Chinese President Xi Jinping’s purge of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is widening. While the news that Defense Minister Dong Jun is under investigation for corruption remains unconfirmed, the sacking of Admiral Miao Hua is a clear sign that graft and disloyalty within the military continue to haunt China’s leadership. The growing number of top officers ensnared in this renewed anti-corruption campaign will have implications for PLA morale and credibility, Xi’s confidence in his military, and China’s appetite for conflict.
A Year of Purges
On November 28, 2024 news broke that Miao Hua, a member of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and head of its Political Work Department, had been suspended for disciplinary violations.
Miao Hua’s removal caps a year of purges and corruption-related scandals within the PLA as Xi’s anti-corruption campaign within the PLA intensifies. Over a dozen top generals have been removed from their posts or placed under investigation since mid-2023, including two consecutive ministers of defense (Li Shangfu and his predecessor Wei Fenghe). If the investigation into Dong Jun is confirmed, this would turn him into the third consecutive defense minister to be fired for corruption.
Over the last few months, Xi has also fired the two generals who headed the PLA Rocket Force, which is in charge of China’s missile and nuclear capabilities, as well as a number of high-ranking officers from the PLA’s Equipment Development Department and a few senior officials in China’s state-owned defense industry.
This is not Xi’s first attempt at rooting out corruption within the Chinese military. Xi’s initial and sweeping anti-corruption campaign was launched shortly after he came to power in 2012. By then, PLA units had already been banned from launching business ventures (one of the original sources of the entrenched corruption, profiteering, and misuse of resources). But the effects of these practices remained elsewhere: Ranks and promotions were routinely up for sale, and bribery was rampant. Over a decade later, this second wave of investigations suggests that Xi’s initial push to clean up the endemic corruption within the military failed, and that he remains unsure of the PLA’s leadership and their commitment to the party and its goals.
From Corruption to Political Disloyalty
The suspension of Miao Hua is highly significant for what it reveals about the focus of this round of investigations. It signals that the anti-corruption campaign is broadening from the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department—long considered a hotbed of corruption due to its role at the heart of defense procurement—to include other branches, such as the Navy or the Political Work Department.
But it also throws into question Xi’s approach to personnel appointments. Miao was one of Xi’s personal choices to lead the PLA in the run up to the 2027 and 2035 modernization benchmarks. Xi promoted him to the rank of admiral in 2015 and elevated him to the CMC just two years later in 2017, tasking Miao—as head of the CMC’s Political Work Department—with ensuring the political loyalty of China’s military and with overseeing all promotions. Not even Xi-appointed officers are safe from the ongoing purge.
Political branch officers going down is also a signal of the extent of the problem in Xi’s eyes. The issue is no longer “just” corruption or the misuse of funds, but the political loyalty of the PLA more broadly. And this is a development that is sure to be keeping China’s top leadership up at night.
Early signs of this shift, and of the level of concern, emerged in the summer of this year. For the first time in a decade, Xi personally decided to convene an unexpected CMC Political Work Conference at the historic revolutionary base of Yan’an. In front of the entire military top brass, Xi referred to political war as the “lifeline” of the PLA, emphasized the need for party leadership to be upheld, and demanded that senior officers “introspect, engage in soul-searching reflections, and make earnest rectifications.”
As Beijing’s threat perceptions rise, the party is pushing for an ever-greater focus on conflict preparedness. Xi has called for China’s top national security officials to be prepared for “worst-case and extreme scenarios,” and has repeatedly exhorted the PLA to be ready for war. In this strategic environment, making sure that, in Xi’s own words, the “the barrel of the gun” always follows the Chinese Communist Party’s commands is a top priority for Beijing. And tackling any signs of disloyalty in the military has moved to the top of the to-do list.
A Reduced Appetite for Conflict?
The PLA will not stop functioning or conducting its usual missions because of the top-brass purge, but the rapid turnover and the sense of crisis will have clear implications for both the PLA and China’s foreign and security policies. As investigations spread, more officers are likely to get caught up in this campaign. This could trigger internal discontent and mistrust within the PLA or, a sense of paralysis among mid- and high-ranking officers. Morale and cohesion are likely to be hit. Additionally, the rapid turnover at the top will have an impact on the credibility of the PLA internationally.
If corruption is truly as widespread as this campaign suggests, there is also a question with regard to the PLA’s true capabilities and effectiveness. Last year, reports suggested that the PLA Rocket Force leadership was taken down over their misappropriation of funds that were earmarked for the modernization and development of China’s missile arsenal. These reports claimed that missiles had been filled with water instead of fuel and that missile silos had not been properly built. While this remains unconfirmed, if accurate, it could imply that the PLA’s capabilities might be less formidable than officially announced.
Perhaps more immediately relevant for Europe and the United States is the fact that these concerns with endemic corruption and disloyalty in the PLA might reduce Xi Jinping’s trust in his own military. If Xi cannot be sure that the PLA would be able to prevail in the case of a conflict, he is less likely to take on the risks that an operation against Taiwan or in the South China Sea, for example, would entail. In the short run, and at least while this second anti-corruption drive takes place, Beijing’s appetite for conflict might be reduced. The PLA will not stop its current operations in the Indo-Pacific, nor will it stop pressuring Taiwan and other regional actors, but it might behave less recklessly if political leadership is not ready for conflict.
But we should not lose sight of the fact that this second purge of the PLA is happening for a reason. Xi Jinping remains laser-focused on his geopolitical goals, most notably his wish to see China become a global power once more by 2049, and he is working to remove any obstacles to achieving them.
Helena Legarda is INTERNATIONALE POLITIK QUARTERLY’s Indo-Pacific Watch columnist and lead analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin.
