German diplomats seemed well prepared for the US presidential election on November 5, and quite certain about what the next American presidency would mean. A kind of semi-official narrative spread across Berlin, and it went something like this: troubled times lay ahead in international relations, and the relationship with the United States was no exception. America would demand more from all its allies and especially from Germany. In that respect, there wasn’t much difference between the two candidates, Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump. Especially on issues important or problematic for Germany, the candidates broadly agreed.
Both potential presidents would expect more defense spending within NATO, over and above the previously agreed 2 percent of gross domestic product. Both candidates expected Europe to contribute even more to financing and securing Ukraine in its defense against the Russian attack. Both candidates were pursuing a protectionist agenda, and both expected more support for America's efforts to slow down China’s ascendancy.
According to the narrative in Berlin, the web of American demands and expectations didn’t make things easy for Germany. Domestically, there was no consensus on accommodating the Americans. As a result, friction was preprogrammed with any US president, so it made little difference who would be elected. The differences between the two candidates, as diplomats said literally and repeatedly, including in briefing sessions, were to be found “essentially in tone and style.”
So now, German diplomacy is getting a fresh taste of President-elect Donald Trump’s tone and style, and one can only hope that the fine tale of equidistance from both candidates was not collective self-suggestion, but merely diplomatic restraint in line with the traditional neutrality in foreign election campaigns. Or perhaps it was due to the diplomatic idiosyncrasy of seeing a lever for improvement in everything.
Otherwise, equating the candidates would be a category mistake, in which the dimension and impact of this election were systematically played down. The differences that are now taking political effect are evident: Surely, it will be significant for Germany if the president-elect sees alliances as a burden for America while his opponent saw alliances as a force multiplier. It’s likely to become clear very quicky how important it is for Germany that the president-elect sees America’s interest in Ukraine as ending the war as quickly as possible, with little regard for the terms, while Harris believed it was in America’s interest to beat back the aggressor first in order to achieve a lasting and just peace. And it will become clear just as quickly that the ability and willingness of allies to join in the US rivalry with China will be influenced by whether that rivalry is seen from a hegemonic (Trump) or systemic (Harris) perspective.
A Widening Gap Between the US and Europe
In re-electing Donald Trump, the American people have made a pivotal choice that lies outside the traditional spectrum of US politics and will probably have long-term consequences. Sending a man with anti-Western reflexes to the White House twice has never happened before. In terms of foreign policy, it may be that Kamala Harris would have advocated some of the moves Donald Trump will now make. But these are surface phenomena. The goals, definitions of interests, and value systems differ so drastically that the gap between the United States and Europe, including Germany, is likely to widen over time.
No one should be under any illusions about the dimensions of what lies ahead for Germany and Europe. America is likely not only to fall back into nationalism and isolationism, but also to lurch into unpredictability. For Trump, this is a tactic designed to produce quick results. But over the medium term too, his country will become incalculable as a foreign policy player because the persistent polarization could foster a series of swings from liberal-internationalist presidents to illiberal-isolationist ones. This would make the United States an unreliable power and reduce its credibility. There would be little one could count on over the long term. Everything can be reversed immediately or in four years. We can therefore expect all sorts of things, including the opposite. How are allies supposed to plan their foreign policy under such conditions?
It has long been clear that Europe and Germany will have to get by with less America in future, and stand more firmly on their own two feet. However, the question was always whether this process would be harmonious and based on solidarity or disruptive and antagonistic. This difference is not just stylistic; it is fundamental because Europe’s security may depend on it. This is shown, for example, by the Europeans’ attempt to close a deterrence gap vis-à-vis Russia by conventional means and to develop a cruise missile for this purpose. The declaration of intent to build this ground-launched missile was signed by France, Germany, Italy, and Poland at the most recent NATO summit in July. It will be many years before the four countries can deploy this missile. in the meantime, the United States agreed to station its Tomahawk missiles in Germany.
Germany’s Security Dependency
That’s an admirable behavior that only an alliance allows for and produces: the largest partner stands by its allies as long as they are working toward defending themselves better. The Europeans will be hoping that Donald Trump will live up to this solidarity as an ally, but they’re unlikely to be able to count on it for much longer. It remains to be seen whether he will stick to the deployment of cruise missiles. It’s more likely that Trump will weaponize Germany’s (and Europe’s) security dependency. Weakness creates potential for blackmail. Concessions in trade policy, for example, can be easily achieved by pointing to the asymmetry in defense policy. That is the lesson of Trump’s first term in office. And nobody knows that better than Trump himself. His inhibition to create a nexus between unconnected factors has diminished further, regardless of whether Russia’s neo-imperial reach represents a clear and present danger to Europe.
The standard response to this challenge is that Europe must stick together to stand up to the bully in Washington. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock puts it this way, reheating a slogan of her predecessor: The answer to America First must be Europe United. Progress in European integration is generally achieved in crises—that’s the mantra now. Europe, everyone is saying, will stick together because it must.
Integration Forged in Crisis
The last time Europe came together in a crisis that led to closer European integration was Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The Europeans rushed to Ukraine’s aid, spending enormous sums on military and civilian assistance, more than the United States; and they found ways to do this within the European Union system; they developed a new and useful division of labor between NATO and the EU. Now, for the first time, the EU has a defense commissioner—this is European integration forged in crisis.
Nevertheless, one should remember that the EU didn’t achieve this on its own. It was the US administration under President Joe Biden that began convincing the Europeans of the imminent danger six months before the Russian attack. For the United States, it was a role straight out of the textbook of transatlantic relations: America unites Europe and thus the Western alliance. Germany gets to move into America’s slipstream, and in doing so goes from donating 5,000 helmets to becoming the second largest supplier of military equipment to Ukraine. At the same time, the US makes it easier for Poland and the other states on the eastern flank to adopt a more robust stance toward Russia, because they know the US has their backs.
But what will Trump do now? When he takes office, will he too bow to the demands of the situation and turn into a European unifier, like so many US presidents before him? The opposite happened during Trump’s first term. He enjoyed playing the European nations off against each other. He used differences between countries as leverage.
Three Different Camps
While Europe's governments are proclaiming unity in the face of Trump's presidency, the first cracks are in fact already emerging. At least three different camps are forming in Europe: the adapters, the sovereigntists, and the right-wing populists.
The group of adaptors is led by Poland. They are likely to accept Trump’s wish to bilateralize relations with Europe. To that end, President Andrzej Duda has already taken the precautionary step of paying his respects to the future US president at Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s pre-Oval Office power base in Florida. Most of the adaptors live close to the Russian border, and their need to accommodate Trump is a consequence of the Russian threat. The need to maintain the common defense under the NATO treaty is so overwhelming that they want to please, charm, impress, or distract the president-in-waiting.
Incidentally, Germany also belongs to this group. Almost completely dependent on America’s nuclear umbrella for its defense, it is one of the most vulnerable nations in Europe and will therefore want to weigh how vocally it opposes Trump.
The group of sovereigntists is led by France. They don’t just want to strengthen Europe; even the adaptors want to do that. The sovereigntists want to go further. They are striving to distance Europe from America and establish the continent as an independent pole of power in what they see as a multipolar world order. They believe that an unreliable United States can no longer be seen as Europe’s anchor of security.
For now, the group is small. It is likely to grow once Trump is in office and starts taking decisions.
The group of right-wing populists is led by Hungary. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán believes that his time to lead Europe is nearing because Trump’s election will trigger a domino effect in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Although ideologically close, this is unlikely to be a tension-free union. Above all, Orbán is grateful to Trump for pursuing the separation of Europe from America, which the Hungarian prime minister regards as urgently necessary—in this respect at least, he is similar to the sovereigntists.
Demonstrating Unity
If Europe wants to demonstrate unity against Trump’s America, it will need an alliance between the different camps. Despite the different objectives in individual policy areas, this isn’t completely impossible but it may require isolating and buying off individual veto players (such as Orbán).
It would be much more difficult to make Trump a comprehensive offer to reconcile European and US interests. Trump wants a quick peace in Ukraine and he wants to leave Europe largely alone to handle the consequences, such as peacekeeping with troops. The Europeans (including the Ukrainians) will insist on US participation in security guarantees. Trump sees tariffs as a kind of punishment for past misbehavior. According to Trump's controversial logic, Europe is guilty of the offense of having a trade surplus with the United States. Buying American weapons, soybeans or LNG gas could help. Trump feels just as cheated when it comes to defense spending within the NATO alliance. To him, the Europeans are freeloaders; they haven’t paid and have sent Washington the bill. The Germans, at least, will find it difficult to escape this logic. Sharp increases in Germany’s defense contribution, which are necessary in any case, would be a good idea here.
Such a package, proposed jointly by the European Commission and the member states, would amount to a kind of super-accommodation—and would therefore be highly controversial. The sovereigntists and right-wing populists would reject it on principle, while the adaptors would groan under its weight. And even if an agreement were reached, it is almost certain that Trump would soon come up with new demands, for example on dealing with China.
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff is the director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
