Back in May 2000, The Economist labelled Africa the “hopeless continent,” reflecting a widespread sentiment in the West, not least in Europe. Ironically, just five months later, China hosted the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), quietly building on its existing ties to lay the groundwork for what would become a strong and transformative economic and political presence. Beijing went on to eventually reshape not only large parts of the African continent, but also much of the so-called Global South.
Once a continent of “perpetual crisis” in European eyes, Africa became a continent of opportunity for China. Likewise, for many years, China’s exponential growth in influence in many other regions across the world was often downplayed as either politically insignificant or economically unsustainable. The European Union, for its part, failed to anticipate the scale of China’s achievements in these regions—either because it was distracted by more pressing domestic issues while prioritizing economic gains, or simply because it put blind faith in the attractiveness of its economic and governance model.
China’s Ever-Expanding Footprint
Beijing’s expanding global footprint has far-reaching implications for the European Union. China has secured a dominant position in the acquisition of critical raw materials, which it can weaponize at its own discretion with severe consequences for the EU’s industrial base and growth. Beijing is now the top trading partner for more than 120 countries, surpassing the EU in places where it once used to enjoy a position of strength. In Latin America, China is now the region’s second-biggest trading partner after the United States, while in Africa it is projected to outrank the EU by 2030.
As the world’s top exporter and shipbuilder, as well as a leader in strategic and emerging technologies, China also maintains a dominant position in global supply chains with the possibility to disrupt, withhold, and choke them. By cutting off supplies, China can inflict huge damage to the EU’s ability to advance its green agenda and technological innovation, leaving it vulnerable to economic and political pressures from Beijing.
In addition, China has ramped up its exports to BRICS+ and ASEAN countries, transitioning from merely being a low-value-added industrial supplier to providing high tech and green energy products across the Global South. With China’s expanding industrial “overcapacity,” its companies are in a position to continue offering products below market prices, which can ultimately drive European competitors out of these markets and re-affirm China’s centrality, rather than the West’s, in global trade.
However, it is not just about trade, though for some countries of the Global South that alone is enough to make China an indispensable partner. With more influence and control over trade routes, ports, supply chains, and emerging technologies, China has changed the rules of the game in ways the EU can no longer ignore. By being more than an economic actor in various regions, Beijing is looking to forge new security and military partnerships, building coalitions for a multipolar world order on its own terms, and waging a “battle of narratives” to win the hearts and minds of people increasingly disillusioned with the West.
All this has allowed China to promote its own economic development while simultaneously gaining international political clout and soft power projection: from deepening influence in the UN to brokering talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, from making inroads into new defense markets to facilitating the expansion of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
With Washington retreating from key international fora and scaling back development aid, Beijing is poised to fill the vacuum and exert greater influence over traditionally Western-led institutions, where it can shape policy discussions on key issues (e.g., trade, technology, artificial intelligence, environment, etc.) with the intention of establishing a “Chinese-led bloc” ready to challenge Western dominance.
China on Their Minds
What’s more, Beijing’s push for a multipolar world is finding fertile ground in nations whose views are either increasingly hostile to the West or simply dissatisfied with its leadership. Against this backdrop, the EU’s narrative has struggled to gain traction. The scars of Western colonialism remain fresh for many, and China has been able to craft a compelling counter-narrative. The EU, in stark contrast, is seen as still displaying paternalistic behaviors; even when multilateralism is suggested, many countries do not reject the concept per se, but rather the version of multilateralism they have experienced.
The EU’s rigid, binary view of the world has done little to strengthen its global standing and has framed global engagement with many of the countries of the Global South within very narrow parameters, often set by former colonial powers. National agendas have frequently overshadowed collective EU efforts.
In an attempt to improve relationships, Brussels has gradually started to re-frame its engagement with these countries, yet with China always in the back of the EU’s mind. This has reinforced a long-standing view in many countries of the Global South that Brussels’ engagement is reactive, driven by competition with China rather than by a sincere commitment to these nations’ development.
Beijing’s push came at a crucial time, when countries of the Global South were looking for new relationships to hedge against rising geopolitical tensions. Yet, it was not just about good timing.
China’s presence offers them choices and greater strategic flexibility. By expanding ties with Beijing (or any other investor), countries enhance their agency with more options to choose from, playing one camp off against the other. Alignment is not absolute. For many, the appeal of multipolarity is less about embracing China and more about resisting dominance, whether the West’s or China’s. In a world increasingly transactional, non-alignment is a more attractive and practical choice to safeguard national interests and maintain autonomy.
Becoming a Balancing Partner
There is truth in saying that the EU is losing ground in many areas, or is playing catch-up, vis-à-vis China. However, no actor’s future is set in stone, let alone the future of the EU’s engagement with different parts of the world.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a more proactive stance, the EU cannot afford to sit back and hope for Beijing to stumble. Especially with tensions between the US and China likely to intensify, the EU has a unique opportunity to position itself as the balancing partner that many capitals from Brasilia, Pretoria, to Dhaka and Kuala Lumpur would like to see.
Recently, the EU has taken a more assertive stance vis-à-vis Beijing, but its aim at responding to a more Sinocentric world requires more than just focusing solely on China; it demands that the EU rethink its engagement with a large and heterogeneous group of countries.
The EU has indeed often overlooked the diversity of these actors and states, and has not invested enough in Brussels’ ability to craft more targeted and effective policies. There are varying levels of engagement that the EU and China enjoy with different countries.
Furthermore, China’s interests and implications for the EU tend to vary across regions, from Southeast Asia to the EU’s immediate neighborhood. On certain issues, countering China is neither feasible nor in the EU’s best interest. On key global challenges, such as fighting climate change, the EU may find that cooperation with Beijing is not just an option, but a necessity. Nevertheless, China’s expanding influence is undermining the EU’s capacity to build consensus around international issues, from climate change and arms control regime to digital governance and global standards.
Several indicators suggest that the EU is gradually losing importance on the global stage, while others gain ground. With growing challenges at home and a preference for short-term thinking, European leaders might be failing to see the bigger picture and addressing the effects but not the root causes of China’s growing influence worldwide. To stay relevant, Brussels should articulate a vision that speaks to the aspirations of its partners, backed by concrete commitments; its relevance in international fora and in these regions will not be determined by rhetoric alone.
Ivano di Carlo is a senior policy analyst in the Europe and the World program at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels.
