When faced with the second Trump presidency, Europe may be experiencing all five stages of grief at the same time: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Where Europe’s defense and deterrence are concerned, the stakes of coming to terms with the new US administration could not be higher. Europe faces war in Ukraine and the Russian threat will not simply go away, even with a temporary “peace.” Europe’s whole security architecture has been founded on cardinal, sacred truths for many decades: The United States provides Europe’s nuclear and conventional defense and in exchange Europe keeps its markets open to America, buys US military equipment, and joins the US on expeditionary operations.
This long-standing transatlantic bargain appears to be in question today. The imposition of “Trump Tariffs” on Europe has opened up a potential trade war between the world’s historically biggest supporters of free trade. And on defense and deterrence, the questions posed by President Donald Trump in his first term have re-surfaced. These include demands that Europe spend more on defense and that the old continent take on more responsibility for conventional defense. So far, so good. Most observers agree that Trump is absolutely right on both of these accounts, although many would question whether Europeans will ever get to 5 percent of GDP on defense spending.
However, what really concerns Europeans is the possibility that the US might suddenly drastically downsize its military presence on the continent before Europeans have the time to bulk up their own forces. What is more, without reassurances that the US will honor NATO’s sacrosanct Article 5, it seems as though Europeans need to think about nuclear deterrence too. Hence, the recent steps to initiate a discussion on nuclear deterrence by France. In London in early March, leaders spoke of the need for a continued “strong backstop” from Washington for European security: The fear is that Europeans will be left to fend for themselves at a time when Russia is seeking to destabilize Europe.
Three Schools of Thought on Trump
As far as Europe’s defense and deterrence are concerned, there are at least three main schools of thought on the US approach to European security.
The first view is that President Trump is bluffing on pulling America’s security guarantee to Europe. Here it is argued that the US has a manifest interest in European security, and that the social media soundbite threats are nothing more than a rhetorical tactic to force Europeans to up their game on defense. The second view is that Trump is deadly serious about pulling back the US from European security as the pressing issue for America is China—and Europe is just a distraction to this core aim. The third view is that Trump does not really know what he wants to achieve in Europe yet, so chaos has been sown in order to eventually discern the terms of a better bargain for the US in the mess.
This idea of chaos being an end in itself should not be underestimated. In addition to wanting to subjugate Canada as a new US state, President Trump’s persistent calls to seize Greenland has changed the game for Europe’s calculations on how to handle the president. And what if the calls to seize Greenland, the trade tariffs, and questions of the US security guarantee to NATO are all linked as part of a grand transatlantic bargain? What if the offer is made: “We will remove all tariffs, but hand over Greenland.” And if the Europeans say no, what of the follow-up threat: “We will leave NATO unless you hand over Greenland.”
A European Pillar in NATO
These are nightmare scenarios for Europeans to have to contemplate, all at a time when the Trump administration’s negotiations with Russia over Ukraine are being read as a potential way for the US to prize Moscow away from Beijing. Should such a plan be successful, and there are strong doubts that it will, the Europeans would be faced with a critical dilemma. Indeed, under any successful “reverse Kissinger” between the US, Russia, and China, Europe would be faced with a political pact that includes both its main aggressor and its security guarantor.
Quite how (or if) Europe can respond to these geopolitical dilemmas remains to be seen. One response that has gained particular traction in the last few months has been to create a “European pillar” within NATO. Most European states would be comfortable with NATO, and they stress that there is no need to duplicate NATO’s military structures with new frameworks. Some in Europe presume a problem-free ride toward a European pillar, where Europeans build up their conventional forces but America still leads within the alliance. What if the US choose not to lead? What if Washington decides not to leave NATO but to remain in the alliance only to block all initiatives unless President Trump’s demands are met on defense spending, Russia, and even Greenland?
Clearly, several European governments are not waiting for such doomsday scenarios. Germany has recently changed its constitution to enable a €500-billion injection of infrastructure and defense spending under the new coalition, and countries such as Sweden, Greece, Finland, and others have also pledged increased defense spending—in some cases pushing up expenditure to beyond 3 percent of GDP. The media is also a flutter with reports of new military acquisitions in Europe including Norway’s plan to double its howitzer fleet, the Netherlands pledging to purchase tanks and frigates, France seeking to bolster its nuclear-ready air forces, and Germany tripling the number of submarines it will buy and more.
And the European Union is seeking new ways to help finance Europe’s defense. Beyond the “phantom” €650 billion announced under the EU’s recent White Paper, the European Commission has proposed an interesting new €150-billion loan facility for defense and negotiations about a new European Defence Industry Programme could result in further billions for common procurement. On top of this, the European Investment Bank has also steadily stepped up its role in defense to provide further billions for military infrastructure and technology development. Should the EU member states want to avail of it in the coming months, there would be an ample pool of investment in defense available within the EU structures.
In fact, the credible strategy available to European states at present is to double down on building up their conventional defense—this is one major factor that can convince Russia that Europe is serious about its own defense, no matter what happens in the transatlantic relationship. However, one of the critical obstacles facing Europeans at present is how unified they can remain in the current geopolitical climate. With NATO currently in political deadlock and several European governments reluctant to deepen EU defense integration, the risk is that no political center of gravity emerges in Europe to help substitute American leadership.
And there is a quest underway to find a suitable political arrangement to include the willing and able governments from within NATO and the EU. Yet, for all the frustrations with existing frameworks, this is not the time to duplicate efforts or create disunity among EU member states and NATO allies. So, in reality, Europe is faced with the challenge of having to rearm while also remaining united. The good news is that Europeans have it well within their power to achieve both—that is, if they truly want to.
Daniel Fiott is professor at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and a non-resident fellow with Real Instituto Elcano.
