The re-election of Donald Trump has significant implications for European security. Given that his first time in office was marked by his skepticism toward NATO, coupled with calls for increased defense spending on the part of European NATO member states (and Canada), his return to the White House has caused heightened nervousness in Europe. Rather than being awestruck by the prospect of how Trump’s second administration might impact the continent’s security, however, European NATO states must act swiftly. They need to acknowledge that they can no longer lean on the United States to disproportionately carry the burden of transatlantic defense provisions—coupled with, and compounded by, the fact that a revisionist Russia is here to stay.
Thus, European NATO states must more intensely scale up the continent’s weapons production capabilities and further foster (deeper) integration among their respective armed forces. Pursuing this two-pronged avenue, Europe could master weaning itself off its overreliance on the US, while investing in its defense requirements that are direly needed considering the upended security landscape in Europe and beyond.
Scaling Up Weapons Production
Considering the expectations that many inside and outside Germany attach to the country’s so-called Zeitenwende, turning itself into a more reliable and active actor on behalf of European security, it makes sense to start by reviewing Berlin’s attitude toward its own as well as Europe’s defense industry.
In the past, state regulations posed significant challenges for German arms companies when it came to adapting to an increased level of demand. The government frequently renegotiates prices for armaments, creating an unstable market environment. Bureaucratic requirements further complicate the establishment and expansion of production and storage capacities. Moreover, the state has proven to be an unreliable partner due to a lack of financial resources, with new production lines only being established in conjunction with long-term purchase guarantees.
Current procurement processes are unnecessarily costly, as orders are typically placed in rather small quantities, leading to higher unit prices compared to bulk orders. However, a concerning lack of ambition and stable funding persists in Germany and beyond. Notably, Russia has significantly ramped up its production capabilities, and is said to now be able to produce the entire stock of the Bundeswehr within just six months.
To overcome the current hurdles and to address the ensuing challenges, the German government put forward a National Security and Defense Industry Strategy in December 2024. In it, among other things, the government examines “to what extent advance orders for the armed forces … for the next 10 years and beyond can be enabled to increase production.” Furthermore, the strategy mentions the consideration of fixed purchase quantities as well as advance payments. What also stands out is the government’s support of “strengthening the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the area of security and defense while ensuring the refinancing capability of the bank.”
If implemented, these proposals alone could considerably help Germany to increase its ability to act. Hence, the next German government should commit to the implementation of the suggestions. In addition to the national level, the European dimension of the strategy must not be disregarded either, especially the creation of a “European market for defense goods and services”—a task whose realization has seen little success thus far.
Overcoming German Opposition
To underline the importance of the further development of a European industrial base that truly deserves that label, Andrius Kubilius has been appointed as the EU’s defense commissioner—a position introduced for the first time by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for her second commission, further emphasizing the necessity to move ahead in this policy field. Kubilius’ task is to focus on removing obstacles to European armaments projects and increasing investments in the sector. His primary objective is to establish a European Defense Union, potentially involving the incurrence of common debt—a proposal facing significant opposition, particularly from Germany.
To advance this agenda, the European Defense Industrial Program, proposed by the European Commission, is supposed to be further developed. It should include the provision of additional funds to help promote joint procurement and create a single market for defense equipment. Accordingly, by 2030, the aim is to have member states jointly purchase at least 40 percent of their respective defense equipment and allocate at least half of their procurement budgets to products manufactured within Europe.
To raise further funds to buttress the proposals put forward by the commission, EU member states must seriously consider how to finance joint procurement initiatives, which in turn could help scale up the production of capabilities that are needed not only for further supporting Ukraine, but equally important, for NATO’s deterrence and defense provisions. One way forward would be the issuance of so-called defense bonds, which would open the door for joint borrowing―meaning the accumulation of debt―to ramp up common defense industry production.
Germany in particular stands out as an opponent to this approach. This is a stance the next government in Berlin should revise, along with Germany’s debt brake regulations, as spending more money on defense provisions might prove to be too difficult to achieve otherwise. Berlin could follow Paris’ example in terms of making concessions for the common and greater good—France has recently abandoned its persistent opposition to allowing EU-funded incentives for Europe’s defense industry to be extended to non-EU companies.
The Goal of Operational Readiness
The other big effort Europeans should undertake is the advancement of integrating forces across EU and NATO member states. Such initiatives are anything but new. Yet, so far at least, the endeavors of different European nations attempting to integrate their forces have rarely been tested in terms of operational readiness, i.e., actual deployments—which clearly should be the level of ambition. Future force integration should be organized in permanent multinational formations, with national brigades serving as foundational units that regularly train and operate jointly. This approach offers substantial benefits, including the gradual harmonization of doctrine and equipment across participating national brigades. Taking such steps would be in line with NATO’s Force Model (NFM), which was introduced in June 2022 in reaction to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The driving rationale behind the NFM is to establish a pool of 300,000 troops to be deployed at short notice, in conjunction with pre-assigning them to regional defense plans, which the transatlantic alliance has been working on for the past three years.
To strengthen and complement this approach, Germany should work toward ensuring that European allies take joint actions to close the strategic capability gaps in European defense that are currently covered by the United States. These include airlift capabilities, reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refueling, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Germany should advocate for a more active use of the Framework Nation Concept (FNC) to acquire these critical capabilities as quickly as possible.
Initially established in 2013 by Germany and later integrated into NATO, the FNC was designed to enable smaller states to collaborate with a larger ones to jointly develop complementary capabilities. This approach is well-suited to offset potential reductions in US contributions to European defense. Given Germany’s role in creating and promoting the FNC, it is logical for the next German government to spearhead efforts to enhance its functionality in line with further integrating national armed forces within NATO Europe.
Reducing Europe’s Overreliance
By pursuing this double-tracked approach—creating the conditions to scale up arms production and integrating Europe’s militaries further and better—Europe could successfully counter its overreliance on the US while confronting an evolving security landscape. Consequently, Europeans could enhance their ability to act in a rapidly changing geopolitical era.
Aylin Matlé is senior research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Center for Defense and Security.
