Outlining the key points of German foreign policy a couple of years in advance is like gazing into the famous crystal ball. Too many supposed certainties have been shaken, and too many uncertainties about future developments make any forecast a risky gamble.
Only a few years ago, the direction seemed much clearer. Our foreign policy cornerstones appeared unshakable: Germany as champion of the rules-based international order. NATO as the guarantor of our security, the West as the democratic center of gravity. Ever-closer European cooperation as a guarantee of prosperity, democracy, and stability on our continent. Germany’s special responsibility toward Israel (its security a German “reason of state”) as a bipartisan consensus. Economic globalization and free trade as engines of growth for German industry. Deepened economic exchange and political dialogue with Russia and China would secure peace and promote the convergence of systems.
Although Russia’s covert intervention in the Donbas and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 marred the picture, they were largely viewed as regional events and temporary disruptions. Warning voices were dismissed as Cold War hysteria. No weapons for Ukraine; de-escalation through negotiations. A policy of détente was the order of the day.
A Fundamental Reorientation
Today, the cornerstones of German foreign policy have all been shaken to their foundations. Long-held convictions have turned out to be mistaken or have been swept aside by the events of recent years. German foreign and security policy must undergo a fundamental reorientation. Two events in particular have dealt a crushing blow: Russia’s colonial war against Ukraine and Donald Trump’s re-election as US president. That a Russian military attack on Europe has entered the realm of possibility, while the United States is calling its mutual defense guarantee into question and is turning against liberal-democratic Europe, was a nightmare scenario for Germany that has now come true.
At the same time, other supposed constants are also beginning to crumble. National-populist parties are on the rise in European Union member states. Centrifugal forces are increasing, and the EU’s ability to act is being called into question. When it comes to Israel, there is no longer any common ground. Since October 7, 2023 and the ensuing war in Gaza, anti-Israel sentiment has been growing in Germany, too. International law lies in ruins—partly because the United Nations Security Council, as its guardian, has failed. Anyone who wants to have a say in international politics and influence the course of events must be strong militarily and economically.
New Guidelines for New Times
Since then Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s famous “Zeitenwende” (“historic turn”) speech on February 27, 2022, German politics has been tentatively feeling its way forward on this new ground. New guidelines are slowly taking shape. They include:
We can no longer rely on the US. Germany can no longer sail in America’s slipstream. We must take our security into our own hands—together with our European partners.
Like other European nations, we, too, must drastically increase our defense spending. We must become “war-ready”—not to wage war, but to prevent it through credible deterrence. And not alone, but through increased pooling of European forces, including in the defense sector.
If the nuclear umbrella provided by the US is in question, Germany can no longer avoid the issue of a European nuclear deterrent. This applies to the entire spectrum of capabilities—from tactical to strategic—maintained by Russia. The deployment of some French nuclear weapons in Germany, the use of which remains entirely in French hands, can only be a first step toward a European defense union that also includes a nuclear component. Whether it is situated within or outside NATO, which nations belong to it, and to what extent they transfer their national sovereignty to joint decision-making mechanisms must be determined through a political process that must be initiated now.
It is in our national interest that international relations not be determined entirely by the law of the strongest. But the mere invocation of international law remains powerless if it is not underpinned by real power. Nor does invoking international law spare us from weighing conflicting norms and interests in conflicts with states that trample on international law. Realpolitik operates in gray areas, not in the ivory tower of pure doctrine.
Given the political divergences in Europe, we must increasingly form “coalitions of the willing and capable” within the EU and beyond, for example in supporting Ukraine.
Furthermore, Germany and the EU should seek global alliances with other middle powers that pursue similar interests and values. This becomes all the more urgent if the US continues to drift toward nationalist and authoritarian policies. The goal must be to form a new “global West” that defends human rights, democracy, and international law both internally and externally.
Will the Center Hold?
The constellations and alliances within which future German foreign policy will operate, how dangerous the situation will become, and what price we will have to pay to defend our freedom depend crucially on factors over which we have very limited influence: Will the democratic center be able to hold its ground in key European countries such as France and Poland, or will the EU be paralyzed by growing political polarization? Which path will the US take? Which forces will prevail in Russia after President Vladimir Putin? Will the mullah regime in Iran collapse, or will it succeed in acquiring the atomic bomb after all? Will China attack Taiwan and seek confrontation with a divided West? Will climate change destabilize entire regions?
Whatever happens, we must prepare for turbulent times. A clear moral compass, the ability to act, economic and military strength, and social resilience are crucial prerequisites for upholding liberal democracy in a turbulent, conflict-prone world. A forward-looking foreign policy begins with putting our own house in order.
Ralf Fücks is managing director of Zentrum Liberale Moderne (LibMod) in Berlin.
