We are living in times of historical discontinuities. As the fundamental architecture of the international order changes, so too does German public opinion on European defense and fiscal policy.
Among voters of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and even among backers of the hard left Die Linke party there is significant support for strengthening defense, and doing so as Europeans, a new poll by Forsa conducted for the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) shows.
Starting with the overall goal: 69 percent of Germans are in favor of European countries building a common army to coordinate Europe’s defense, if necessary also without NATO. Only 23 percent of Germans oppose that goal. The result signals a big shift in German public opinion. In March 2015, a similar poll conducted by Forsa had 49 percent of Germans in favor of a European army and 46 percent against it.
Moreover, it is striking that apart from supporters of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the voters of all parties represented in the new German parliament back the idea of a European army. 87 percent of Green, 86 percent of SPD, and 84 percent of CDU/CSU voters are in favor. The upcoming CDU/CSU-SPD government led by Friedrich Merz thus has strong backing to make his promise of creating a “European defense community” a reality.
A European Bomb
Germans’ desire for more European security also extends to nuclear deterrence. According to the poll, 54 percent of Germans are in favor of Berlin beginning talks with Paris and London on the creation of an independent European nuclear deterrent. 37 percent are opposed and 11 percent undecided.
French President Emmanuel Macron has offered to explore the option of strengthening the European dimension of France’s force de frappe with allies including Germany. Ideally, he wants the talks to be concluded by the summer.
Germans’ openness to strengthening nuclear deterrence is all the more surprising, as the country has a highly ambivalent relationship to the bomb. In every single poll conducted between 2000 and 2021, an overwhelming majority of Germans were in favor of removing US nuclear weapons form German territory. As late as 2020, a survey commissioned by the Munich Security Conference found that two-thirds of those surveyed wanted Germany not to rely on nuclear deterrence in the future. But as the 2024 publication “Germany and Atomic Weapons in the 21st Century” has already shown in detail, German public opinion on the need and deterrence effect of nuclear weapons has shifted profoundly with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The new DGAP-Forsa poll confirms this.
Again, support for a nuclear deterrent independent from the United States is widespread. Backers of Germany’s two likely future governing parties—71 percent of CDU/CSU and 68 percent of SPD voters—are strongly in favor. Interestingly, given their historical reluctance and rejection of the civilian use of nuclear energy, even Green voters are in favor (71 percent). However, among supporters of the Die Linke (41 percent) and the AfD (41 percent) only a minority wants Germany to become part of a European nuclear deterrent.
Ready to Spend Big
“What doesn’t cost anything isn’t worth anything” is a widespread German aphorism. And the poll indeed suggests that Germans are ready to put the money where their mouth is.
Seventy-five percent of Germans and backers of all parties represented in the new Bundestag think it is necessary that the EU’s member states increase defense spending. Even 66 percent of Die Linke voters support higher national defense spending. That is all the more striking given the fact that Die Linke’s leadership opposes a loosening of the constitutional debt brake to allow for a defense build-up. AfD voters are the least supportive of higher defense outlays on the member state level, yet still a majority is in favor of it (57 percent).
The key question, however, is how Germans think about European defense funding—not only because some EU member states have limited fiscal space, but also because without European funding, Germany ironically is liable to pay more for Europe’s defense than it would with a pooled instrument. Streamlined procurement and common defense spending that forces Europeans really to set joint priorities is indeed key to achieving the objective of a European NATO that offers more bang for the buck and greater security.
The good news is that Germans seem to understand this. 62 percent of Germans support the plans of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to provide €150 billion, backed by the EU budget, that can be given on to member states as cheap loans to finance defense outlays. 26 percent of those surveyed oppose von der Leyen’s defense package, 12 percent are unsure.
Support among CDU/CSU (88 percent), Green (84 percent), and SPD voters (77 percent) is overwhelming, and even 61percent of Die Linke voters are in favor. It is only within the AfD that von der Leyen’s defense package is backed by a minority (32 percent).
The Next “Hamiltonian Moment”?
Undoubtedly, the current €150 billion plan from the European Commission won’t suffice. Thus, Denmark, Poland, the Baltic countries, Spain, and France are among the EU member states that have argued that, just like during the COVID-19 pandemic, Europeans need to set up another big EU debt-financed fund. This fund should be able to disburse not only loans, but also grants to member states for defense investments. In the longer term, it could build the basis of a European Commission defense budget.
Overall, 47 percent of Germans would be in favor such a “Hamiltonian moment” for European defense. 34 percent of those surveyed are opposed. 19 percent of those surveyed have not yet made up their minds. Merz and the SPD could thus take the lead in moving public opinion on the issue toward a firm majority.
It is also noteworthy that the supporters of all the parties in the Bundestag with the exception of the AfD (24 percent) are in favor of such a big EU debt fund to hand out grants. Green (69 percent), SPD (65 percent), but also CDU/CSU (60 percent), and even Die Linke voters (56 percent) would support such a step.
Finally and crucially, a large EU dedt-financed grants-based defense fund would only need a simple majority in the Bundestag to pass, so the AfD and Die Linke could not block it. Whether Berlin works toward another Hamiltonian moment and tries to strike a grand bargain with other European Union member states is therefore really about whether the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the Greens are ready for such a leap in Europeanintegration. Such a grand bargain could, for instance, be reached by a quid pro quo between an extension of France’s nuclear umbrella in exchange for an EU defense debt fund.
In any case, one thing is clear: The pandemic recovery fund was a one-off—an exceptional measure to respond to an exceptional event. But if security on the European continent is recognized as a truly common good, that has to be provided and partly financed together, and on a permanent basis. Such a step would set Europe on a new course of defense, fiscal, and political integration.
N.B: The DGAP-Forsa poll was conducted between March 14 and 17, 2025.
Joseph de Weck is IPQ’s Paris columnist and senior fellow at the Institut Montaigne.
Shahin Vallée is senior research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations’ (DGAP) Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology.
