on the wall for a long time, and US President Donald Trump had made a number of things clear before he was even elected. First, that he thinks that Europeans should be primarily responsible for their continent’s security and that the United States should withdraw its troops, personnel, and materiel to focus on the Indo-Pacific and America’s southern border. Second, that he is not interested in the former Biden administration’s goals in Ukraine in terms of preventing borders being changed by force; nor does he see Ukraine as central to a wider set of security questions. Finally, that his presidency would herald in a shift in America’s foreign policy beyond simple transactionalism but toward predatory neo-imperialism.
For a long time, Europeans were in denial. They thought that they could put together a package which would keep the US bound in. There was talk of buying more weapons and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, and moving toward more equal burden-sharing arrangements. The campaign by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron for a European reassurance force in Ukraine, predicated on a US “backstop,” is the latest iteration of this idea. But it should now be clear to all that this strategy was doomed from the outset.
A Generational Shift
Since Trump’s inauguration in January, many have been surprised by the speed, brutality, and jingoism of American policy. My colleagues at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and I have spent the last few months speaking to a lot of thinkers in the Make America Great Again (MAGA) ecosystem, many of whom now work around Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance. What we have found is that this turn in US foreign policy is not just about Trump. In fact, there has been a generational shift among policymakers on the question of European security, with many feeling a strong sense of urgency to shift resources away from the continent.
Many senior officials in the State Department and at the Pentagon are veterans. Scarred by their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are now chomping at the bit to hand the role of NATO’s supreme military commander (SACEUR) over to a European, withdraw troops and weapons systems from Europe or offload them to allies. Specifically, they are making concrete plans to withdraw the 2nd cavalry regiment of Strykers based in Germany, and to offload other equipment to the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Finland while identifying the forces assigned to defend those countries under current NATO defense plans and re-positioning them toward the defense of the Indo-Pacific or even the US southern border.
The second lesson we have learned is that Trump’s goal is to reset relations with Russia rather than end the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. For the Trump administration, the ongoing negotiations will lay the groundwork for a larger deal which includes Iran, North Korea, Syria, Arctic resources, arms control, and even China. The Waltzes and Rubios of the administration are not naïve enough to think they can pull of a “reverse-Kissinger,” luring Russia away from China and turning it into an ally. But they do think it is possible to turn it into a non-aligned country a bit more like India.
In other words, with so many in the administration intent on leaving Europe to its own devices, the appetite for a full-on confrontation with Russia is non-existent, which is why the Franco-British initiative being negotiated at summit after summit is very unlikely to succeed in its stated objectives of securing a US backstop.
Against Russia, Without the United States
But it’s not all doom and gloom. As some have pointed out, the attempt to create a “coalition of the willing” has succeeded in creating a de facto European Security Council, which could eventually form the nucleus of a new European security order. The old European dream for such an order was to build it with Russia and around US engagement. But the new order is shaping up to be built against Russia and without the US.
Since World War II, none of the attempts to create such an order, be it through the European Defense Community, the European Political Community, or a European Security Council have landed on fertile ground. But today’s political reality means that we are now in a very different place to where we have been at any point since 1945.
There are a number of things that Europeans can do to preserve their interests in the short run, such as finding ways to supply Ukraine with materiel and intelligence and making it clear to Washington and Moscow that it too has cards to play in any peace negotiation. But if Europe is serious about guaranteeing its way of life and its continued existence as a geopolitical entity, it will need to link up six interrelated debates.
Linking Debates
First is the question of how, in light of Trump’s cuts to American support to Kyiv, Europeans can find the ammunition, gear, and intelligence to support Ukraine and deter a Russian invasion of the rest of Europe not just in the short-term, but also in the medium- to long-term. This is a question which goes beyond just providing Ukraine with money and ammunition. Faced with the long-term threat of Russia, Europe cannot carry on with peacetime dynamics. It will need to adopt a different way of thinking, one which reflects the emergency it finds itself in and adopts lessons from Ukraine’s experience.
This will mean finding a much more ambitious approach to defense policy and planning. Europe will have to invest in strategic enablers, such as strategic lift, air-to-air refueling, long-range precision strike capabilities, and operational intelligence, all of which Europe currently relies completely on the US for. It will have to greatly increase the amount of ready combat forces and will need plans to use them in the event of a war where US reinforcements are not forthcoming. And it will need to enhance key infrastructure—such as ports, airports, railways, roads, tunnels, and bridges—while also tackling administrative obstacles that hinder the swift movement of personnel and equipment across the continent.
Closely related to this is the second question, how to pay for re-armament with limited fiscal headroom. Incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s decision to ditch the “debt brake” in favor of unlimited borrowing on defense spending and a €500bn infrastructure fund is a good start and an example of what countries can achieve at the national level. But if Europe as a whole wants to re-arm, it will require pooled efforts. This will require an innovative approach to EU borrowing rules and the European Investment Bank’s guidelines, and existing tools like the European Defense Fund, while also looking beyond these.
A European Defense Procurement Act would empower governments to prioritize these investments, and others around agriculture, energy, health, as well as human services and transportation; in short, everything needed to turn Europe into a fortress. The private sector as well as common funding by the European Infrastructure Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Stability Mechanism, and the Council of Europe Development Bank for instance could all be incentivized to invest in those sectors that contribute to Europe’s collective security.
But security is not just about tanks and planes, and a key test of Europe’s mettle will be whether it can protect itself against coercion in the economic sphere, in energy, in cyberspace, and, crucially, against its society, since this broader conception of security will not be sustainable if Europe cannot persuade its populations that the sacrifices it demands from it are necessary and justified.
Third, what will happen to America’s nuclear umbrella in the age of Trump? France has shown itself open for a “strategic debate” on its nuclear deterrence just as allies like Germany and Poland have called for a more nuclear cooperation. As European partners begin to reconsider the credibility of America’s extended nuclear umbrella, and as they turn to France for answers (as Merz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently indicated), France will have to figure out where it stands. The United Kingdom, too, despite being partially dependent on the US for the upkeep of its nuclear arsenal, has a role to play in Europe’s nuclear deterrence.
Getting Competitive Again
Fourth is the question of how Europeans can get their economies to be competitive again. They will need to rethink their economic model and its growth agenda. There are two elements to this. One is offensive: unleashing R&D, creating jobs, and re-industrializing. Climate security, green supply chains, and cheap energy will be crucial, and wind power could be used to create energy for a new industrial base. But there is also a defensive element, which is about finding ways to deal with economic coercion from China and now also from the US.
The fifth debate is about how mainstream parties can protect themselves from the far-right. This is certainly true for the likes of France and Germany, where mainstream parties’ caution when it comes to responding to voters’ concerns around migration have led to massive disillusionment. There is no way around working toward a new paradigm of secure borders and control over who comes in and out of the country. Another element of this concerns the regulation of social media, which has been partially weaponized by Europe’s competitors, by America (as with X, which is being used by the likes of Elon Musk and Vance to hound mainstream parties in Europe), but also by Russia (with Telegram) and China (TikTok).
The final, and perhaps the most important question of all, is how to coordinate common European action when countries like Hungary and Slovakia are actively trying to gum up the wheels. The fact is that some of the most important countries when it comes to defending Europe are outside of the EU, while some of the least helpful countries are inside the bloc. Finding ways to successfully guarantee the continent’s future will mean working in new formats that include some countries and exclude others.
Doing so would have the added benefit of embracing the UK in a way which hasn’t been possible lately. There is an urgent need to get out of the post-Brexit mindset, which has set a clear cap on EU-UK co-operation since 2016. Deeper integration is both necessary and popular on both sides of the channel (polling conducted by the ECFR has shown that more Brits look to the EU than to the US as their country’s most important partner and even 26 percent of Brexit supporters believe the UK and the EU should become closer). The EU must make it clear to the UK that it won’t be safe from coercion (from China or the US) if it is not part of a bigger bloc.
Working in Concert
What in the world can Europeans do to tackle these challenges? First, Merz, Macron, Tusk, and Starmer must continue to work in concert. But they must also integrate smaller countries, especially Nordic-Baltic ones into the debates. Together, they can form the vanguard of a new European Security Community, which would exist outside of formal EU frameworks. Such a community would provide extended nuclear deterrence for its members via France and Britain. It would massively boost re-armament without busting countries’ fiscal space by providing mechanisms for common procurement. And it would allow them to do so while focusing on technology and re-industrialization.
The result could be a European security order fit for the times—leaner, more capable, and much less dependent on the US. The task of building this order will fall on Europe’s most important leaders: Macron, Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Starmer.
But the single most important figure will be Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, whose task it will be to provide Europe with direction in this crucial period. Merz, the quintessential German Atlanticist and fiscal hawk, is an unlikely architect for this new order and the upheavals of all manner of orthodoxies it will require. But his burying of the “debt brake” before even becoming chancellor, as well as his clear-eyed view of the US, allow for some much-needed optimism.
Mark Leonard is founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
