In one of his last interviews before his death, former German finance minister and doyen of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) Wolfgang Schäuble made a bold proposal: In return for helping Paris finance its nuclear deterrent, also known as force de frappe, Germany should be able to slide under the French nuclear umbrella.
It’s an old idea that never got traction. Roughly 50 years ago, Franz-Josef Strauß, a legendary Bavarian prime minister and conservative figurehead, made a similar proposal. But Bonn hesitated, and Paris wasn’t really interested.
After all, President Charles de Gaulle decided to build the bomb at great cost in the late 1950s not only because he feared the Soviet Union. It was also the ultimate guarantee that Germany would never invade France again. Furthermore, de Gaulle saw it as a means of retaining some great power status at a time when the French republic was in the process of losing its colonies in Asia and Africa. Why share that trump card with Bonn?
Time has passed. In France, few fear a German invasion anymore. And yes, for France the nuclear bomb is still a source of pride and ensures its recognition among nuclear powers.
But given Russia’s neo-imperialism; US President Donald Trump not ruling out the use of military force to conquer European Union territory in Greenland, which is owned by member state Denmark; and France’s empty state coffers, could Paris now be ready to seriously explore options of Europeanizing France’s nuclear force? Two points.
Paris Wants a Dialogue
First, the force de frappe hasn’t been an exclusively French affair for a while. Successive French presidents from François Mitterrand onwards have underlined that France’s vital interests protected by the nuclear deterrent also comprise a European dimension. What this means exactly is unclear. Former President François Hollande said in 2015, “Who could believe an aggression endangering the survival of Europe would have no consequences?” We are in the realm of constructive ambiguity here.
Second, President Emmanuel Macron is willing to kick start a debate to flesh out more concretely what this “European dimension” of France’s force de frappe entails. In a speech in February 2020 at the École de Guerre, France’s military academy, Macron said that he was willing to discuss with other EU member states the role that France’s nuclear deterrent can play in their collective security. Macron repeated that proposal in 2024.
German Chancellors Angela Merkel and Olaf Scholz never responded to Macron’s offer. With Friedrich Merz, who is likely to become Germany’s next chancellor, there is perhaps a new chance. Last year, the former Schäuble confidante argued that Berlin must take up Macron’s proposal of a strategic dialogue on nuclear protection. “A lot needs to be discussed without a pre-conceived result in mind. What is France ready to share? What do they expect from us? And what would the decision-making process look like?” Germany’s likely next chancellor asked.
Time for Questions
Macron’s proposal to enter into a dialogue on the force de frappe should not be seen as an offer to build an independent nuclear deterrent within the framework of the EU, French officials say. Any arrangement, whereby Paris would transfer sovereignty over the use of its own nuclear bombs to an EU institution or some other state is a no go in terms of domestic politics. Instead, Macron is willing to discuss how France itself can offer some kind of extended deterrence guarantee to Europe in the event of US withdrawal.
Even this kind of more limited option raises an avalanche of technical, legal, strategic, and political questions. For instance, would France need to build up its arsenal so Paris could offer a credible deterrence guarantee that reaches beyond the Rhine? France currently has 290 warheads, which is no comparison to America’s 5,550 or Russia’s 6,257.
Or where exactly would France’s updated nuclear doctrine draw its red lines and specify under which circumstances Paris would retaliate and “go nuclear” to defend a European ally? And would Germany be fine with co-financing a French nuclear weapons stock if it only had a limited say over its use when push comes to shove?
These questions are just scratching the surface. French expert circles advise that Paris and other European capitals should engage in a careful step-by-step approach if the force de frappe is supposed to complement and, in a worst-case scenario, replace the US guarantee. But Europeans may simply not have the time for gradualism in security integration anymore. French writer Victor Hugo once said, “Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come.” Now may be the time.
Joseph de Weck is IPQ’s Paris columnist and author of Emmanuel Macron. The revolutionary president.
