Once again, Germany finds itself sitting on the sidelines during a major geopolitical crisis, in a region where, just a few years ago, it played an important role as a diplomatic mediator. The German government was informed only shortly before the first bombs fell on Tehran—and not by the United States, but by Israel. This also shows how much Berlin has declined in importance for Washington.
The initial reactions from politicians in Berlin were mostly about trying to be on the “right” side. Chancellor Friedrich Merz, in particular, made some remarkably clear statements. By saying that international law would have “relatively little effect” and that it was problematic to not be “prepared to enforce fundamental interests with military force if necessary,” he effectively gave his full political backing to the war of aggression that had been justified as a “preemptive strike.”
In his argument, the chancellor went even further than the warring parties themselves, stating that Iran was “possibly only weeks away from assembling nuclear weapons systems.” “In this respect, there is a reason for intervention,” Merz said. In doing so, the chancellor not only contradicted his own statement from the summer of 2025 that Iran’s nuclear program was “largely finished,” but also the publicly available assessments by Western intelligence services.
With its positioning, Germany is also occupying a fringe place in the European context. In his justification of the war, the German chancellor went well beyond the joint E3 statements with France and the United Kingdom. Instead of contributing to the consolidation of a common European position in line with its own claim to leadership, Germany once again has found itself at one extreme of the political spectrum, as was already the case in its policy regarding Israel’s war in Gaza.
This questioning of international law, as well as the silence about the attacks on civilian infrastructure such as schools, energy infrastructure, and water desalination plants, raises another key question: What strategic goals can the war, which has been endorsed by the chancellor and many German politicians, actually achieve?
The permanent containment of the dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs would be just as desirable as the replacement of the Islamic Republic—a regime that brutally massacred thousands of Iranians just a few weeks ago—with a democratic system. However, there is little to suggest that either of these goals can be reliably achieved by the military route that has been chosen.
There is no question that combined US-Israeli military power can inflict serious damage on Iran. Its missile arsenal, production facilities, and parts of its nuclear program could be significantly weakened. At the same time, key elements of Iran’s nuclear and weapons activities have been moved to underground facilities precisely to protect them from such attacks and it is unlikely that they can be completely destroyed from the air.
The fall of the Islamic Republic also appears extremely unlikely in this scenario. For that to happen, the regime would have to lose its monopoly on the use of force in the country. This would require either an organized armed opposition or the secession of significant parts of the security apparatus—neither of which is currently apparent. The only plausible outcome of this war at present therefore appears to be a lasting weakening of Iran, possibly leading to the collapse of the state.
The German government’s policy toward Iran is hardly any easier to understand when viewed in a broader political context. The search for political common ground with the Trump administration has clearly played an important role—at a time when the US is moving further and further away from German interests and shared values. The chancellor’s good personal relationship with US President Donald Trump has so far yielded few tangible results for Germany, and there is little to suggest that this will change: Europe still has no place at the table in the Ukraine negotiations, Washington remains far from making a firm commitment to Kyiv, and there are no signs of compromise in the tariff dispute.
Challenges for Germany in the Iran War
The German government’s position is all the more questionable given that Germany will bear a significant share of the many risks, follow-up costs, and far-reaching consequences of a war with Iran.
Germany and Europe’s biggest security challenge at present, the war in Ukraine, is particularly affected. Kyiv could become a collateral victim of the new crisis in several ways. The already scarce air defense ammunition, especially for the American Patriot systems, is likely to be diverted to the Middle East and, at the same time, the US is shifting reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities from Ukraine to the region.
In addition, Washington has already allowed India to continue purchasing sanctioned Russian oil in order to avoid driving up oil prices even further. As the US shifts its attention away from negotiations with Russia and Ukraine, Moscow is gaining additional leeway to continue its war with undiminished intensity and possibly even expand it, supported in part by rising revenues from higher energy prices.
The German government’s questioning of international law has a particularly significant impact when it comes to Ukraine. This is because it not only undermines the normative basis on which Germany relies in its international dealings with Russia in the context of the war—the rejection of the use of military force to change borders—but also the condemnation of the deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the demand for a just peace.
The German government’s position on the Iran war also weakens a central pillar of German foreign policy: International law and international rules are particularly important for middle powers such as Germany because their influence is largely based on the binding force of a rules-based order. If Berlin undermines this order itself, it accelerates the erosion of its own foreign policy influence. In conjunction with Germany's stance on the Gaza war, this further weakens Berlin's credibility and influence, especially in the Arab world and the Global South.
The German economy is already feeling the strain in the first days of the war. Trade routes are being disrupted, and energy and raw material prices are rising. The longer the war lasts, the greater the impact of higher energy prices and disrupted supply chains on the German economy is likely to be, creating new inflationary pressure. Some economists already fear that this could stifle the slight economic upturn.
A continuation or further escalation of the war in Iran could also harm Germany and Europe on numerous other fronts by further undermining regional stability in the Middle East and, particularly in the event of state collapse in Iran, triggering consequences that would be almost impossible to control. This could trigger new migration movements or significantly intensified existing refugee movements. By extending the conflict to the Caucasus, key air traffic corridors and trade routes between Europe and Asia could be disrupted and, through possible confrontations in the Red Sea, for example by the Houthis, shipping traffic could once again be disrupted, putting pressure on supply chains.
Ultimately, an Islamic Republic that survives the US-Israeli attack is likely to become even more radicalized and act even more aggressive both internally and externally. Internally, even more ruthless measures against the country’s own population can be expected, while externally, efforts to build up a capacity that will deter Israel and the US from future attacks is also likely. On the nuclear issue in particular, this could give greater weight to those voices who advocate turning the hitherto implicit threat of nuclear armament into an explicit one, actively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The challenges associated with Iran therefore remain, and threaten to become even greater, as a result of the war.
Interest-based Politics Guided by International Law
The German chancellor has now warned of a “collapse of Iranian statehood or proxy conflicts being fought on Iranian soil.” However, given the strategic and economic costs of this war, it is essential to reflect, to define interests, and to change course, because there is a lot at stake for Germany. Berlin remains a marginal player in the Iran war and has only limited direct influence. This is precisely why it should use the existing starting points for strategic damage control instead of advocating a war of aggression that runs counter to German interests in many respects.
This applies all the more so, given that Germany is by no means alone in having its own key interests in the region. Nearly all the countries in the Middle East share fundamental goals that are also priorities from Germany’s perspective: preventing further escalation, establishing a rapid and durable ceasefire, averting state collapse in Iran, and, not least for migration policy reasons, preventing a humanitarian crisis. It would therefore make sense to focus on intensive cooperation with regional powers such as Turkey and the Gulf states, with parallel offers to strengthen their defense capabilities. Failure to take such a step would also undermine Berlin's current central foreign policy approach of developing alternative strategic partnerships to the US and China. Germany is likely to lose further credibility, particularly in the countries of the Global South, which are the target of this policy.
Such a change of course would have to be implemented in several areas. Germany should first clearly state that the war is contrary to international law and unequivocally highlight the risks associated with it, as Berlin did in the case of the US-led war against Iraq in 2003 and the Russian attack on Ukraine. It should intensively support diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation and achieve a ceasefire, contribute to alleviating the looming humanitarian crisis in Iran, and at the same time further expand its support for Ukraine, particularly in the area of air defense.
Above all, however, Berlin should leave no doubt that international law remains the foundation and guiding principle of its foreign policy actions. Only in this way will it regain credibility in the Middle East and the Global South and be able to exert influence with the instruments at its disposal.
—Translated from the German by Kate Brown
David Jalilvand is an associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.
Stefan Meister leads the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.
