Too often, the course of recent history has caught Europeans unprepared. Russian President Vladmir Putin won't invade Ukraine, will he? He did. The Americans won’t re-elect Donald Trump as, will they? They did. Trump won’t side with Putin, surely? He sure did.
For us Europeans—the “vegetarians in a world full of carnivores” (as Sigmar Gabriel, the former German foreign minister, once put it), especially us Germans—the events of the past few years are more than a sequence of nasty surprises. In terms of security and the international order, we’re living a nightmare.
One could argue that this didn’t need to happen. Much of it was foreseeable. However, this article wants to look to the future rather than the past: What must happen so that we Europeans aren’t taken by surprise again?
The Threat Situation
The acute threat is Russia. Without portraying the West as an enemy, the Kremlin would struggle to justify Putinism and the country’s war economy. The latent threat is the end of the liberal, rules-based world order as the United States, the former guarantor of that order, has itself become an illiberal force under Trump. From a European perspective, these are mutually reinforcing threats because of their ominous interaction.
In his speech at the Munich Security Conference, US Vice President JD Vance made it clear that Washington no longer shares the values and principles of the liberal, rules-based world order. The humiliation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office and Donald Trump’s constant disparagement of the European Union and NATO in particular, as well as his threats against Canada and Greenland, underline this emphatically.
Trump doesn’t care about Europe’s security. But without the US, Europe is too weak. For Putin, the EU member states aren’t a serious military opponent at present. That currently places us Europeans in a window of vulnerability. The Kremlin would be foolish to wait until 2029. Trump is in office now, Europe hasn’t rearmed yet. Now is the moment.
Europe’s problem here isn’t primarily a military one—it’s political. Russia wouldn’t need to launch a major military campaign to destabilize NATO and the EU. It would suffice first to test NATO’s commitment to collective defense by carrying out a limited operation.
Will Trump rush to the aid of a state that he most likely couldn’t find on a map? Maybe—but probably not. At this point, the Europeans shouldn’t just hope for the best again. They should prepare for the worst.
Article 5 of NATO isn’t a law of physics; it’s a political relationship of trust. And Trump has destroyed this trust. So, if NATO's Article 5 were to implode, we Europeans could subsequently also find ourselves divided. To be sure, the bloc has its own mutual assistance clause in the form of Article 42 (7) of the EU Treaty. But it’s by no means certain that such solidarity would be forthcoming in an EU that contains Hungary, Slovakia, and numerous countries that may feel geographically far removed from the action.
In the worst-case scenario, collective transatlantic and European defense would collapse. From that point on it would be easier for Putin to break off further parts of Europe using hybrid and military means.
So, the threat doesn’t consist of Russian tank divisions rolling across to the Atlantic in a third world war. The threat is that the liberal democracies of Europe may not be able to stand up to Putin's (and Trump's!) influence.
That would, in the medium term, end our way of life in a free, pluralistic society—with the rule of law, protection of minorities, freedom of speech, and democracy. That is why we in Europe urgently need to strengthen our position—militarily in terms of capabilities and politically in terms of unity and resolve.
What Russia Wants
At this point, some raise doubts. How can a Russia whose land forces are only making territorial gains in Ukraine at a snail's pace pose a threat to NATO? And anyway, doesn’t the root cause of the Russian war against Ukraine lie in Russia’s security interests, which we ignored for too long?
Putin has repeatedly emphasized that he sees Ukraine as part of Russia and also has further-reaching imperial ambitions regarding Europe and the world order at large. A clever political tactician like Putin will naturally also point to supposedly violated security interests. It gives his actions a veneer of justification. It serves Russia’s agenda if powers that might resist him recognize his “security interests” as legitimate and in the process yield to his imperialist policy.
If Putin were really and exclusively motivated by security concerns, then an openly proclaimed imperial agenda would be counterproductive—after all, with its consequences in the occupied Ukrainian territories, which have been followed with horror around the world, such an agenda has the potential to mobilize much greater resistance. In other words: Why the excesses of violence and the eradication of everything Ukrainian if Russia is supposedly only interested in creating a military buffer zone? Why abduct children and systematically torture, rape, and murder civilians? A country that is merely seeking security does not need to rename the last gravel road in the smallest village from Ukrainian to Russian.
Therefore, since it would harm an actor who is exclusively interested in security if he says and does imperialist things, but would benefit the imperialist if he says he is also pursuing security interests, the only plausible conclusion that remains is that if something bears hallmarks of imperialist policy then it constitutes imperialist policy, even if additional reference to security interests is made.
We could hope for the best here too. Perhaps Putin, who has been waging war in the Russian periphery since taking office in 1999, will spontaneously think better of it and change course. It would, however, be wiser to prepare for the worst here too.
That’s because if we ignore Putin's intentions once again, as we have done for decades, and respond with concessions, pipelines, modernization partnerships, and the hope of change through trade, then we run the risk of giving Russia’s continued successful imperial agenda even more fuel and continuing to fill his war chest with our euros. If, on the other hand, we unexpectedly miscalculate in the opposite direction, then even in the worst case we will only have helped to resolutely stop a war of aggression in Ukraine that was perhaps really only motivated by security interests but is illegal and illegitimate either way.
As the acute threat from Russia is made up of intentions and capabilities, it should be reiterated at this point that Russia's capacities do not have to grow drastically for the “destructive test” of NATO and the EU outlined above. The comparisons of financial sums and purchasing power between the European defense sector and the Russian war economy that are often used in this discussion are misleading. Russia produces ammunition and combat vehicles around the clock in a command economy, while the Russian army—despite exorbitant losses in Ukraine —is growing to 1.5 million soldiers.
We in Europe, on the other hand, continue to spend most of our money as individual states and operate with a fragmented defense sector based on market economics that manufactures boutique weapons systems for two dozen separate bonsai armies. So, it’s by no means the case that Europe is sinking into war hysteria and needlessly squandering money on defense. On the contrary, the current comparison between the €400 billion spent in Europe and the €300 billion spent in Russia is like comparing apples with orange marmalade. Which leads to the task we now face.
The Task
Europe's double-edged task is to keep the United States on board in terms of security policy for as long as possible—particularly regarding the currently indispensable nuclear security guarantees within the framework of nuclear sharing—and at the same time to emancipate itself resolutely to be able to deter and contain Russia on its own if necessary.
Making conventional deterrence credible requires more than just tanks, aircraft, soldiers, and ammunition for longer than just two days. It requires “strategic enablers”—capabilities that are essential to ensure the operational readiness and effectiveness of modern armed forces.
These include real-time reconnaissance and target acquisition from space down to a few meters above the battlefield, secure command and communication systems, refueling capabilities, rapid strategic deployment capabilities, cyber and information capabilities, robust capabilities in space, long-range precision weapons, and a powerful and innovative defense industry capable not only of developing warfighting equipment but also producing it with economies of scale. Without these key capabilities, even troops with modern equipment can neither deter nor defend—they would be rendered blind, dumb, and immobile in the first week. So far, we have relied almost entirely on the US for these capabilities. Europe must now build them itself. Otherwise, we will remain vulnerable—and irrelevant in global politics.
It's an enormous undertaking, which explains the amount of debt that many EU member states are taking on. Moreover, providing these capabilities will take years—years in which we will remain vulnerable.
One deterrent capability that we can develop almost immediately is based on the use of new technologies, in particular artificial intelligence.
There has been much debate in the last two decades about whether and how AI should be used for military purposes. The opportunities lie in the acceleration of processes (faster completion of the “kill chain”) and the elimination of the need for control connections which would render the enemy’s electronic warfare ineffective. The risks lie in the loss of control over the use of military force and the creation of accountability gaps under the laws of war.
Thanks to years of intensive discussion about the opportunities and risks, it has, to put it simply, become easier not to accidentally build killer robots. Europe still has the opportunity to set global standards in the responsible—i.e., militarily effective and complying with the international law of war—use of AI in the military.
Our ageing post-heroic societies will no longer raise armies of millions. Even a possible reactivation of compulsory military service won’t change that. In Russia, on the other hand, quantity will eventually become a quality of its own. If Europe wants to counter this with its own form of mass on the battlefield, then we will simply be forced to rely on unmanned systems and AI-enabled precision.
Anyone who can use strike drones (loitering munitions), each of which costs only a five-figure sum, to threaten hundreds of Russian tanks that are each many times more expensive, can succeed in establishing conventional deterrence.
Building Resilience
Strictly speaking, a third threat should have been mentioned earlier—because the 21st century isn’t only becoming harsher geopolitically, but also with regard to climate change. Liberal democracies must become more resilient both internally and externally. A form of comprehensive defense is therefore needed that strengthens the resilience of society as a whole—both internally and externally. After all, the climate crisis is already here. We’re already living in a phase of climate extremes in Germany. In spring 2024, temperatures were already 3.1 degrees Celsius above the long-term average. The number of hot days has tripled since 1950.
Extreme weather events such as heavy rainfall, droughts, and heatwaves are on the rise.
Against such a backdrop, it would be negligent to think of security in purely military terms. Instead, critical infrastructures, energy and food supplies, disaster prevention, and social cohesion must also be considered and integrated. Ultimately, it doesn't matter why the power gets cut off for three days—whether due to extreme weather or a Russian cyberattack. What matters is that society is able to withstand such crises.
Every ton of CO₂ saved not only reduces the number and intensity of future climate impacts but also weakens those countries that are living off fossil fuel exports and pursuing aggressive ambitions toward us—above all Russia. Buying Russian fossil fuels in the hope of “change through trade” was therefore not only a gigantic geopolitical error in retrospect, but also a huge mistake in terms of decarbonization efforts. A resumption of such dependencies—for example via gas supplies through Nord Stream 2—would not be an act of “sober realpolitik” but the foolish repetition of a historic mistake.
The Good News
To make nasty surprises less likely in the future, it’s important that we don’t close our eyes to possible worst cases but anticipate such possible future scenarios and actively work to avert them. This requires a rethink in many areas, particularly in Germany; and the challenges are undoubtedly great. But there’s also good news.
First, there are far fewer conflicting objectives than is sometimes assumed. For example, it’s wrong to say that we’re now focusing on security—that’s hard realpolitik—and that we therefore no longer have time or money to fuss about with climate change. On the contrary, as stated above: If you think security, you also have to think climate change. And anyone who thinks climate change must also think security. A Europe that consistently decarbonizes its energy supply not only reduces climate impacts, but also cuts interdependencies that can be weaponized, making itself less susceptible to blackmail by fossil autocracies—while simultaneously creating new industrial opportunities.
Second, Europe actually has all the resources to meet the challenge: 450 million well-educated, innovative, and in many cases affluent people as well as the industrial base, the capital, and the technological edge. Not only are we now spending more taxpayers’ money on defense, we’re also paving the way for private and venture capital to enter the defense sector. This means that the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund, as well as private banks and investment funds, are in the process of rethinking the role of dual-use and the interpretation of ESG criteria (Environmental, Social and Governance) in the light of the security situation in Europe.
Third, we won’t be doing anything wrong in terms of transatlantic relations, in fact we’d be doing everything right, by making a greater effort to ensure our own security. Even if at some point a democrat (I refer in this case to political conviction rather than party affiliation) were to move into the White House again, we could be assured of their gratitude. “Sorry, Europe, that we’ve been Trumpling on NATO for the last few years, but thank you for doing what we’ve been asking you to do for decades.” Another positive side-effect of a strengthened Europe could be that the political unity and resolve I called for above will grow as its capabilities expand. In short: Perhaps those who are sure of their ability to exercise solidarity within the framework of Article 42 (7) will be more willing to actually provide it.
Fourth, the “sea change” called out by then German Chancellor Olaf Scholz days after Russian launched its invasion of Ukraine is underway. So far, the so-called Zeitenwende mainly become visible in the enormous amounts of debt involved. But in the engine rooms of politics, business, the armed forces, and the administration, decisions have long since been taken to change tack.
It’s understandable that we Germans are finding some things more difficult, above all rearmament. That’s a good thing. It’s the historical lesson that we had to learn and have learned. But the fact that many Europeans today expect solidarity and active support from us in times of need could help Germany to establish a new mindset. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski put it in a nutshell more than 10 years ago when he said: “Today I fear German power less than German inaction.” A Zeitenwende that is accompanied by constant critical self-reflection and that shows empathy for the people who feel overwhelmed by it is capable of winning majority backing in Germany—for Europe’s sake.
Frank Sauer is Head of Research at the Metis Institute for Strategy and Foresight at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich and co-host of the podcast “Sicherheitshalber” (“For Safety’s/Security’s Sake”).
