“Prudence”: The word is emblazoned in gold letters on the base of the monument to the Italian general and statesman Carlo di Robilant in Turin, Italy. At first glance, the monument looks like a symbol of traditional German and European foreign policy. It is the European dream in which the military leader takes off his helmet, holds it under his arm, and from that point on, switches from the battlefield to diplomacy.
The most common piece of advice given to German foreign policy decision-makers—and one that fits every situation—is that they should be cautious. “Watch out,” “we must be careful,” “we must keep an eye on this,” “we should wait and see,” “we should not hurry,” “first see what the others are doing.” The practical value of diplomatic bureaucracy’s recommendations for action often stands in contrast to its pronounced self-confidence.
But the consequences of a constant wait-and-see foreign policy approach are serious.
A passive Germany lives with the consequences of the actions of others. Syria, Libya, Yemen, the Red Sea, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Western Balkans, North Africa, Afghanistan, the Sahel—German and European interests were and are impacted everywhere. It is other nations or powers that assert their will because they are able and willing to act.
This affects Germany even more because the United States, the nation that has provided for German and European defense, has been in retreat as a global power for some time. The impending loss of the United States’ interest in maintaining the European and global order represents a fundamental change for Germany. The Americans are doing less, while others are acting and creating new realities. Meanwhile, Germany remains cautious and expresses its “wishes” about how it would like foreign policy developments to be.
No Pushing Back
The German foreign policy of prudence has failed. Europe has been at war for 10 years since Russia’s attacks on Ukraine with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. So far, the Europeans have not pushed Russian President Vladimir Putin back to peace. Moldova and Georgia are under ever-greater pressure from Moscow to move away from Europe again. Central Asia is politically further away than ever before. And Europe has been unable to successfully shape either the Mediterranean or the Black Sea region in its own interests.
With entire regions of the world increasingly closing themselves off, global trade—Germany’s lifeblood for economic growth—has become more difficult for Europe, as other nations are setting new rules that only benefit them and not the Europeans. And while Germany continues to sing the praises of multilateralism, its interests are worked against at the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other global organizations.
Germany, Europe’s largest economic power, is in danger of having to cope with less security and less prosperity in the future in large part, because of its unsuccessful—and prudent—foreign policy.
A Second Look
But a second look at the aforementioned monument to Carlo di Robilant in Turin makes you sit up and take notice. The full inscription advises both prudence and audacity. Maybe the general did not entirely become a diplomat? Does he embody power and negotiation at the same time?
Germany must embrace boldness in its foreign policy, and it can only do that by openly saying that it has interests. For decades, Germany has pretended that it has none. Its foreign policy cultivates a romantic longing for a role as an “honest broker” that does not pursue any supposedly “base” interests, but always acts in the higher interests of the good, the true, and the beautiful.
However, neither Germany’s allies nor its enemies believe this. Friend and foe alike find it difficult to negotiate with Germany, to explore common ground, and to come to an agreement. Germany continually conceals its own interests. Too often it is only through German obstruction and blockades that they get any indication of what Germany wants. Expressing its foreign policy interests and using its limited resources to realize these interests—what sounds like a matter of course in foreign policy—still seems to be too audacious for Germany.
Articulating Interests
Germany called the Russian invasion of Ukraine a “turning point” (“Zeitenwende”)—and it briefly looked as if Germany would finally wake up and recognize reality. But almost three years later, Germany’s response to the “turning point” is not only insufficient but leaves it and Europe in a dangerous place of weakness.
Germany needs a new, bold foreign policy to ensure its security and prosperity.
To achieve this, German foreign policy must be geared toward interests, set priorities, and focus resources on these priorities. This may sound banal, but neither the government’s foreign policy actions since 2022 nor the first National Security Strategy have fulfilled this requirement. Instead, Berlin likes to pretend that bad developments are solely the consequences of adverse external circumstances, that everything is equally important, that setting priorities is impossible, and that major foreign policy solutions are the task of others anyway. There is seldom anything said about Germany’s role or responsibility for what is taking place.
Moving forward, Berlin must finally make German and European security a highest priority. It is the core task of the German government.
At the same time, it is in both German and European interests to enable legal immigration and the granting of asylum on the one hand while blocking illegal and disorderly migration on the other. Germany also has an interest in international rules and the greatest possible degree of reliability when it comes to trade and economic cooperation to enforce its business model as an export economy with few raw materials.
For Germany to be successful in the long term, it must contain China, which is strategically working against the foundations of its prosperity. Strengthening, expanding, and technologically revitalizing the European Union is essential for German and European security and prosperity. And finally, Germany must grow its economy not only to fund the investments in defense that are essential, but to provide its people with a future—and not just a past. Again, this requires boldness.
The Central Task: Security
Security is the central task of German foreign policy. Ukraine is the pivotal country for European security. The choice is whether to allow Russian aggression in Ukraine to continue, granting Russia more political control over Kyiv again as time goes on? Or to allow Ukraine to develop independently with Euro-Atlantic integration? This is a question about the destiny of European security deliberately raised by Putin since his 2014 war.
Germany is a key player with the power to help Ukraine successfully fend off Russia’s war of aggression and establish a lasting security order in Europe. So far, however, the governments of Angela Merkel and Olaf Scholz have stubbornly refused to take on this role.
In 2025, Germany should exert its influence in two ways, both better and faster. First, an immediate increase in the performance of the defense industry and faster delivery of German and European arms production. These are key factors for both Ukraine’s assertiveness and for European defense as well as the credible articulation of deterrence. The creation of a large European financial framework, a combination of European funds and private capital, and a reliable increase in national defense spending can provide the necessary boost.
Second, the Bundeswehr must finally be roused from its lethargy to make its above-average European defense contribution commensurate with a leading power. Fewer staff and more troops, realistic exercises instead of pre-rehearsed PowerPoint presentations, modern personnel concepts, and a modern compulsory service. If necessary, this must finally be implemented with radical restructuring and rigorous personnel changes at the top. The monstrosity of excessive planning and protracted procurement can also finally be overcome if new money is used to set up a capital-funded national armaments agency that does things differently.
Moreover, diplomacy with countries in Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia about Russia and Ukraine will also be more successful if Europe resolutely and successfully enforces security in Ukraine against Russian aggression.
Migration Policy Is Not Working
Migration policy is not working—that is the consensus in a substantial number of European capitals. But a successful migration policy is not possible at the national level. Rather, it must be implemented across the whole Schengen area (which allows for passport-free travel across 29 European countries). Solidarity within the EU about migration, however, is currently at an all-time low. Hopes for effective repatriation agreements also seem unrealistic.
Measured against the importance of the issue in democratic decision-making processes, Germany is making far too little use of foreign policy instruments and resources to assert its interests. The protection of the Schengen area’s external borders and the prevention of smuggling should finally be given greater attention and significantly more resources in terms of foreign policy.
It has been well-known for a long time that most of the war refugees in the EU come (or came) from Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Sudan. The causes of flight are also well-known. In a new effort, zones of protection and security should be created where people can feel physically safe and where humanitarian aid and development are made possible, also by being able to apply European development cooperation resources and instruments in a targeted manner. This makes it possible for people to stay in or near their countries of origin. If this is undertaken a proper immigration system can be implemented, where the receiving country can decide who can and cannot come.
Business Model under Strain
Germany’s business model is simple. With few raw materials and energy sources, it imports those necessary inputs to produce its goods and then exports them all over the world. To maintain and expand its prosperity based on this business model, Germany has an interest in international economic cooperation and trade with reliable rules. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international institutions have been in deep crisis for some time. They have not stopped China and others from using trade as a weapon.
Germany must work more closely with those who abide by the rules and want to develop new rules. To this end, Germany needs the EU to entertain or conclude free trade agreements with as many regions of the world as possible, the development of energy relations, and sources of raw materials that are broadly diversified and reliable, and secure access to markets. Germany will benefit from actively creating as many such links as possible, including with countries in Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia, even without always applying strict criteria for full compliance with the rule of law and democracy.
The China Challenge
In recent years, Germany has come to realize that China’s rise is a challenge and even threatens German’s economic success. For a new German foreign policy, the vague formula of China as a “partner and rival” should finally be thrown overboard. The buzzword politics of “decoupling” or “de-risking” should also be avoided.
Berlin must enforce reciprocity. What China is allowed to do economically and financially in Germany, German companies must also be allowed to do in China. Where this is not the case, Berlin must push for an expansion of opportunities in China or restrict Chinese opportunities in Germany. Investment audits and export controls are among the instruments Berlin must use to achieve this. Germany needs to be much more rigorous in preventing the outflow of security-relevant technologies, taking tougher action against industrial espionage, and counteracting the targeted weakening of the European industrial base by China. There is no mysterious third way. Germany and Europe can only successfully shape their China policy together with the United States.
Shaping Europe
Germany needs Europe and should actively shape Europe to advance German interests. It should not shy away from this supposed egoism if it finally wants to take its claim to be a leading European power seriously. A stronger, economically healthier Germany is in Europe’s interests. Moreover, Germany should strive to finance research, development, and technologies from an EU innovation budget.
A new European strategic capability in future technologies should not override its rules for fair competition. However, the EU must put itself in a position to be able to act competitively on a global scale if, at the same time, others are skewing competition through protectionism or state monopolies.
Germany has been the biggest beneficiary of the NATO and EU enlargements. For its security and prosperity, it is in Germany’s interest to quickly eliminate gray areas by first bringing the countries of the Western Balkans into NATO and then into the EU, as well as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Germany will be better off if this is implemented. Indecision and eternal stalemates are not in Germany’s interest.
An Open Discussion
As in every policy area, not everything can be equally important in foreign policy. Resources are limited. Guidelines with clear priorities on security, migration, new partnerships, containing China, and revitalizing the EU in Germany’s interests can help.
Increased efforts for security against China will also help support Germany’s important relationship with the United States, without allowing it to slide into a personal reaction game with incoming US President-elect Donald Trump. Germany cannot forget that its largest single trading partner is the United States. Demonstrating German strength on the national security and foreign policy front is important for relations with Washington.
Security, prosperity, and migration touch on existential feelings for many people. For all democratic parties in the political center, the chance of future legitimacy depends very much on whether they can successfully tackle these problems, which are perceived as existential. Many people understand that caution alone will not be enough. However, the clarity and focus required to be bold can only be achieved if Germany openly discusses what it wants and what it is prepared to do to achieve it.
Boldness. Audacity. Clarity. Interests. These are not words that most foreign policy leaders around the world would use to describe a post-World War II Germany. Those are words Germany needs to say and act on. The time is now.
Nico Lange is Senior Fellow of the Munich Security Conference's Zeitenwende initiative. In 2019-21 he was chief of staff of the German defense ministry.
