Before Europe responds to US President Donald Trump, it should be very clear about what it is actually responding to. What Europe now faces from Washington is not the erratic behavior of a short-tempered hothead. Rather, Trump has a coherent worldview, including elements of a foreign policy strategy. This is not something we immediately associate with the apparently mercurial US president. But like it or not, Donald Trump has a well-thought-out approach.
Connoisseurs of international relations theory may debate whether the US president’s actions derive more from classical realism or from neo-realism. Either way, his hostility toward any form of organized international cooperation and his skepticism toward treaty-based alliances both have precedent in the history of political ideas.
For Trump, the only relevant actor in international relations is the nation state, which must have freedom to act and is characterized by an instinct for expansion and self-preservation. The US president appears to believe that the domestic order within nation states is inconsequential for the quality and depth of their relations with each other. He also thinks that the balance of power between large states is all that prevents war in an anarchic world. Small states have no role to play, unless they adopt the subservience of a vassal toward large states.
Neither Friends nor Enemies
Trump knows neither friends nor enemies, he knows only strength and weakness. He thrives in a world of global social Darwinism and believes that moral relativism is the best way to get by in such an environment.
The coherence and consistency of this thinking has only been revealed in outline, in fact only in fragments, during Trump’s first term in office. Yes, there were attacks on “globalists,” an image of European NATO members as “parasites,” and the suggestion that a trusting United States was being ripped off by malicious trading partners. Finally, there was his puzzling sympathy for some of the world’s worst autocrats.
All this led to expectations that Trump’s second term would essentially offer more of the same: Washington would ignore the United Nations and reintroduce tariffs, including for Europeans, who at the same time would have to fork out more in NATO contributions. Ukraine would have to expect less support; and the United States would increasingly turn to face the challenge of China.
Some analysts now claim that Trump’s foreign policy since he took office on January 20 was predictable. The signs were there for Europe to read, they claim. But unfortunately—so goes the argument—traditionalist “Atlanticists” misjudged the danger, choosing hope over strategy.
But all this is just too clever by half. While some phenomena may have been foreseeable, the system-shattering character of Trump’s thoughts and actions was not: his desire to orchestrate epochal change after 80 years of a stable post-war order. In 1996, then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the United States an “indispensable nation”—such was its importance for the maintenance of stability, international law, and global order. Now, almost 30 years later, Trump has transformed the country into a “rogue superpower” (Robert Kagan) which helps itself to what it needs—or thinks it needs—from other states.
An Aggressive Imperialist
During the election campaign, Trump portrayed himself as a peace-loving isolationist. But it turns out that Americans have elected an aggressive imperialist who believes more in the concept of spheres of influence than in territorial integrity of nation states, based on international law. He is now talking about wanting to acquire Greenland, much in the way Russian President Vladimir Putin used to speak about Crimea, before Russia took control of the peninsula and annexed it.
What seemed to be on offer was an American president who wanted a realistic but fair peace for Ukraine. Few people foresaw a president who would engage in “peacewashing” in Ukraine, apparently set on an outright reversal of alliances, not unlike the sudden switch in European alliances which helped bring about the Seven Years War in the 18th century.
This interpretation of Trump’s actions allows us to better understand why his “peace efforts” have come at the expense of Ukraine and Europe. This result is not an unfortunate side effect; it is the point of the entire exercise. The goal is rapprochement with Moscow: This is why the world’s three most important oil-producing states—and they alone—have been negotiating about rare earths and other business opportunities, the uses of the Arctic, including security in that region, not to mention Iran and a future G8. Finally, they were also talking about the obstinate Ukrainians.
Trump’s vision of the world sees it divided into three spheres of influence, dominated by the three superpowers: China, Russia, and the United States. This resembles an idea of former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who in 1942 put forward a vision of “four policemen” taking charge of the world when the war was over. At that time, Britain still counted as one of the policemen. All other states would be disarmed. However, it quickly became clear that the United States, as a democratically governed state, would find it difficult to co-dominate the world with autocracies.
Today, we seem to look at the opposite situation. It is Western democracies that are proving a hindrance to Trump’s attempts to re-order the world. Trump has not said much so far about NATO, the military alliance of these democracies. He no longer needs to, because to Europe and to Berlin the message is loud and clear. What Trump is now increasingly talking about is the European Union: In his account, the EU was founded in order to do damage to the United States. Of course, in reality, it was the United States—thanks to the Marshall Plan, designed to rebuild a ruined Europe—that stood at the cradle of what we now call the European Union.
Switching Sides?
For Europe, Trump’s America is not, as had been expected, simply an ally, even if increasingly disengaged. Instead, the United States seems to have switched sides and now stands in opposition to Europe’s two most important interests. First, Trump is seeking normalization and fraternization with Putin’s Russia, Europe’s most dangerous antagonist. He seems indifferent to Putin’s war of aggression, his war crimes, his guilt. Second, Trump is now undermining the integrity and unity of the European Union itself.
The analysis of such a drastic shift in US policy seems to point to an equally drastic response: If the United States goes its own way, so too must Europe.
Such clarity may feel appropriate at this point in time. But things are more complicated, for at least two reasons. First, in terms of security policy, Europe will be dependent on the United States for years to come. No matter how significant an effort Europeans make, it will be at least a decade before Europe can independently deter a potential attack onto its territory.
Second, it is not clear that Trump will succeed with his radical approach. At least two actors may derail him: the American people and Vladimir Putin. No one knows whether Putin will have the good sense and the statesmanship to dial down his demands and accept compromise, once he realizes he has squeezed out of Trump what he can. Ultimately, Putin is a revisionist and a maximalist, who is seeking to restore the Russian empire.
The People and the Neo-Imperial Turn
And then there is the US electorate, which has been taken by surprise by their government’s neo-imperial turn just as much as America’s Western allies. In its self-image propounded by Hollywood, America is the land of the good guys, always helping the underdog and standing up for freedom. But now, Trump is working to replace the country’s cultural DNA. All that loudmouth patriotism and all that America First nationalism can barely conceal the fact that Trump is taking the country to a dark place, where the gangster is replacing the freedom fighter as national hero. Whether the attempted replacement of a national self-image will work or simply encourage and grow the opposition, is an open question. For Europe, the question is whether it should gravitate away from the United States before the fight for the soul of country has even started?
For these reasons, a speedy European abandonment of the United States would represent a grave risk. Europe’s response must be cooler, shrewder, and more nuanced, despite widespread outrage at Trump’s behavior.
There are signs of hope that a more nuanced strategy can be developed. One such element is the “coalition of the willing,” which initially met in London and Paris, where European NATO members and Canada coalesce to ensure continued support for Ukraine and ultimately to create a nucleus of a strong European pillar within NATO. It seems likely that, this time, Europe will do more than talk about defense, but take action.
The promising element of this new initiative is precisely the fact that it has not been created within existing EU structures. The establishment of an independent “European Defense Initiative” would take far too long. Moreover, the unanimity principle would mean it could be brought to a halt at any time. Using NATO structures also creates the opportunity to cooperate with countries like Canada and the United Kingdom, which have capabilities that the rest of Europe cannot easily develop.
The new grouping should aim to implement NATO’s recently developed regional defense plans to the greatest degree possible—if necessary, without the United States. Even if a US disengagement was to happen swiftly, the active participation of the United States in this process will be preferable. Therefore, Europe must continue to behave cooperatively toward Washington. If America were to withdraw from Europe in a fast and disorderly way, it would be far more difficult for Europe to fill the empty structures that America leaves behind.
Money Alone Will Not Be Enough
All of this will cost a great deal of money. But by itself, money will not be enough. New structures are needed—free of excessive bureaucracy—so that defense and deterrence capabilities can take visible shape as quickly as possible. Germany would do well to become a leading member of this willing group within NATO, assuming political, financial, and military responsibility. This is also true for a possible post-ceasefire European military presence in Ukraine, which would seek to deter Russia from any later resumption of its war.
The main task for political leadership in this “coalition of the willing” will probably lie in convincing citizens of EU member states of the necessity and feasibility of rearmament.
Germany is still a long way from such a state of the public debate. The phrase “I am prepared to risk my life for your freedom,” which forms the core of mutual assistance clauses in the NATO and EU treaties, does not yet sound particularly convincing coming from Germans. Our Eastern European partners are well aware of this ambivalence among the German population, but so too is Vladimir Putin, who has by no means given up on his goal of wrenching Germany out of its transatlantic bonds and away from the structures of European unification.
Another closely-related issue will be the necessary discussion about the nuclear umbrella that the United States has hitherto provided for its European NATO allies. This nuclear umbrella may have been the ultimate reason why Finland and Sweden abandoned their decades-long position of neutrality after Russia’s attack on Ukraine.
If a day comes when the United States’ conventional support can no longer be relied upon, it would almost certainly also mean that it cannot be relied on in terms of the potential use of nuclear weapons, an even more serious scenario. This means that European NATO states, along with Canada, must talk with France and the United Kingdom about whether, and to what extent, their nuclear capabilities can offer future protection to Europe in the form of deterrence against any potential Russian nuclear threat.
What should be clear, however, is that a complete separation from US capabilities is not in Europe’s interest, and that alternatives will not provide sufficient deterrent potential. Europe’s nuclear capability should be viewed as a complement to, rather than a replacement for, the American nuclear umbrella.
The United States would also have a powerful interest in engaging in this discussion: The withdrawal of US nuclear protection could result in the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons within the European NATO territory and Turkey. In this scenario, the proliferation bans associated with the United Nations Non-Proliferation Treaty, already fragile, would become even harder to monitor and enforce.
All of this comes to show that it is not in Europe’s interest to respond to the uncertainties emerging from Washington with a disruptive response of its own. On the contrary, even if there is no return to the traditional transatlantic partnership, both sides of the Atlantic have reasons to work on a new division of responsibilities, possibly on an entirely new basis. The sooner the Europeans can demonstrate success in self-defense, the more likely they are to be taken seriously on the other side of the Atlantic.
It is currently unknowable if it will be possible to maintain or re-establish the security partnership with the United States in the medium term. It is not even certain that the dramatic shift in America’s foreign policy posture will endure in the longer term. At the moment, “hoping for the best, preparing for the worst” seems the only promising strategy.
Political leadership is needed, but at the same time, it must be made clear that defense and deterrence capabilities do not stand in opposition to diplomacy and negotiation. In fact, they are the prerequisites of successful diplomacy. Russia is forcing us to rediscover that war can only be prevented by preparing for it.
Sigmar Gabriel is chairman of Atlantik-Brücke. He has served as Germany’s vice-chancellor and foreign minister, and as leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff is director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
