It has been less than three months since Donald Trump’s inauguration as the president of the United States. Yet, this short time has been enough for him to turn America’s foreign policy strategy upside down. The clearest example of this is Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine and US relations with Moscow.
The most convincing theory holds that the U-turn vis-à-vis Russia is a “Reverse Nixon” (or “Reverse Kissinger”) strategy—just like US President Richard Nixon (and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger) drove a wedge between Beijing and Moscow in the early 1970s by “going to China,” the same effect can be achieved by cozying up to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Although discussions of this approach have been circulating for a while, the current US administration is apparently the first to genuinely attempt to implement it in practical political terms.
However, if the Trump administration’s goal is indeed to coax Russia out of its partnership with China, it risks misjudging the strength of that partnership, potentially leaving Washington vulnerable to manipulation by Russia.
An Ever-Closer Relationship
In fact, China’s strategic importance for Russia cannot be overstated. It may not seem so, but it goes far beyond shared grievances about US dominance in the global order.
Russia’s pivot to China gained momentum in 2014 as a response to the first wave of Western sanctions, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. However, signs of Moscow moving closer to Beijing were evident before that.
There are strong objective reasons for the close Sino-Russian partnership.
Firstly, there is the long shared border that both nuclear powers want to be a source of opportunities, not problems. Back in 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin laid the groundwork for fruitful cooperation by resolving the border disputes, which were fully demarcated by 2006.
Secondly, there is economic compatibility: It’s a match made in heaven between the world’s largest exporter of fossil fuels and the largest consumer. The structure of Russia’s economic partnership with China has previously mirrored its partnership with Europe. Russia used to sell natural resources and, in return, received machinery and technologies. In 2016, China replaced Germany as Russia’s main supplier of technological products.
Thirdly, both countries are governed by non-democratic, personalistic authoritarian regimes. This fosters a perfect environment for partnership, further incentivized by the personal rapport between the two leaders. Additionally, both leaders are focused on maintaining power indefinitely and see themselves as historical figures pursuing historic goals, unlike the constantly changing elites in the democratic West.
In addition to these existing reasons for Moscow and Beijing to remain close, the past few years has brought new ones.
By launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has entered, from its perspective, into an existential conflict with the West. While previously Russia could balance its foreign policy between Europe and China, Moscow has now eliminated all other options.
China, conversely, has become the main threat to the West’s global position, albeit for different reasons. Beijing has not initiated its own version of Russia’s war; however, the US and its allies view the spread of Chinese power worldwide and Beijing’s attempts to reshape the global order to better serve its needs as even more dangerous than Russia’s actions. The fact that the West considers both countries as adversaries has created an ideal foundation for Moscow and Beijing to stick together.
Sole Supplier
Practically speaking, we see that Russia has become highly dependent on China. In trade, China accounts for 40 percent of Russia’s imports and 30 percent of its exports. The People’s Republic has become virtually the sole supplier of technologies to Russia. Moscow is selling record volumes of oil and gas to China and hopes to further bind the country to its territory with another pipeline—Power of Siberia 2. Both have almost completely abandoned the US dollar in favor of national currencies in bilateral trade and have established a network of regional banks that can operate even under the threat of secondary sanctions.
Ideologically, Moscow and Beijing find common ground on many aspects of their talking points, both domestically and internationally, particularly in their approach to countries in the so-called Global South. Domestically, Russia and China are learning from each other’s experiences, from maintaining authoritarian stability to circumventing sanctions.
Russia has also abandoned its reservations regarding China. Whereas pre-war Moscow was primarily concerned about falling into dependency, this is no longer much of a concern. Russia is supplying China with some of its advanced military technologies in submarines and military aircrafts, while keeping some precautions mainly by keeping a close eye on Russia’s own scientists who have been closely cooperating with Chinese interlocutors.
In the future, the growing economic dependence on China could transform into political dependence. If, previously, Moscow could avoid taking sides in China’s conflicts with India or countries in the South China Sea, Beijing will increasingly exert pressure that Russia will find it difficult to resist.
At the same time Moscow views Donald Trump as an anomaly, from whom some short-term gains might be possible, but around whom it would be unwise to plan a long-term foreign policy shift. In both Moscow and Beijing, Trump’s actions are seen as evidence that it is impossible to reach any agreement with Western leaders who are focused on their own short-term electoral cycles. In four years’ time, when his term ends, Trump will no longer be US president, but Putin and Xi still intend to be in office.
Mission Impossible
This means that at this point it is almost impossible to drive a wedge between China and Russia, at least while the current political regimes remain in power in both countries. This is a troubling situation for Europe, which, on the one hand, risks being left to deal with Russia alone after Trump’s attempts to strike a deal on Ukraine, and, on the other hand, faces structural problems in its relations with China that have led to the emergence of a “de-risking” strategy.
Fundamentally, Trump’s dalliance with Moscow puts Europe in a position where its main ally is disregarding the transatlantic alliance, leaving Europe without support on critical issues. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of European states and to undermine European unity place additional pressure on Europe in its relations with Russia and China, which have been employing similar tactics, albeit with far fewer resources and access than the US.
In the international arena, Europe will have no option other than to coexist with both Russia and China in third countries. Retreating from the countries of the Global South due to pressure from Moscow and Beijing, or because the political leadership in those countries fears a backlash from them, might seem to be hindering the European Union’s ability to develop its presence there. However, Europe can only remain relevant and avoid losing ground by adopting a pragmatic approach.
Temur Umarov is a fellow at Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.
