Historic change is always easier to spot in retrospect. In the speech defining his chancellorship, Olaf Scholz on February 27, 2022, spoke of a “Zeitenwende” (historic turn) when describing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine three days after President Vladimir Putin launched it. Yet, Germany’s squabbling coalition parties, and in particular the Free Democrats (FDP) who put party before country and forced an early break-up of the Scholz government last fall, never really rose to the occasion.
The re-election of Donald Trump as US president on November 5, 2024 shows, however, that a revanchist, imperialist Russia is only one part of the picture. A United States that is turning more nationalistic and defining its security and economic priorities in new ways—and to the detriment of Europe—is another.
As Emily Haber, Germany’s outstanding diplomat of her generation and ambassador to the United States during Trump’s first term, tells us in an interview, the outcome of the US presidential election marks the end of America’s “globalization consensus”—"the conviction prevalent in both parties … that globalization brings prosperity for all, that open borders and the free flow of goods, services, and people is beneficial, and that the US investment in alliances is an investment in global security and in America’s global role.”
This, Haber argues, forces Europe to rethink: “We need to have a different discussion about investing in our security and resilience” (see also our IPQ Fall 2024 issue). In a similar vein, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff warns that “no one should be under any illusions about the dimensions of what lies ahead for Germany and Europe” as a consequence of Trump’s return to the White House.
Jan Techau, meanwhile, reminds the Europeans that “the timeless laws of political and military power have not been suspended.” Economic might remains one of the decisive factors when it comes to enabling powerful defense and, if necessary, robust enforcement of one’s own interests. In short, Europe needs to regain its competitiveness in an era in which “the fiscal is strategic.” And Julia Friedlander spots a “silver lining,” arguing that the shifts in the US will force Germany to concentrate more on Europe and “approach Washington from a position of strength” when it comes to trade and economic relations. There is also the possibility of “Trumpism” gaining ground in Europe. Jacob Ross looks at the French case.
It’s impossible to predict how exactly the policies of the Trump II administration will impact the world and particularly Europe. However, as Emily Haber says, that much is clear: the status quo “is history.”
Henning Hoff is Executive Editor of INTERNATIONALE POLITIK QUARTERLY.
