Jan Jireš has observed the European discussions on defense from the inside while his country has acted as a crucial trendsetter when it comes to supporting Ukraine militarily.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has created a consensus in Europe that it needs to dramatically improve its defense capabilities. Do you agree that Europeans now share a common threat perception, which wasn’t the case before?
Jan Jireš: That’s broadly correct. European nations are much closer now on this than a couple of years ago. Importantly, there is no longer a separate perception of the threat from the East, i.e., from Russia, and the threat or challenge from the South, i.e., in North Africa. When I worked in NATO five, six years ago, it was clear there were two camps of allies. One camp focused on the Russian threat. The other camp focused on the security challenges coming from the South. And it was very challenging for NATO and by extension the European Union to work with these two divergent perspectives. We are now in a completely different situation and that's a good thing. It is very clear that most of the threats that are relevant for European security are interconnected. Our Spanish, Italian, Portuguese colleagues are now completely on the same page because they see that actually it's Russia and Russian mischief in North Africa and the Sahel that is amplifying, if not actually causing in some cases, the security challenges coming from the South.
Another example is China. Six, seven years ago—and I witnessed all those discussions in NATO and the EU—there were more diverging perceptions of the Chinese challenge when it comes to European security than what we have today, fortunately.
Still, aren’t there some differences?
Yes, there are still differences regarding the intensity with which different European nations see this—is it an existential or non-existential threat to their security? And what is the appropriate reaction? So, the threat perception is broadly the same, but the sense of urgency is quite different—also the urgency with which European nations should implement countermeasures. Obviously, there are big differences still, depending on geography, history, and other factors. And a 1990s mental map is not very helpful here. The Baltic countries, Poland, Romania—their positions on Russia are very clear and very straightforward. But then you have Slovakia and Hungary.
What else is holding Europe back when it comes to improving its defenses?
Well, objectively, there are hurdles that you cannot really overcome within two years. This refers to legal frameworks, demographic factors, financial resources, and so on. When it comes to Germany, we can see the same set of hurdles that we ourselves face in the Czech Republic. Again, I'm not able to speak for the Baltic countries or Poland, because to start with their domestic legal frameworks are completely different. So, what Poland or the Baltic countries can implement very easily, we as the Czech Republic cannot implement very easily because our domestic legal system is very similar to the German or Austrian legal system, which means rigid and ossified, and we cannot do the same thing that the Poles would do with a snap of the finger. So, what we see in many European countries is a very rigid and inflexible political and legal system, of course, and this has a very big impact in defense, so that's sort of an objective factor.
We also see a big bottleneck when it comes to improving the capacity of Europe’s defense industry. This is what we knew two, three years ago. And very little has changed, very few measures have been implemented since that time, relatively speaking. Perhaps it’s better to say: A lot has been done, but not nearly enough. And the reason we haven’t really progressed sufficiently when it comes to defense industry capacities is because simply, we haven't been able to find a proper formula that would generate contracts, large contracts and long-term contracts for the defense industry in Germany, in the rest of Europe, in the Czech Republic, because that's the key thing that is needed. Arms manufacturers need contracts. And then there is the European legislative environment. We all know that it is impossible due to both EU and national regulations to build a new ammunitions factory in Europe from scratch. You can extend the existing factories, but you cannot just build a new ammunitions factory on a green field.
What else?
Another problem is that most European countries are unable to generate a sufficient number of people who would serve in the military. Most European countries, Germany and the Czech Republic included, face real difficulties in figuring out how to generate military reserves. The list goes on. And we’ve just seen in regional elections in Eastern Germany that there are strong political forces that are either openly pro-Russian or at least cautious about the continued support of Ukraine and the defense build-up. This, then, tells you something about the political feasibility of this.
Let’s talk specifically about Germany and the question of leadership in Europe. Berlin stands accused of always doing “too little, too late,” while the Czech Republic has played a completely different role, including organizing the purchase of a million artillery shells for Ukraine on world markets earlier this year.
What the media call the Czech Ammunition Initiative is really just a more recent example of our systematic effort that started already before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the early stages of the war, our role was even more important than it is now, setting examples of how to help Ukraine in a very practical way. That was very impactful in the sense that at that time we were the trendsetters in delivering different types and different categories of weapons to Ukraine. We did not hesitate to start supplying heavy weaponry to Ukraine early on; the Czech Republic was the first country delivering tanks to Ukraine. We were the first country delivering helicopters to Ukraine. We were the first country delivering artillery systems to Ukraine. We were able to make the decision and ship them to Ukraine and show to Germany and other Western European countries that this was possible. And we also never put any caveats on our assistance.
And back in 2022, this was absolutely crucial because countries such as Germany at the time were mentally unable to cross what they perceived as red lines. At that time, Germany was offering to send helmets to Ukraine.
To what extent do you think Germany has changed since then?
The mentality of what is permissible when supporting Ukraine militarily has certainly changed, but it is still “too little too late.” And two-and-a-half years into the war, the Czech Republic and other Central European countries cannot play the role of trendsetters anymore. Our military stocks are empty. We have no long-range weapons; only the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany can supply them to Ukraine. Now the “axis of caution” stretching from Berlin to Washington is making decisions on their own. You no longer actually have us as the trendsetters who could make the courageous decision and show you that it was possible. And yes, the countries in question are struggling to make these decisions.
Defense is still a matter mostly for the nation states. However, the EU has just introduced its first defense commissioner. What do you expect from him.
It speaks of the political determination of the new European Commission to focus on defense. And this is something we, of course, support. However, the commission’s powers and responsibilities are pretty limited when it comes to defense. So, I expect a combination of supporting Europe’s defense industry, coordinating, and somehow consolidating all those different strands of the EU's support for the defense industry, and perhaps promoting joint procurement. It’s a new portfolio, and it will be highly dependent on the commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, to actually make some sense of it.
As you say, the EU has only a limited role, NATO will continue to do the heavy lifting when it comes to European defense. Is “strengthening NATO’s European pillar” the right way to go and would it safeguard against a United States potentially disengaging from Europe?
The United States will always be in Europe. The question is: to what extent and how fast would it be able to react? There are some other global hotspots that might be actually in play and requiring US military focus. And then: How quickly would US reinforcements be able to reach Europe? That's why a permanent US military presence in Europe is crucial and will continue to be crucial. I mean, we obviously need US forces in Germany because it will always take some time to bring reinforcements across the Atlantic. So, the US will be there.
The question is what Europeans need to do before US reinforcements come or, if they will need to be deployed elsewhere around the globe, how to make up for those parts of the US military capabilities that will be missing from the European theater. And it’s pretty easy. I mean, of course, everything we have been talking about, in the EU and in NATO, about the “European pillar of NATO” boils down to this: How to incentivize European countries to do more for their own defense? And it’s a simple fact: European nations need to invest more in defense. That’s always the starting point. And second, European nations must figure out how to procure high-end military enablers that are currently owned in NATO only by the Americans—strategic lift, air refueling, deep-strike fires and so on. That is not a satisfactory state of affairs, since the Americans may need to use these high-end enablers somewhere else around the globe, especially in Asia Pacific. So, what we need in Europe is to generate more of the high-end military enablers that we currently don't have here.
And since not all European countries will need to equip themselves with these enablers, what we need to discuss is: What are the mechanisms that make the European nations work together to acquire these high-end enables and capabilities? But the starting point will always be that we need to be spending more money in Europe and thus strengthen NATO.
The interview was conducted by Henning Hoff.
