On September 14, the most powerful man in Georgia suggested that the country should apologize for Russia's 2008 invasion. At a rally in Gori, which was briefly occupied by the Russians during the five-day war, the honorary chairman of the right-wing populist ruling party Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvilli, said the actions of the “criminals” and “traitors” of the pro-Western opposition party United National Movement, who were in power in the war, “burned our Ossetian sisters and brothers in flames.”
“We will definitely find strength in ourselves to apologize," Ivanishvilli, a reclusive billionaire who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s and has long been accused of loyalties to the Kremlin, went on. While he said the apology would be to the people of the breakaway pro-Russian province of South Ossetia, by extension, this meant Moscow.
A month before pivotal October 26 parliamentary elections, Georgian Dream launched a major advertising campaign on roadsides and public transportation, as well as on social media. It featured black-and-white photographs of destroyed Ukrainian cities juxtaposed with color photographs of intact Georgian cities. "No to war!" read the caption of the black-and-white photos, showing the ballot numbers of the opposition parties. “Choose peace!” read the caption of the color photos, featuring the ballot number of the Georgian Dream. (Other posters show destroyed Ukraine with captions of “No to Nazism! No to violence!” echoing the Kremlin’s language.)
Illiberals on the Rise
It may sound strange that the leaders of a country that was invaded—and remains partly occupied—by Russia are touting peace with it. But the rhetoric coming from Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream is part of a growing trend of illiberal figures in Western countries who say it’s preferable to make peace with Russia than to fight it. On September 25, Balázs Orbán, a top (unrelated) advisor to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, cited his country’s 1956 anti-Soviet uprising and said: “We wouldn’t have done what [Ukrainian] President [Volodymyr] Zelensky did two and a half years ago, because it was irresponsible.” Orbán added that he wouldn't have advised Zelensky to defend his country and that “we have to be careful with very precious Hungarian lives.” On September 25, US presidential candidate Donald Trump claimed that Ukraine could have given up “a little bit” of its territory to avoid the 2022 full-scale invasion. The “worst deal,” Trump added, would have been preferable to the war.
With Georgia's October 26 election cast as a referendum on whether the country in the Caucasus, which, like Ukraine, borders Russia and the Black Sea, will tilt in a pro-Moscow or pro-Western direction, this appeasement rhetoric will face its starkest electoral test to date. Georgia, its 2008 war with Russia in the living memory of its voters, offers a window into how this sort of rhetoric plays in a polarized electorate.
Working with the “Fear of War”
Alexander Kevkhishvili, a senior analyst with Transparency International, told IPQ that Georgian Dream conducts focus groups on messaging, and that the party has found that the “fear of war is something that works with Georgians.” He added that Georgians, not only went through the trauma of the 2008 war, but also that of the civil war from 1991-93, in which Russia intervened in, too. “The government is playing on that trauma, saying we are the only ones that are able to keep you safe,” he said.
Mikheil Benidze, who helped conduct public opinion surveys for the Georgia Information Integrity Program, said that at the outset of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war and “keeping the peace” was the top concern of Georgians. “We know what a Russian invasion means,” he told IPQ, adding that Georgians were watching every development of the early weeks of the Ukraine invasion. Playing on these fears, the government has accused its opponents of wanting to cause Russia to launch a “second front” in Georgia. However, nobody is trying to provoke Russia into war and Moscow “doesn’t have the capacity” to launch a war while it is bogged down in Ukraine, Benidze said. Russian officials have made vague threats about the elections: On October 3, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergey Naryshkin said Georgians would make “the right and accurate choice” in the parliamentary elections despite “Western attempts” to “interfere.”
While provoking fear of war may prompt some people into voting for the Georgian Dream, the apology proposed by Ivanishvilli largely backfired. The South Ossetian leadership did not accept it. “It might have been a big mistake,” Renata Skardziute-Kereselidze, the deputy director of the Georgian Institute of Politics, told IPQ. “It could cost votes among those who were in the war and had family members who participated. They feel betrayed by these statements that they do not understand.” Indeed, family members of relatives who died in the 2008 invasion took to Facebook to express their anger at the apology.
Unpredictable Outcome
The October 26 election—marred by questions over whether it will be free and fair—is less predictable than ever. Four opposition parties are vying against the Georgian Dream, which retains a plurality of support in opinion polling. If the Georgian Dream comes in first as expected, it will have the first chance to form a government. However, it remains unclear whether the Georgian Dream can marshal enough support for a parliamentary majority. If it cannot form a government, then the opposition parties will get their turn to do so. Their leaders have signed a document known as the Georgian Charter saying that they will unite to form a technocratic government and pursue reforms to try to jumpstart European Union accession negotiations.
Especially since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the ruling party has adopted a conciliatory attitude in its relations with Moscow; Georgia has declined to take part in Western sanctions against Russia and its relations with Ukraine have cratered. In addition, an estimated 100,000 Russians came to the capital Tbilisi—a city with a population of just over 1 million—after the 2022 full-scale invasion; graffiti telling Russians to “go home” is everywhere.
“On February 24, 2022, [Georgia] had to choose a side,” said Gigi Gigiadze, a former Georgian diplomat who is now a senior researcher at the Economic Policy Research Center in Tbilisi. “The [Georgian Dream] of course, made the only choice which they could make, the pro-Russian choice.”
Joining Europe “With Dignity”
As the Georgian Dream has pursued what it calls a “pragmatic policy” with respect to Russia, relations with the United States, European Union, and NATO have reached a low. Washington has imposed sanctions on Georgian officials for crackdowns on peaceful protesters and political opponents; Voice of America reported that sanctions against the Georgian Dream’s Ivanishvili are being prepared. Relations with the EU are at a nadir after the current government secured membership candidacy in 2023, but then proceeded to enact “foreign agent” legislation targeting civil society and independent media. The EU’s envoy to Georgia said in July that accession talks are “stopped.” NATO, meanwhile, “has not been on the agenda of this government. For the last 12 years, they just killed the issue,” said the former diplomat Gigiadze.
Rather than call out Western governments and European institutions by name, the Georgian Dream has often opted to lump its perceived opponents into an amorphous group called the “global war party.” Despite the stalled accession process due to its “foreign agent” law—which provoked huge public protests—the Georgian Dream claims to be for joining the EU; opinion polls show some 80 percent of Georgians want EU membership. The party uses the EU flag in its political advertisements, calling for joining Europe “with dignity.” The phrasing implies that the Georgian Dream can negotiate for accession from a position of strength; however, given the EU’s frustrations in dealing with democratic backsliding in member state Hungary and elsewhere, the notion that Georgia can be admitted despite its recent authoritarian tendencies strains credulity.
Worsening relations with the West has left the Georgian government largely isolated in its dealings with its much larger neighbor, Russia. Georgia, unlike Turkey—or even Hungary—which have maintained relations with Moscow since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is outside NATO. That means that the Georgian Dream’s “pragmatic policy” toward Moscow comes from a place of weakness. Tengiz Pkhaladze, a researcher with the Brussels-based European Centre for International Political Economy, said the best way to advance relations with Russia would be in concert with Western strategic partners—not alone. “If you are backed by strong friends, then your position is much stronger,” he told IPQ.
The October 26 elections will determine whether the Georgian Dream’s pro-Russian foreign policy gets the endorsement of Georgians. If Trump wins the US presidential election some 10 days later, then this compliant attitude toward Russia will gain its biggest ally yet. Suddenly, Georgia—and other revisionist European states—may not be so alone in genuflecting to Russia.
Luke Johnson is a freelance reporter living in Berlin, who frequently writes about Ukraine and Eastern Europe. This article was written as part of a study trip organized by n-ost and funded by Erste Stiftung.
