Europe’s security debate remains trapped in a circular argument over budgets, platforms, and—most prominently—“drones versus tanks.” Yet Europe’s most decisive military gap lies elsewhere. It is neither armor nor airframes, but something less visible and far more consequential: ground-based deep-strike capabilities.
Deep-strike weapons systems—ground-launched missiles capable of striking high-value targets far behind the front lines—are not just another military asset. They are a strategic enabler—one that will determine whether Europe can deter enemies, defend itself, and decide independently when, where, and how military force is used. Without them, the Europeans are unable to guarantee peace in Ukraine, credibly deter Russia, or claim real autonomy in their own defense. With them, the Europeans could transform the battlefield economy in their favor, just as drones reshaped modern war. In other words, deep strike is the new drones—not in form, but in function: a technology that changes the scale, cost, and psychology of conflicts.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed this gap. Despite heavy losses, Moscow continues to mobilize, reconstitute its forces, and expand missile and drone production. Its arsenal includes mass-produced attack drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and new intermediate-range systems moving into large-scale production. These capabilities allow Russia to strike deep across Europe, while European forces remain largely incapable of threatening Russia’s hinterland.
A Key Capability
Deterrence depends on symmetry. Deterrence fails if Russia can treat its own territory as untouchable. If Moscow knows its command centers, factories, logistics hubs, and missile infrastructure can be struck from the ground by European forces, its calculus changes.
Deep strike therefore is not just another capability. It is the most important strategic enabler Europe lacks. This imbalance has immediate consequences. Deep strike capabilities would enable European NATO forces to put high-value targets inside Russia at risk without flying crewed aircraft into heavily contested airspace. They would also degrade Russia’s ability to sustain the war and give Europeans escalation options below the nuclear threshold. Without credible deep-strike assets, Europeans cannot control how a conflict with Russia develops—they can only respond to Russian choices.
Some argue that European countries should simply buy US Tomahawk missiles. That is a mistake. US missile lines are already stretched by domestic replenishment needs, Indo-Pacific planning, and rising global demand. Even with contracts in hand, European buyers would have to wait years for delivery—time Europe does not have if Russia poses a direct threat within two to five years. Also, while Tomahawk is a proven system, it was designed decades ago, and Russia has adapted its defenses accordingly. At roughly €1-2 million per missile, stockpiles large enough to matter would consume scarce budgets while leaving Europe dependent on US production priorities. And beyond delays and cost, reliance on US systems raises a more fundamental issue of control.
Buying US deep-strike weapons therefore outsources not only hardware, but also production tempo, supply chains, upgrades, and operational expertise. The Europeans remain consumers of security rather than producers—without control over scale, timing, or sustained availability in crisis.
Quick Decisions Needed
But Europe possesses the industrial and technological base to act on its own. The problem is not technology. It is focus. Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all have advanced aerospace and defense industries capable of developing and producing deep-strike systems—and scaling their production quickly. Europe’s automotive sector, now in transition, could be repurposed for missile casings, guidance housings, and modern mass-production techniques. Startups and dual-use firms could contribute to modular design, additive manufacturing, and cost-reducing innovation. The building blocks already exist. What is missing is the decision to act.
To make this effective, the Europeans must move from limited production to sustained scale—fast. That means expanding manufacturing capacity, securing critical components, and standardizing designs so deep-strike systems can be produced in quantity rather than through small, bespoke programs. Europe’s current deep-strike initiatives (ELSA and the British-German Trinity project) signal intent but risk repetition. ELSA, launched in 2024, already faces familiar problems: competing national priorities, duplication, and slow timelines. Trinity, a bilateral effort to develop a 2,000-kilometer range missile, is more concrete but still follows the logic of traditional, expensive procurement. Both approaches are moving too slowly and cost too much. They aim to deliver refined systems in the 2030s—when Europe needs mass-produced deep-strike weapons now.
So, instead of bureaucratic compromise, Europe should choose speed. Ambition must match the threat. Europe should field deep-strike capabilities in months, not decades, and produce them in numbers large enough to matter. The analogy is drones. When drones arrived on the battlefield—cheap, numerous, expendable—they transformed the battlefield economy. Commanders could use them freely, saturate defenses, and impose costs on the enemy. Deep strike can be the same. Not a handful of multi‑million‑euro missiles too precious to risk, but thousands of affordable systems ready to fire. This would change the cost-benefit analysis. Russia would have to defend everywhere, always, against mass salvos. Europe would gain escalation parity and operational freedom.
For speedy delivery, the Europeans should adopt the best model. They should assign lead responsibility to the nation or company best placed to deliver, while others contribute funding, basing, and integration. This model would avoid duplication, accelerate delivery, and ensure interoperability.
For deep strike to work effectively, the Europeans needs to be able to identify Russian missile factories, drone assembly sites, supply depots, and command headquarters quickly and accurately. Achieving this requires the use of satellites and advanced intelligence networks that combine information from many sources. To guide missiles precisely to their targets, it is also crucial to have dependable satellite navigation systems. Precise timing is important. Weapons that rely on pinpoint accuracy must be carefully synchronized. Europe must move quickly to strengthen and expand its secure satellite navigation services and develop alternative ways to provide accurate position and timing information. Without these supporting technologies, deep strike becomes a blunt tool that lacks precision. But with them, it transforms into a European scalpel, capable of striking at the very core of Russia’s military operations with accuracy and confidence.
The Europeans cannot assume that the United States will always provide these weapons systems. Strategic autonomy means being able to act if American priorities shift. Deterrence—and peace—depend on Russia believing Europe can respond on its own.
Partnering with Ukraine
Ukraine is the natural partner for the European deep strike transformation. It has shown extraordinary agility under fire. Ukrainian experience would ensure that new systems were optimized for real battlefield conditions, not theoretical scenarios. Co‑developing a European deep-strike capability with Ukraine would accelerate timelines and strengthen Europe’s role as a sovereign security actor. In other words, by building deep strike together with Ukraine, the Europeans would be able to replace a US strategic enabler with a European one more quickly. This would strengthen NATO, as Europe would become a more capable pillar of Western security, able to act independently when necessary.
The threat is immediate. The vulnerability is clear. The current approaches fall short. Yet Europe’s industrial, technological, and innovative potential is immense. European deep-strike capabilities can be transformative, revitalize Europe’s industrial base, and accelerate technological innovation. By acting now, the Europeans can help bring peace to Ukraine, preserve stability across the continent, and deter Russia for generations. As drones have shown, what matters most in modern warfare is not the elegance of a few systems, but the power of the many.
Nico Lange is founder and director of the Institute for Risk analysis and International Security (IRIS). From 2019 to 2022, he was chief of staff at the German defense ministry.
