At February’s Munich Security Conference, US Vice President JD Vance spoke to Europeans with rank hostility, while Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi took a far more conciliatory approach. He proposed “mutually beneficial cooperation” with Europe, saying that the continent should have a seat at the table at any peace talks between Ukraine and Russia.
Chinese representatives also met with the Ukrainian delegation in Munich; the readout was positive. By contrast, the Trump II administration has sidelined European nations in its efforts to quickly end the war in Ukraine and publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, while most European leaders have closed ranks around him.
According to one audience member in Munich, China was “saying all the right words.” As former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrelis Landsbergis explained to me in a recent interview, the Chinese delegation was “interested in meeting European leaders, talking about how much it’s interested in stability in Europe, and how it understands the principle of territorial integrity in Ukraine.” The Chinese charm offensive, Landsbergis said, was an effort to “drive a wedge deeper between the European Union and United States.”
A Protective Hedge?
If European Union relations with the US continue to sour—Washington has launched 25 percent tariffs on European aluminum and steel and Trump has threatened 200 percent tariffs on alcoholic beverages—China may become more appealing as a strategic partner. China could offer a protective hedge against a rogue US and an aggressive Russia.
However, this partnership remains a long way off. The EU has voiced concerns about Chinese technology, slapped tariffs on its electric cars, and spoken about "de-risking" its economy vis-à-vis China following the break with Russian energy after Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Many Europeans are wary of partnering with Beijing. According to polling conducted in 11 EU member states in November and December 2024 by the European Council on Foreign Relations and published in February, an average of just 4 percent consider China to be an “ally.” 39 percent see it as a “necessary partner,” whereas 37 percent regard it as a “rival” or an “adversary.”
While more respondents thought of China as a “necessary partner” than any of the other responses, further polling across the EU suggests that views of Beijing remain dim. According to the Eurobarometer survey published in fall 2024, 65 percent of Europeans think of China either “somewhat” or “very” negatively, while 25 percent thought of it as “somewhat” positive and 4 percent were “very” positive.
Intra-European Divisions
While an EU-wide rapprochement would likely be unpalatable, there are divisions within EU populations on China. The ECFR survey revealed a wide range of responses nationally; southern Europeans were generally more positive about China than northern Europeans. 54 percent of Hungarians and 59 percent of Bulgarians thought of China as either an “ally” or a “necessary partner,” whereas 55 percent of Germans and 52 percent of Danes thought of China as a “rival” or an “adversary.” (The Eurobarometer survey also broadly reflected a split between northern and southern Europe.) Even as the Trump II administration continues to sideline Europe, viewing it as practically an adversary, it is doubtful that European attitudes, broadly speaking, toward China will ipso facto improve.
One explanation for the varied responses is that China has been heavily investing in like-minded European countries such as Hungary and Serbia (not an EU member), while Germany and Denmark have moved toward the current EU position of “de-risking” their own economies from China after years of economic interdependence.
China can exploit these divisions. If China were to invade Taiwan, the EU might have a difficult time mounting a unified response in foreign and security policy, given that such decisions require unanimity. (The EU might also face difficulty mounting a response because Trump himself has been opaque about whether he would defend the island.) As is often the case with Russia sanctions, Hungary would be the likeliest to veto collective action on Beijing.
After years of underinvesting in defense and depending on the US nuclear umbrella, European countries are now rapidly increasing debt-financed defense spending and are considering seizing Russian assets to arm Ukraine. According to the ECFR polling, Europeans are split (42 to 43 percent) on whether the bloc can be a great power competing on equal terms with the US and China. However, a full 15 percent are undecided on this question: it's up to European leaders to take decisive action, such as seizing Russian assets, to convince their publics that they are ready to deal with the great powers.
Yet, into this vacuum caused by US retrenchment, China may look like an attractive option to enhance European security. Beijing has leverage over Moscow to deter any aggression. It can produce weapons cheaply for Europe to defend itself. But the lesson of the breakup of Europe’s reliance on the US is that dependent relationships breed complacency and can turn abusive; thus, it would be a mistake for Europe to rush from one dependent relationship with a superpower into another.
Luke Johnson is a freelance reporter living in Berlin, who frequently writes about Ukraine and Eastern Europe.
