The last time the European Union changed shape and size, the reason was Brexit. After much turmoil, the United Kingdom exited in January 2020, leaving 27 EU member states behind.
Now Montenegro (population 630,000) wants to reverse the trend, by becoming the EU’s 28th member by 2028. The Western Balkans enlargement frontrunner has benefited from the fact that Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022 brought a moribund EU enlargement policy back to life, with Kyiv serving the geopolitical argument and Podgorica, Montenegro’s capital, advancing the merit-based logic.
And given that it will be the first newcomer in a long while, Montenegro is playing the role of a pars pro toto candidate. This means that designing Montenegro’s accession treaty will likely set a precedent for the next generation of accession treaties, while testing the readiness of skeptical member states such as France and the Netherlands to accept new members. At the same time, the European Commission has been upscaling its gradual integration offer, to smooth the way of candidate countries into the EU. However, in doing so, it has also introduced new conditionality, while shying away from opening access to the single market.
The Council Decides
The European Commission presented new documents at the beginning of October on how the EU and aspiring members should prepare for integration. The French saying “La Commission propose, le Conseil dispose” still applies, though: It is the European Council, the gathering of EU heads of state and government, that will make the final decisions. Therefore, the release of the “roadmaps” for frontrunner countries—Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine—to pave the way for EU membership is welcome news. But there is no question that member states are slow to address the EU’s internal dysfunctionality.
While the European Commission’s “A stronger Europe through enlargement” document is rather unambitious when it comes to suggesting changes to the Treaty of the EU (TEU), its proposal on “safeguards” in future accession treaties makes up for it. A key institutional proposal involves the suspension of voting rights in the European Council for up to 15 years in case of Article 2 TEU breaches, i.e., the EU’s values, including the rule of law. This post-accession mechanism introduces a much lower threshold to deprive a member state of its veto and other rights. In effect, the “safeguards” introduce a more severe version of Article 7 TEU to newcomers (while in future Article 7 will only apply to current members).
This is symptomatic of the whole process now: It’s not the EU that is changing. Rather, the burden is shifting to those who join. In effect, the acceding countries will have to come to terms with an EU membership that entails fewer rights, more obligations, and potentially less benefits. This is the enlargement zeitgeist in the age of realpolitik.
Montenegro’s Membership Travails
There are clear milestones for Montenegro to conclude its accession talks, pending resolving dispute with Croatia in the coming two months. In closing chapters and negotiating the parameters of its accession treaty, Podgorica thus has a broader responsibility vis-à-vis other frontrunners, even if real EU reform will only happen in the context of reaching an EU of 30 or more members. Being small sometimes helps.
Now, the tension between the geopolitical necessity to enlarge the EU and its structural deficiencies is stark. In an era of political polarization, technological change, and a hostile geopolitical environment, EU member states are cautious both about welcoming new member states and changing the way the EU works.
Today, enlargement is about admitting new political subjects, in a time where the nexus between international and domestic troubles creates angst for the future of politics in Western societies. Indeed, Russia’s war against Ukraine and the changing transatlantic relationship reinforce the need to consolidate and strengthen the European order, as well as to arrive at a more effective European decision-making. In contrast, the debate about what is in effect a second-class membership is leading Europe into a cul-de-sac.
A crucial event will be the French presidential elections next spring. If an extremist candidate wins, this may cause irreparable damage to the EU’s current enlargement push, as a future French president then be unlikely to sign the accession treaty with Podgorica—a prerequisite for eventual ratification.
Germany Leads, Carefully
As the United States and Russia continue their exploratory talks on ending the war in Ukraine, Germany continues to be occupied with questions of European security, not least with supporting Kyiv’s EU integration prospects. To his credit, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has taken a more supportive, political ownership of Podgorica’s accession. And while there is little appetite in the chancellor’s Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group for enlargement in general, the mood increasingly is that tiny Montenegro “will make it” into the EU. In contrast, German ministries such as the foreign office are more concerned with how to advance EU reform. There, Montenegro is seen as a potential catalyst for a long overdue debate on real reform of the EU—which leaves open the prospect of whether any other accession after Montenegro is possible.
As a German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) conference on EU enlargement earlier in November made clear, German politicians overall are more concerned with EU reforms than with Montenegro potentially being subjected to less favorable treatment than previous newcomers, at least for an interim period. Ratification by Germany’s parliament, the Bundestag, thus depends on the post-accession “safeguards,” as the backsliding examples of Hungary under Viktor Orbán and Poland under the rule of the Law and Justice (PiS) party has spooked German lawmakers.
At the same time, even a “small bang” enlargement is becoming unlikely. The European Commission’s roadmaps offer indicators for accession timelines for Albania and Moldova, but not for Ukraine. This means that Chisinau’s and Kyiv’s pathways to EU membership will probably decouple. Then again, Ukraine’s relevance for Europe’s future, identity, and order is much bigger than any roadmap can sketch out.
After all the intense technical debates about EU enlargement this year, 2027 will turn them into political questions: Do European voters support an expanded EU or not? With elections not only in France, but also in Estonia, Finland, Greece, Slovakia, Poland, and Italy, the future of enlargement is now basically a question of national politics across the EU.
Nikola Xaviereff is research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) Center for Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.