We all know the drill. Breakups hurt—and yet they tend to follow a familiar script. First comes the shock: “No way!” Then the anger: “What an idiot!” Eventually, we accept that we no longer have much in common with the person we once shared our life with. We open ourselves up to the idea of a fresh start, maybe even with someone new: “Hey there—who might you be?”
This is what seems to be happening in the US-German relationship. A large share of the German public has already said goodbye to the United States—or at least to the version of it led by a coalition of conservative hardliners and MAGA devotees who either encourage US President Donald Trump, or at the very least don’t stop him, from floating plans to take over Greenland, casually tossing around tariffs, or waging war against Iran.
Never before have German-American relations been viewed so negatively. In the fall of 2025, according to polling for The Berlin Pulse, only 27 percent of Germans saw relations with Washington as positive—hardly surprising, given how little “positive” remains amid all the disagreements. Sixty-two percent no longer trust in US nuclear deterrence and 65 percent believe that Trump has no serious interest in a lasting peace in Ukraine.
And German politics? It’s stuck somewhere between phases one and two of the breakup timeline. Shock and denial alternate with anger and grief. Chancellor Friedrich Merz insists that “nostalgia or dwelling on the past won’t get us anywhere.” And yet, for over a year now, the German chancellor and the US president have been exchanging pleasantries in various constellations. Visible opposition—of the kind that doesn’t happen behind closed doors—remains conspicuously absent.
Strategic Bromance
As unpalatable as it may sound, bromances do, at times, have their place in international politics. The fact that the chancellor has so far managed not to upset Trump is, in its own way, an achievement. The strategy seems to be to keep indulging him until there’s progress on a ceasefire in Ukraine—while, in parallel, channeling the billions from a loosened “debt brake” for defense expenditure into reducing Germany’s security dependence on the US.
But the price is high. In return for their strategic friendliness toward Trump, Germany and Europe are getting exactly what they currently need least: tariffs. What’s more, they also change from one day to the next. Business leaders in Germany are, unsurprisingly, livid.
To make matters worse, Germany is now also feeling the economic fallout of the war against Iran, which is snuffing out the fragile shoots of economic recovery before they even have a chance to grow. A war, incidentally, that a majority doesn’t even support: 58 percent of Germans oppose it, according to the ARD Deutschlandtrend. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, however, does not. Or does he?
Turning to Europe
In an attempt to counter the current malaise, Merz has announced plans to repair relations with European partners. “Europe is the most important guarantee for the future.” That strikes a chord with Germans, who consistently express a desire for more European cooperation in The Berlin Pulse survey.
But it’s also true that calls for “more Europe,” whether from politicians or the public, tend to grow louder precisely when things aren’t working elsewhere. That’s not exactly how you pull off a genuine fresh start—if we return to the breakup metaphor.
The appeal to Europe is understandable, but it’s also simplistic and vague. With internal divisions and rising populism, it’s unclear how Europe will be able to avoid being squeezed between Russia, China, and the United States. Germany’s answer, for the most part, is rearmament. Seventy-two percent of Germans supportspending 5 percent of GDP on defense, and 56 percent even support deploying peacekeeping troops in Ukraine. When it comes to their own security—and, by extension, Ukraine’s—Germans seem ready to take matters into their own hands.
But here’s the catch: Only 38 percent of Germans want Germany to assume a military leadership role in Europe. There it is again—the lingering spirit of Germany as a purely “civilian power.” But sentiment seems to be changing on this question, too. This being the flipside of the German divorce with America, it’s something the Germans need to figure out by themselves.
Jonathan Lehrer is an editor at The Berlin Pulse, published by Körber-Stiftung.
